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Abstract 
Security Policy Enforcement in Application Environments 
Using Distributed Script-Based Control Structures 
Klaus-Peter Fischer-Hellmann 
Dipl.-Math. 
Business processes involving several partners in different organisations impose deman-
ding requirements on procedures for specification, execution and maintenance. A 
framework referred to as business process management (BPM) has evolved for this pur-
pose over the last ten years. Other approaches, such as service-oriented architecture 
(SOA) or the concept of virtual organisations (VOs), assist in the definition of architec-
tures and procedures for modelling and execution of so-called collaborative business 
processes (CBPs). 
Methods for the specification of business processes play a central role in this context, 
and, several standards have emerged for this purpose. Among these, Web Services 
Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL, usually abbreviated BPEL) has 
evolved to become the de facto standard for business process definition. As such, this 
language has been selected as the foundation for the research in this thesis. 
Having a broadly accepted standard would principally allow the specification of 
business processes in a platform-independent manner, including the capability to 
specify them at one location and have them executed at others (possibly spread across 
different organisations). Though technically feasible, this approach has significant 
security implications, particularly on the side that is to execute a process. 
The research project focused upon these security issues arising when business processes 
are specified and executed in a distributed manner. The central goal has been the 
development of methods to cope with the security issues arising when BPEL as a 
standard is deployed in such a way exploiting the significant aspect of a standard to be 
platform-independent 
The research devised novel methods for specifying security policies in such a manner 
that the assessment of compliance with these policies is greatly facilitated such that the 
assessment becomes suited to be performed automatically. An analysis of the security-
relevant semantics of BPEL as a specification language was conducted that resulted in 
the identification of so-called security-relevant semantic patterns. Based on these 
results, methods to specify security policy-implied restrictions in terms of such semantic 
patterns and to assess the compliance of BPEL scripts with these policies have been 
developed. These methods are particularly suited for assessment of remotely defined 
BPEL scripts since they allow for pre-execution enforcement of local security policies 
thereby mitigating or even removing the security implications involved in distributed 
definition and execution of business processes. 
As initially envisaged, these methods are comparatively easy to apply, as they are based 
on technologies customary for practitioners in this field. The viability of the methods 
proposed for automatic compliance assessment has been proven via a prototypic 
implementation of the essential functionality required for proof-of-concept. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Service-oriented computing (SOC) is currently considered to be one of the most 
promising new paradigms for distributed computing (Curbera et ai, 2003; Foster and 
Tuecke, 2005; Papazoglou and Georgakopoulos, 2003). Though comparatively new, a 
significant amount of research has already been dedicated to this field {e.g., Deubler et 
a/., 2004; Papazoglou and van den Heuvel, 2007). Web services, and the composition or 
choreography and orchestration of them, play a central role in current approaches to 
service oriented computing (Berardi et a!., 2003). Service orientation is also expected to 
have an important influence in the field of Grid computing, where the provisioning of 
computing resources within a conceptual huge network of collaborating computers and 
devices can also be fostered by services (so-called Grid services in this context) 
provided by different nodes (Tuecke et al., 2003). 
In service-oriented approaches using Web services, a layered architecture for 
composing new services from existing services or for executing processes based on 
existing services has emerged (Medjahed et al., 2003), as shown in Figure I (adapted 
from ibid, p.56). The communication aspects reside in the bottom layer. Messages 
between Web services and other communication partners are exchanged using 
standardised protocols such as SOAP (Box et al., 2000) and HTTP (Fielding et aL, 
1999). The layer above, the content layer, contains the definition of Web services, 
thereby providing a service-oriented architecture (SOA) in order to allow for service-
oriented computing. Web Services Description Language (WSDL) (Christensen et al., 
2001) is used for the definition of Web services in this layer while Universal 
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Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) (Clement et al., 2004) is intended for 
publication and discovery of Web services provided by an organisation in order to be 
used by others. 
Business Process Layer Vendor-Specific or Standardized Business Process Definition Technology 
Content Layer Web Services, WSDL -> SOA. SOC 
Communication Layer SOAP. HTTP 
Figure 1: Layered Architecture in Business-to-Business Interaction 
While Web services are stateless by their definition, stateful processes reside in the top 
layer of this architecture, defining potentially long running business processes based on 
the invocation of Web services. Business process definition languages (BPDLs) are 
used for the purpose of defining the orchestration and choreography of Web services in 
order to establish a business process. It should be noted that a business process defined 
using one of these languages can itself be considered a Web service from the point of 
view of external communication parties. 
The request for fast adaptation of enhanced services and business processes to changing 
requirements led to a framework denoted as business process management. Methods for 
the specification of business process in the top-most layer of Figure 1 play a central 
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role. For this purpose, a high-level definition language is used abstracting from as many 
aspects as possible covered in the layers below. After an initial period where vendor-
specific definition languages have been used coming with platforms for specification 
and execution of business processes, the need of standardisation to avoid dependency on 
certain platforms (vendor lock-in) has grown leading to a variety of business process 
definition languages (BPDLs) for the specification of enhanced Web services or 
business processes in the top layer of Figure 1. These BPDLs were initiated by different 
standardisation organisations or vendor groups. Of course, having competing standards 
aiming the same purpose detracts from the very function of seeking for standardisation 
in a particular field. Fortunately, one among these standard propositions, namely Web 
Services Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL or BPEL for short) pro-
pagated by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS) backed by many prominent vendors of business application platforms, evolved 
the de facto standard in this field even prior to its official acceptance as an OASIS 
standard in April 2007 (OASIS, 2007). 
Based on methods for platform-independent definition of business processes offered by 
such standardisation, the growing demand for specification of cross-organisational 
business processes was fostered. Collaborative business processes (CBPs) came to the 
centre of interest of some research (e.g., Lippe et al. 2005; Coetzee and Eloff, 2003). 
With CBPs, the specification of the interoperability aspects between different 
organisations are important while the organisation-specific aspects how a functionality 
or a service is provided could remain opaque. However, specifying a CBP at one 
location and distributing the specifications to the partner organisations involved in such 
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a CBP for execution could be another approach. This approach is essentially fostered by 
the use of standardised specification languages for business processes. 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
Since security already is an important issue in distributed applications in general, this 
topic is also of significant importance for CBPs and, in particular, for the application of 
BPDLs. Security of Web services is well studied and several approaches for access 
control to Web services exist {e.g., Abendroth and Jensen, 2003; Dimmock et al., 2004). 
Role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo ei al., 2001; Peng and Chen, 2004) is the 
widely used concept for dealing with security aspects in this field. However, novel 
security aspects not covered in the aforementioned approaches arise from the distributed 
definition and execution of CBPs. The following questions have to be answered in this 
context: 
• Are the semantics of a remotely defined business process compatible with the 
security policy effective at the node where it is to be executed? 
• Which classification, with respect to access control, is required for the Web 
service offered by the remotely defined business process in order to be 
compliant with the security policy in the domain where it will be executed? 
It is anticipated that becoming able to cope with security issues arising from distributed 
definition and execution of business processes using standardised BPDLs such as BPEL 
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(Alves et ai, 2007) will foster the acceptance of cross-organisational development of 
business processes {i.e., specification of BPDL scripts remotely from the site of 
execution). This may allow additional capabilities provided by these standards to be 
deployed in practical applications such as supply chain management. Since the second 
of the above questions is already in the scope of other related work, this research project 
aimed to address the first question. 
To this extent, the research project has been dedicated to fulfilling the following 
objectives: 
1. Analysis of the security-relevant semantics of BPDL-defined business processes, 
in particular in environments where the BPDL scripts specifying a business pro-
cess are being defined remotely from the location of execution. 
2. Based on the results of this analysis, development of a framework for assessing 
compliance of remotely defined business processes with security policies 
effective at the location of their execution. This includes a method for defining 
security policies in terms of security-relevant semantics of BPDLs in order to 
facilitate the assessment process. 
3. Development of methods for compliance assessment preferably based on 
technologies customary in the context of SOA established on Web services and 
business processes. The reason for this objective is to aim at ease of applicability 
for practitioners accustomed to the specification of Web services and business 
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processes. In order to apply the methods proposed in this research project, 
potential users should not be forced to acquire additional skills in addition to 
those already acquainted in the field of application. 
4. Investigation of the methods proposed with respect to their suitability for 
automatic performance of compliance assessment. Being able to perform 
compliance assessment with as little as possible human interference was deemed 
to support acceptance of such methods. 
5. Evaluation of the feasibility of the framework for practical applications by 
implementing parts of it in a research prototype and evaluating this prototype in 
a test bed environment. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
In Chapter 2, the current use of business process definition languages and conceivable 
extensions of its application, in particular in the context of CBPs, are discussed. Using a 
comprehensive example of a distributed business process taken from the context of 
supply chain management, security issues arising in the field of Web services and 
business processes are considered, in particular in situations where definition and 
execution of business processes are distributed across security domain boundaries. 
The state of the art of specifying and enforcing security policies in general, as well as in 
SOA-based applications and in application environments using mobile code, in 
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particular with respect to access control and information flow control, is discussed in 
Chapter 3. In addition, restricting the research on a particular representative of BPDLs, 
namely WS-BPEL, is justified in this section. 
Chapter 4 contains an overview of WS-BPEL as a specification language and presents 
the results from an analysis of the security-relevant semantics of WS-BPEL performed 
as part of the research project. To this extent, security policy-induced restrictions for 
Web service invocations have been classified and so-called semantic patterns have been 
derived from this classification. 
In Chapter 5, the results of this analysis are applied to propose a method for the 
specification of security policies that helps to facilitate the process of security policy 
assessment for cross-organisationally defined business processes. In addition, 
approaches to reduce the complexity of security policy specifications and to cope with 
dynamic aspects in pre-execution security policy assessment are discussed. 
Chapter 6 takes a deeper look into the process of assessing the security-relevant 
behaviour by inspecting WS-BPEL scripts in order to determine the compliance to 
security policies and introduces an architecture that allows for separation of the security 
analysis and assessment of WS-BPEL scripts and the displacement of these tasks to 
special nodes in an application environment. 
In Chapter 7, the research prototype specified and implemented during the research 
project as proof of concept will be presented. After introducing the scope of the research 
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prototype, the method of specifying security policy statements introduced in Chapter 5 
in a machine-processible manner wil l be explained. Furthermore, the architecture of the 
prototype, the hierarchy of Java classes and the algorithms used for assessment of 
compliance with security policies and, in particular, for information flow analysis will 
be discussed. The chapter sums up the results of the proof of concept by presenting the 
evaluation of the prototype. 
Chapter 8 considers the wider applicability of the results achieved in this research 
project. In particular, the transfer of the results to the field of Grid computing is 
discussed. The extent to which such transfer is possible is demonstrated, and issues for 
further research instigated by this approach are identified. 
Finally, Chapter 9 contains a summary of and conclusions drawn from the results 
achieved, and discusses limitations and directions for further research based on these 
results. 
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2 CROSS-ORGANISATIONAL D E P L O Y M E N T OF BUSIIVESS 
PROCESSES 
Collaborative business processes (CBPs) as defined, for instance, by Coetzee and Eloff 
(2003) denote business processes that span organisational boundaries in order to support 
business interactions involving cross-organisational workflows. Modelling of such 
CBPs has been discussed, for instance, by Lippe et. al. (2006). The definition of 
workflow views that provide as much information as required to allow for specification 
of CBPs assuring cross-organisational interoperability, but at the same time as less 
information as possible about the internal aspects of a workflow as implemented by a 
particular partner in a CBP is considered essential (Dickson et al., 2004). Approaches to 
provide the required functionality for cross-organisational workflows based on SOA are 
considered particulariy beneficial (Papazoglou and van den Heuvel, 2007). SOC 
established by those approaches facilitates the definition of CBPs. Standardized BPDLs 
play a central role in the definition of CBPs due to their ability to specify business 
processes on top of Web services and their platform-independency (Sayaha and Zhang, 
2005). Though currently the definition of executable business processes across 
organisational boundaries seems not yet to have found much interest in research, using 
standardised BPDLs particularly for this purpose would exploit the capability offered by 
a standard more than is done currently. This consideration will be explained in more 
detail below. 
In an SOC environment, first the situation is considered where the task of defining 
CBPs and related enhanced Web services using a BPDL is distributed between several 
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nodes in different organisations. This state-of-the-art employment of a BPDL, where 
each organisation engaged in a particular CBP defines on its own the respective 
business processes or enhanced Web services executed within their system, is depicted 
in Figure 2. Of course, agreement on the overall task of the CBP has to be achieved 
between the organisafions involved. 
Service Oriented Computing (SOC) 
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Figure 2: Collaborative Business Process Using Locally Defined Subprocesses 
Figure 2 illustrates an exemplary environment for the distributed development and 
execution of a BPDL-defined collaborative business process, with two systems residing 
in two different domains A and B. Each node depicted in Figure 2 is supposed to belong 
to a different organisation, but still is capable of running processes defined in a 
particular BPDL. 
Consider the case where in domain A there is a need for a CBP, for instance, in a supply 
chain application, requiring information I A offered by a Web service W 2 at system 2 in 
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domain B. Because of restrictions imposed by security policies in domain B, Web 
service W2 would not be allowed to be accessed directly from outside domain B, 
because, for instance, it provides further information besides U that must not be leaked 
from domain B. For solving this conflict with security policy restrictions, a conven-
tional approach would be the provision of an enhanced Web service in domain B, say 
Wi at system 2. Wj would access the information required from Web service W2 and 
offer the non-restricted part of the results (i.e., U) to system 1 in domain A across the 
domain boundary. Since a business process defined by a BPDL script offers services to 
its environment, it can itself be considered a Web service. Therefore, in this example 
W| is assumed to be defined by a BPDL script Si. 
2.1 Extended Use of Business Process Definition Languages in GBP Scenarios 
In order to allow for fast development and adaptation to changing requirements of 
business processes, it would be desirable to concentrate the definition of all business 
processes and enhanced Web services at one particular node and distribute the BPDL 
script resulting from this location to other nodes for execution. This would reduce the 
coordination overhead implied by distributed definition of the parts of the CEP in 
different organisations and, therefore, could help to save time and to increase flexibility 
during the specification and implementation of CBPs. 
Since the need for the particular business process in this example arose in domain A, it 
is very probable that also requests for changes to this business process will arise in this 
domain. In order to circumvent the requirement that requests for change arising in 
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domain A must be presented to developers in domain B in order to have them change 
the Web service W], it would be conceivable that W] running on behalf of a business 
process in domain A will be defined by developers in domain A. The defining BPDL 
script S| will subsequently be brought to execution at system 2 in domain B as indicated 
by the arc from the developer workstation at domain A to domain B in Figure 3 
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Figure 3: Cross-Organisational Deployment of Business Processes 
This approach would greatly facilitate the adaptation of W] in domain B to changing re-
quirements originating in domain A. Given both systems are based on a BPDL-enabled 
platform using the same preferably standardised BPDL, this scenario, as depicted in 
Figure 3, would be technically feasible. However, it would induce severe security 
weaknesses in domain B, i f Si would be executed in domain B without particular 
precautions. Prior to running Si, it has to be determined whether the semantics of Wj 
defined by Si comply with security policies effective in domain B. Unless these security 
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issues can be solved, it may prevent this extended use of BPDL scripts from being 
actually applied in a real-world cross-organisational environment. 
2.2 Motivating Example of Cross-Organisational Business Process 
In Figure 4, an example from the area of supply chain management (SCM) is shown 
that will be used to illustrate the security issues arising when remotely defined BPDL 
scripts are being deployed across enterprise domain boundaries. 
Supply Chain Management 
B P D L script-dttfin«d controlling 
bus iness process 
Sub-Supplier 1 
domain C i domain A 
price 
Quotation 
price 
Quotation Offer 
Car Manufacturer Gearbox Manufacturer 
omain C ; 
Sub-Supplier 2 
Figure 4: Collaborative Business Process Example 
The application context of the distnbuted business process depicted in Figure 4 is the 
order processing of a car manufacturer ordering gearboxes or components thereof from 
a gearbox manufacturer who, in tum, orders components for gearboxes from different 
sub-suppliers {two in this example). 
13 
Chapter 2 - Cross-Organisational Deployment of Business Processes 
The business process is set up in a SOC environment where all functions used for the 
application are provided as Web services and the composition of Web services is 
accomplished using BPDL for the definition of the controlling workflow. In such a 
context, BPDL scripts are not required to perform any kind of data manipulation or data 
processing. Since standardised BPDLs usually do not provide any language constructs 
for performing data manipulations, constructs of other languages such as XPath 
(Bergiund et a/., 2006) would have to be imported for these purposes. Since in a service 
oriented application context, all data processing can be kept outside the controlling 
BPDL scripts, it is assumed that the BPDL scripts considered here only make use of 
elements imported from XPath, i f any, in expressions specifying conditions for flow 
control purposes not implying any data manipulation. 
2.2, / Description of Business Process Example 
In this example, a BPDL script is executed in a system of the gearbox manufacturer 
defining a controlling business process denoted by control in Figure 4. An order 
process of the car manufacturer (that may itself be a Web service or a BPDL-defined 
business process) invokes the Web service offered by the control process at the gearbox 
manufacturer providing a list of gearbox components to be ordered by the car manufac-
turer. Before placing an order, the car manufacturer expects a price offer accompanied 
by a commitment with respect to the delivery date. 
The control process invokes a clteckStock Web service for checking the availability of 
the ordered items in stock. For this purpose, the list of items to be ordered is passed to 
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this Web service. After checking the availability in stock, the clteckStock Web service 
returns two lists of items that are to be ordered from sub-supplier I and sub-supplier 2, 
respectively. Together with these lists of items, a transaction ID for the order in 
progress and the credentials required to invoke the respective Web services of the two 
sub-suppliers are returned by checkStock. 
Upon receiving the response of checkStock, the control process invokes the price-
Quotation Web services of the sub-suppliers and provides the respective list of items to 
each of them. In order to get access to these Web services, the credentials returned by 
checkStock are used by the control process. Of course, each Web service of the two 
sub-suppliers requires its own set of credentials. Therefore, the control process has to 
provide the proper instance of credentials to each of them. 
Af^er checking availability of the items on the respective list, each priceQuotation Web 
service returns a list augmented by prices and availability on stock or dates of delivery. 
The control process then invokes a calculateOffer Web service of the gearbox manu-
facturer to prepare an offer for the car manufacturer. For this purpose, the control 
process passes the augmented lists retumed from both sub-suppliers to the calculate-
Offer Web service together with the transaction ID that was retumed to it before by the 
checkStock Web service. 
The calculateOffer Web service uses the transaction ID to identify the proper order 
request of the car manufacturer and to find the information relating to this order in the 
data base of the gearbox manufacturer provided there by the checkStock Web service. 
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For instance, information about items found to be available in stock and potentially 
reserved for this order by the checkStock Web service could be identified by the 
calculateOffer Web service in the course of its processing. Finally, the offer is returned 
to the control process and will be passed to a checkOffer Web service of the car 
manufacturer. This Web service will return an 'OK' or 'Reject' response to the control 
process after having checked whether the offer would be acceptable to the car 
manufacturer. 
The response from the checkOffer Web service is passed to a completeOrder Web 
service by the control process. Depending on the type of response, this Web service 
either completes the order processing within the gearbox manufacturer i f the response 
was 'OK* or discards all intermediate information such as items reserved for this 
transaction FD i f the response was 'Reject'. 
After the completeOrder Web service has terminated its task, it returns a corresponding 
result to the control process that, in turn, provides this result to the order Web service 
of the car manufacturer as a response to its own invocation, thereby completing the 
workflow of this business process. 
For the purpose of this discussion it is supposed that the control process could be 
specified by the car manufacturer as a BPDL script and sent to the gearbox manu-
facturer for execution within his domain. Reasons for doing so could be the ability to 
better adapt the order processing with respect to the communication requirements 
between the car manufacturer and the gearbox manufacturer, and to react faster to 
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changing requests concerning the workflow on the side of the car manufacturer, thereby 
providing more flexibility for definition of the collaborative business process to the car 
manufacturer. However, unless the security issues related with this approach (as 
discussed in the next section) could be solved satisfactorily, the gearbox manufacturer 
would not accept this remotely defined BPDL script for execution. 
2,2,2 Security Policy-Induced Restrictions in Cross-Organisational Business Process 
Execution 
When the controlling BPDL script is brought in from the car manufacturer for execution 
in the domain of the gearbox manufacturer, the processing performed by the controlling 
business process wi l l be subject to several restrictions derived from security policies of 
the gearbox manufacturer. 
The security policies of the gearbox manufacturer may mandate that the list of items 
that are not in stock and, therefore, have to be ordered from the sub-suppliers may not 
be disclosed to the car manufacturer and the respective competing sub-supplier for 
strategic reasons. The same will obviously hold for the credentials required for granting 
access to the priceQuotation Web services of the sub-suppliers. This information may 
only be passed to the respective sub-supplier, but neither to the competing sub-supplier 
nor to the car manufacturer for obvious security reasons. 
Other restrictions in the example of Figure 4 may require that the list containing prices 
and delivery dates for the items to be ordered returned by each of the sub-suppliers has 
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to be passed unmodified to the calculateOffer Web service while the respective source 
of the lists may not be conftised in order to allow for proper calculation of an offer to 
the car manufacturer. Finally, this information may also not be disclosed to the car 
manufacturer or the competing sub-supplier Furthermore, it may be required that the 
offer containing prices and delivery dates returned from the calculateOffer Web service 
is passed to the checkOffer Web service of the car manufacturer without any modi-
fication in order to prevent manipulation of this offer, for instance, by changing the 
committed delivery date or the prices. 
A further type of possible restrictions implied by security policies of the gearbox 
manufacturer may require that particular input parameters of a Web service may not be 
used, or only be used with a restricted range of allowed values when invoked in a BPDL 
script imported from the car manufacturer. An example of such restrictions could be the 
calculateOffer Web service that could have a fijrther input parameter for controlling the 
type of rebate to be taken into account in calculating the offer. When invoked by the 
control process defined by the car manufacturer, this parameter may be forbidden to be 
used at all of may be restricted to one or a few values. Without such a restriction, the car 
manufacturer could define in the control process any amount of rebate the calculate-
Offer Web service is able to provide, even though the gearbox manufacturer usually 
would only allow a specific amount of discount to this car manufacturer. 
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2.3 Security Issues Related to Cross-Organisational Deployment of GBP 
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, many restrictions refer to non-disclosure 
of information passed between Web services within the control process to destinations 
outside the domain of the gearbox manufacturer, in particular to the car manufacturer. 
The latter restriction is of special interest facing the fact that in the example above this 
very process is defined by exactly the car manufacturer who is restricted to get some of 
the information handled by this process. 
Other restrictions mandate that the values passed to a Web service originate from a 
particular other Web service or lie in a particular range of values. 
Access control to Web services (e.g. Abendroth and Jensen, 2003; Dimmock et al., 
2004) and in particular role-based access control (RBAC) (Ferraiolo et a/., 2001; Peng 
and Chen, 2004) may only cover part of these restrictions. When addressed by access 
control means alone, enforcement of non-disclosure of information outside the local 
domain would imply that access to the particular information would not be granted to 
any principal outside the local domain. In this example, the car manufacturer residing 
outside the local domain of the gearbox manufacturer and, as a consequence, also the 
BPDL script defined and invoked by the car manufacturer, would not be granted access 
to visibility restricted information thus preventing the control process of this example 
being remotely defined and deployed by the car manufacturer. 
Relaxation of access restrictions, such as granting access provided the values passed to 
a Web service come from a particular source (for instance values returned from a 
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specific Web service), require information flow (in backwards direction) to be con-
sidered for making decisions upon granting access or not. Thus, information flow 
analysis has to be applied in addition to purely access control-oriented approaches, in 
order to cope with this kind of restrictions. 
Restrictions with respect to visibility of values retumed from a Web service are also not 
covered by access control measures alone. For this purpose, information flow (in 
forward direction) has to be analysed, that means the future use of the values retumed 
has to be taken into consideration. 
With the approach proposed in this thesis, these restrictions derived from the security 
policies at the location where a remotely defined BPDL script will be executed can be 
enforced using the methods proposed, including the restriction that the author of the 
BPDL script is precluded from getting knowledge about information handled by the 
business process he has specified. At first sight, the last one may seem to be a restriction 
contradictory to itself However, it will turn out during the course of the thesis that it is 
possible to grant access in such a fine-grained manner to a remotely defined business 
process and enforce the implied information flow restrictions in a straightforward 
manner at the executing site. 
The security issues arising when remotely defined BPDL scripts are to be executed can 
be condensed into the following questions: 
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• Will the business process defined by the BPDL script comply with the security 
policies of the executing domain? 
• Which access privileges are required in order to grant access to the business process 
defined by the BPDL script (i.e., to possess the proper privileges for accessing the 
resources, particularly the Web services, encountered in the course of its execution)? 
The second question is addressed by research considering access control (Koshutanski 
and Massacci, 2003; Mendling et al., 2004), even though not necessarily in the context 
of BPDL script execution (Joshi et a/., 2001). The first question, however, is comparati-
vely novel since execution of remotely defined BPDL scripts seems currently not to be 
in practical use very much and, therefore, security aspects inherent in this way of using 
BPDL have not found a lot of attention in research, yet. 
This research project strives to propose a framework for coping with these novel 
security aspects arising from the employment of standardised business process 
languages. To this end, semantic aspects of the business processes defined by their 
respective scripts written, for instance, in BPDL, are considered at the time, a new script 
is to be deployed to a node across security boundaries. However, the analysis of the 
semantics of code written in programming languages is a well-known difficulty (Cousot 
1999). Therefore, the need to analyse the semantics of a BPDL-defined business process 
with respect to involved security-relevant semantics would make the approach to 
specify a business process remotely from the location of execution impractical unless 
this analysis can be provided automatically, at least to a large extent. The methodology 
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proposed will make use of the fact, that business process languages offer little to none 
means for defining data processing or computational tasks as part of the language itself, 
but rather have to invoke Web services for these purposes or must import constructs 
from expression languages defined in other X M L standards such as Xpath (Berglund et 
al, 2006). 
The extended use of business processes as proposed in Section 2.1 and parts of the 
framework for assessing compliance of remotely defined BPDL scripts described in 
chapters 4 through 6 have been published in several workshop, conference, and journal 
papers (Fischer et al., 2005, Fischer et al., 2006, Fischer et a!., 2007a, Fischer et al., 
2007b, Fischer e/ aL. 2007c). 
2.4 Restriction of Research to WS-BPEL without Loss of Generality 
For the definition of Web services, Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1 
(Christensen et aL, 2001) (expected to be gradually substituted by its newer version 
WSDL 2.0 (Chinnici et aL, 2006)) has been established by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) as a single standard broadly accepted for the definition of Web 
services. 
In contrast, for business process definition languages (BPDLs) several approaches to 
standardisation have been taken by different vendor groups and standardisation 
organisations, leading to a plurality of standards: 
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• Web Services Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL), formerly known 
as Business Process Execution Language for Web Services (BPEL4WS or BPEL for 
short) (Alves et ai, 2007), propagated by the Organisation for the Advancement of 
Stmctured Information Standards (OASIS), 
• Business Process Modelling Language (BPML) (Arkin, 2002), propagated by the 
Business Process Management Initiative (BPMl.org), 
• X M L Process Definition Language (XPDL) (Workflow Management Coalition, 
2002), propagated by the Workflow Management Coalition, 
• Web Services Choreography Interface (WSCI) (Arkin et ai, 2002). propagated by 
the Worid Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and 
• ebXML Business Process Specification Schema (Malu et ai. 2002), propagated by 
UN/CEFACT and OASIS. 
Though the existence of several parallel standards aiming at the same goal detracts from 
the very purpose of standardisation, the different standards at least have some obvious 
commonalities, as all languages are script based using X M L (Bray et ai, 2006) and 
facilitate the composition of business processes by invocation of Web services and 
definition of the communication with other parties (in particular human participants) 
involved in a business process. 
The fact that several business process languages exist in parallel, gave rise to research 
as to which extent these languages are comparable with respect to their semantic 
expressiveness (Aalst et ai, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; Wohed et ai, 2002). In particular. 
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Aalst et ai (2002) and Wohed et al. (2002) analysed different languages {i.e., WS-
BPEL, BPML, WSCI and some vendor-specific business process languages) with 
respect to workflow and communication patterns. The results of their work indicate that, 
to a large extent, the different languages are capable of expressing the same semantics 
with respect to workflow control and communication behaviour. 
As could be expected from these results, the different languages may be convertible to 
each other as has been shown in an exemplary manner for XPDL and WS-BPEL by 
Fischer and Wenzel (2004). 
In other work (Haller et al., 2006; Haller and Oren, 2006) a process ontology based on 
multiple meta-models derived from different existing workflow models is introduced in 
order to facilitate mappings between choreography descriptions defining possible 
interactions between different partners of a CBP and internal workflows of the partners 
defined using different workflow languages, workflow models, and choreography 
languages. Since this research seems to be still in its early stages, only one successful 
mapping (with manual intervention) between a vendor-specific workflow definition 
language and Abstract BPEL (definition of abstract, i.e., not executable, business 
processes defined in BPEL) is reported. Although automatic conversion between 
different workflow definition languages and BPDLs based on their proposition is still 
for fijrther study, this approach using a specific ontology meta-model as an intermediate 
during mapping can be expected to be promising towards supporting automatic mapping 
between different workflow definition languages and different BPDLs. Once this 
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ongoing work will have proven successfiji, their approach might also be useful for 
automatic conversion of different BPDLs to each other. 
Given the fundamental similarity of all different languages used for business process 
definition and their potential to be converted to each other, the research in this PhD 
project has been concentrated on one particular representative, namely WS-BPEL. 
During the course of the research project, WS-BPEL has been accepted by the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) as an 
OASIS standard (OASIS, 2007). Prior to this, through support by prominent vendors 
like IBM, BEA, Microsoft, SAP, and Siebel, WS-BPEL already had emerged as the de-
facto standard for business process definition (Wang et ai, 2004; Mayer and Liibcke, 
2006). 
According to the usual practice, for the remainder of the thesis BPEL will be used as a 
short-hand for WS-BPEL. 
2.5 Summary 
In this section, the main goal of the research project namely the assessment of 
compliance of remotely defined BPEL scripts with local security policy has been 
motivated by discussing some of the security issues arising by executing remotely 
defined BPEL scripts. It has been shown that availability of fine-grained access control 
and information flow control may enable sensible tasks to be performed by remotely 
defined business processes without jeopardizing local security policy. 
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Since the different standardised BPDLs are comparable with respect to their 
expressiveness for specifying the process logic of a business process and BPEL is 
considered the de-facto standard for business process definition as backed by related 
work discussed above, without loss of generality, the research in this PhD project could 
be restricted to BPEL. Therefore, in the remainder of the thesis, BPEL alone is 
investigated as the most prominent representative of standardised BPDLs. 
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3 APPROACHES TO SPECIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
S E C U R I T Y P O L I C I E S 
In this chapter, approaches to cope with security policy enforcement in general, and of 
Web services and business processes, in particular, will be discussed. Possible methods 
include validation (or even verification) prior to execution, or by monitoring and 
intervening during execution of a program. In addition, because a BPEL-defined 
business process can itself be considered a Web service, approaches to specify security 
requirements of Web services and to solve security issues with Web services may also 
relate to business processes defined this way and, therefore, will be considered in this 
chapter. 
Since this research project was particulariy interested in scenarios where BPEL scripts 
are defined at one location and brought to a remote location for execution, approaches 
to solve security issues arising with execution of mobile code are also considered. This 
is because the distributed definition and execution scenario for BPEL scripts is, to a 
large extent, similar to the situation when mobile code is to be executed. Common to 
both situations is the fact that from the point of view of the executing site, the script or 
code, respectively, has been defined remotely and is brought in for execution on an ad-
hoc basis such as applets contained in a Web page and downloaded via HTTP together 
with the page content. 
As a consequence thereof, it is not clear at first sight what this script or code is going to 
do when executed; that is, the semantics of the script or code are unknown (at least the 
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details thereof while the overall semantics, e.g., collecting information for an order in a 
B2B application) may be known. Because of this, among others, there may be concerns 
about the possible effects to the local system environment resulting from its execution. 
In particular, there will be concerns as to whether the script or code wil l obey security 
pohcies effective at the domain executing it. 
Unlike other scenarios of executing remotely defined code (such as executing programs 
developed and installed by the IT department of one's own organisations or programs 
being part of a product supplied by a well-known vendor), when executing mobile code 
there is not usually a level of trust that is appropriate to alleviate the concerns about the 
potential of the remotely defined program to cause harm to the local environment or to 
violate the local security policies. However, even with programs developed or installed 
by the organisation's IT department, trustworthiness may be arguable because of 
potential infection of this software with malicious code injected during Internet 
communication. This general and apparently increasing risk of getting infected by 
viruses, Trojan horses or spyware (ITU/UN, 2007) gives rise to employ anti-virus and 
anli-spyware check software. However, this risk of malicious modification after 
deployment is not typical to BPEL scripts and may be prohibited by appropriate 
mechanisms of the platform executing such scripts. Consequently, this risk is deemed 
not to play an important role in the scenario considered in this research project and will 
therefore be disregarded. 
I f developed remotely from the executing site but still within the same security domain, 
domain-internal regulations such as quality assurance procedures applied in the 
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development process could help to deem a program or script conforming to security 
pohcies of this security domain. Since this does not apply in situations considered in 
this research project, security concerns with cross-organisational deployment of BPEL 
scripts and when untrusted, remotely defined code is to be executed are comparable to 
each other. Therefore, approaches to solving security issues with the execution of 
mobile code may also be applicable to, or at least may serve as a model for approaches 
to, solve the comparable issues with cross-organisational deployment of BPEL scripts. 
An overview of conventional approaches to cope with security issues involved in the 
execution of mobile code is given by Rubin and Geer (1998). 
3.1 Specification of Security Aspects for Web Services 
In the context of the definition of Web services, a series of specific standards and 
proposal for standards exist, most of them propagated by the Worid Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) or OASIS. To address the collection of these Web service-oriented 
specifications as a whole, they are usually addressed as "WS-*" specifications (the 
reason for this abbreviation might be the fact that the titles of many of these 
specifications contain the term "Web services" and have abbreviated identifications 
starting with "WS-"). 
A large number of WS-* specifications already exist, at different stages of their 
standardisation process, and the number of such specifications is still increasing. 
Therefore, it is difficult to keep track of the dynamic development of these 
specifications. However, a recent article in the lnfoQ.com website provides a good 
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overview of the current state of standardisation and adoption by platform vendors as 
well as of the coherences and interdependencies of specifications in this field 
(Bustamente, 2007), Unlike the existence of several standardized business process 
definition languages that could basically replace each other, these different WS-* 
specifications serve different (though sometimes similar) purposes. However, 
overlapping functional areas also exist in these standards, proposals, or 
recommendations. 
Since security issues are broadly accepted to be one of the crucial points in using Web 
services, in particular in cross-organisational application environments, there are also 
WS-* specifications specifically dedicated to the security aspects of Web services. 
Some of them will be discussed in more detail. The scope of existing security-related 
WS-* specifications covers the following aspects: 
o Specification of security requirements imposed to Web service invocation and 
message exchange between Web services or between Web services and their 
users. 
o Specification of protocols that may be used for security related tasks in the 
context of Web service-based application environments such as acquiring 
certified tokens for authentication and authorisation purposes or conveying 
information for access control purposes. 
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o Specification of policies to determine the rules for granting or denying access to 
particular resources for particular principals (i.e., users or other system resources 
acting on behalf of users) 
i . LI Web Service Security (VVS-Security) 
Web Services Security usually addressed as WS-Security (Nadalin et al., 2006) is an 
OASIS standard adopted in 2004 and updated 2006 that provides the basis for secure 
message exchange in Web service interoperation. The standard defines a security model 
for authentication and protection of the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
message transfer and provides mechanisms, primarily within a special security header 
added to a SOAP message, to convey security-related content such as security tokens or 
information as to which algorithms or procedures to be used for generation and 
verification of signatures or en-/decryption. Mechanisms to specify which parts of a 
message and, in particular, which parts of the message header are to be protected for 
integrity or confidentiality and which specific method of encryption from a variety of 
alternate methods is to be applied comprise mostly of this standard. WS-Security may 
be considered the base standard for security in this field since most of the other security-
related WS-* specifications rely on the mechanisms provided by this standard to 
implement their security-oriented communication needs. 
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i . / . 2 WS-SecurityPolicy 
WS-SecurityPolicy (Nadalin et al., 2007a), also an OASIS standard, offers means to 
indicate security requirements of Web services that have to be applied in the 
communication between the partners involved {i.e., the invoker and the provider of a 
Web service). Such requirements may contain indications which parts of a message 
exchanged between the partners need protection to assure confidentiality or integrity 
and what type of encryption algorithms to be used for these purposes. In addition, 
means are provided to specify requirements for authentication and authorisation in 
message exchanges and what type of certifications will be accepted for these purposes. 
The mechanisms provided in this specification are predominantly bound to mechanisms 
provided in the communication layer of Figure 1, that is, the mechanisms provided by 
the communication protocol used. In many cases, this protocol will be SOAP (Box et 
al., 2000) and its amendments, in particular WS-Security (Nadalin et al., 2006). 
3.L3 WS'Trust 
WS-Trust (Nadalin et al., 2007b) is another OASIS standard that specifies a model and 
procedures to acquire and exchange security credentials in such a way that communi-
cating partners may establish and maintain a trust relationship between each other. The 
standard makes use of other WS-* specifications, in particular WS-Security and WS-
Policy, and among others allows for secure exchange of security keys or policies. 
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3,1,4 Web Services Policy Framework (WS-Policy) 
Web Services Policy Framework (WS-Policy) (Bajaj et al., 2006), is a W3C specifica-
tion that may be used to construct policies relevant for a Web service. For this purpose 
the framework provides mechanisms for the aggregation of policies as combinations 
and alternatives of basic constraints and requirements of a Web service. The definition 
of such basic elements, however, is not in the scope of this specification but has to be 
imported from other WS-* specifications such as WS-SecurityPoIicy (Nadalin et al., 
2007a) or WS-Security (Nadalin et al., 2006). In addition to aggregation mechanisms, 
the framework specifies an algorithm for intersecting different policies in order to 
determine the common alternatives contained in these policies. Although the mecha-
nisms provided are not specific to security policies, the context of the specification and 
the examples used therein are bound to the field of Web service security. 
5,7.5 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Cantor et aL, 2005) is again an OASIS 
standard for the specification and exchange of security assertions with respect to 
authentication, authorisation, or any relation between attributes and objects. Protocols 
for requesting assertions from an asserting party and for management of shared 
knowledge about identities between different providers acting as asserting parties are 
provided in this standard. One field of application of this standard is the establishment 
of so-called identity federations that play a central role in single sign-on over Web 
services from different providers. 
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3.L6 extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
The extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (Moses, 2005) is also an 
OASIS standard that is intended to specify policies and procedures for access control 
and authorisation purposes. The standard provides a model for establishing access 
control decisions, an X M L syntax for specifying access control policies as well as 
algorithms and ftinctions that can be used in policy evaluation and constituting access 
control decisions. 
The main components in the policy-based access control model are a Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) and a Policy Decision Point (PDP) that may be distributed 
over several nodes of a network. The PEP enforces access control based on policy 
decisions from the PDP. To this extent, the PEP sends decision requests to a PDP 
whenever access to a resource in the scope of the PEP is requested and receives 
responses containing the access decision from the PDP. While the structure and content 
of the decision requests and responses are specified in XACML, protocols for sending 
these requests and responses are not defined by this standards. Other standards such as 
SAML have to be employed for this purpose. 
The decision request is accompanied by all required information concerning the 
requestor (subject), the resource access is requested for, the action requested to be 
performed on the resource, and the context (environment) in which the access request 
occurs. On receiving a decision request from a PEP, the PDP, in turn, evaluates rules 
contained in one or more policies (specified based on the schema provided in XACML 
for policy definition) that apply to the particular situation using the information 
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contained in the decision request. The outcome of this evaluation may be "Permit", 
"Deny", "Indeterminate", or "NotApplicable" and is returned to the PEP in the response 
to a decision request. The PEP is responsible of enforcing access control based on this 
decision by granting or denying access to the resource for the requestor. 
Lorch et al. (2003) report on eariy experiences with XACML in different application 
contexts. They discuss the use of XACML in its eariier version 1.0 (Godik and Moses, 
2003) in several projects and systems for authentication and authorization purposes. 
They conclude XACML being suited for specifying complex policies and being used in 
different distributed environments. Because it is an open standard offering means for 
extensibility, they argue that XACML fits well into legacy authentication and 
authorization systems and may act as an intermediate for interoperability between 
different systems. They further conclude that the benefits gained by XACML's 
flexibility and expressiveness come at the cost of being complex and verbose (however, 
the latter applies similarly to many other XML-based standards, too). As a consequence, 
working directly with XACML policies "wi l l be hard for average users" (ibid, p. 34). 
Even when tools will be available to cope with structural complexity and verbosity, the 
authors still suspect difficulties for users in understanding the meaning of policies 
expressed in XACML because of its inherent semantic complexity. 
3.2 Role-Based Access Control for Web Services and Business Processes 
While access control related aspects are predominant with Web services, they are, of 
course, also an issue with BPDLs. For Web services, role-based access control (RBAC) 
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(Ferraiolo et al., 1995) is commonly used (e.g.. Bacon et aL, 2002). The main reason for 
this is that the maintenance effort increases tremendously with the number of principals 
{i.e., users) and resources for access control systems relating decisions to grant or deny 
access to a resource with individual principals as in conventional access control 
systems. Therefore, RBAC relating access decisions with particular roles instead of 
individual principals is better suited in situations involving a large number of principals 
as is the case in Web service environments (Coetzee and Eloff, 2003). In addition, since 
the users of Web services can be distributed over different organisations or are even 
unknown in advance, administration of access privileges for individual users would 
render difficult or even infeasible while associating possible invokers of a Web service 
with some few specific roles is much easier even with users from particular remote 
organisations and even with users that are unknown at the time the access rules are 
specified. 
Koshutanski and Massacci (2003) address access control issues of business processes 
defined by BPEL scripts, in particular the problem of providing the evidence of 
possessing the required access privileges for accessing a particular resource at the right 
time to the right place during execution of a business process. In their approach, they 
propose to use mobile processes defined by BPEL scripts as part of messages sent in 
response to an access request. These mobile processes would be executed at the 
requesting side to interactively collect ftirther credentials required for granting access to 
the particular resource. In this context, they also discuss the requirement that the mobile 
processes have to be subject to a release control policy in order to not disclose the 
access control policy unless the receiver of this information has already acquired the 
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proper security level to be allowed to get this information. In order to deduce the 
missing credentials for an access request at a particular point of a business process and 
the required security level for disclosing the information which credentials currently are 
missing, the access control policy and the release control policy have to be available in 
a formulation that allows for machine-controlled reasoning. The authors argue that 
algebraic constructs would be best suited to serve as formal foundation for this purpose. 
However, requiring algebraic specifications for access control or release control policy 
makes the approach difficult to be applied in practical applications where the skill to 
define or only understand such formal specifications of a policy cannot be considered to 
be available with practitioners working in this field. 
A similar aspect is addressed by Mendling et al. (2004) in their investigation of access 
control requirements for BPEL script-defined business processes. By extracting RBAC 
models from BPEL scripts and converting BPEL language constructs in a format 
suitable for a particular RBAC software component, they provide an automated link of 
access control enforcement into business processes defined by the BPEL scripts. 
Joshi et al. (2001) give an overview of access control approaches and their suitability or 
usability for Web-based applications, in particular distributed workflow management 
systems (WFMSs). They argue that approaches such as the Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) and RBAC are suited for supporting enforcement of security policies in Web 
applications, particularly confidentiality and integrity of the information. In a MAC 
model, all subjects and objects are assigned predefined sensitivity levels to be used in 
the access control enforcement thereby including information flow control aspects into 
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access control. For RBAC approaches to include information flow aspects, the concept 
of role hierarchies and constraints has to be employed. Joshi et al. state, "Enforcement 
of MAC policies is often a difficult task, and in particular for Web-based applications, 
they do not provide viable solutions because they lack adequate flexibility" {ibid., 
p. 41). They fijrther state, "Achieving secure interoperafion in a heterogeneous Web 
environment is a difficult task, because of the inherent dynamism and evolving security 
requirements of the underlying autonomous administrative domains" {ibid., p. 44). They 
come to the conclusion that approaches using RBAC models are suitable to cope with 
security requirements in distributed Web application environments. 
Peng and Chen (2004) propose an extension to conventional RBAC models called WS-
RBAC, in order to incorporate Web services and business processes on top of them. In 
their approach, Web services are subject to access control in lieu of common system 
resources in conventional approaches. Business processes and enterprises are elements 
in their WS-RBAC model making it suitable for application to CBPs. 
3.3 Relation of Programs and Programming Languages with Security Policies 
Algebraic and language-based approaches, not specifically dedicated to Web services, 
address the relation of programs and programming languages with security policies. 
These papers address the issue of verifying compliance of programs with security 
policies and, therefore, are comparable with the scope of the research project of this 
thesis, albeit from a theoretical view. 
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Language-based techniques provide means for analysis or monitoring supported by 
properties or semantics of the particular programming or scripting language. Though the 
work concerned with these techniques relates to programming languages in general and 
is not particulariy related to Web services or mobile code, the results of this work may 
also be extended thereto. At least, basic results on access control and information flow 
analysis, particularly on possible information leakage via certain semantics of program-
ming languages, predominantly related to flow control semantics, also apply to the field 
of Web services and mobile code. A central role in the research on language-based 
security techniques is assigned to policies that restrict confidential data fi-om interfering 
with (i.e., affecting) public or externally observable data. This policy is referred to as 
noninterference (Goguen and Meseguer, 1982). 
Sabelfeld and Myers (2003) give a comprehensive overview of language-based 
techniques for access control and, in particular, for infonnation flow enforcement. They 
point out that access control on its own cannot guarantee confidentiality or noninter-
ference of data. Sabelfeld and Myers argue that information flow analysis is required for 
enforcing confidentiality. This observation is in line with Joshi et al. (2001) who argue 
that models based purely on access rules are not suitable for enforcing confidentiality 
and integrity of information after amendment, but access control model incorporating 
mechanisms for information flow control are able to do so. Sabelfeld and Myers also 
state that static information flow analysis is superior to dynamic information flow 
analysis since static analysis considers all possible execution paths of a program while 
dynamic analysis considers only one instance of program execution. They further argue 
that "the inability to express or enforce end-to-end security policies is a serious problem 
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with our current computing infrastructure, and language-based techniques appear to be 
essential to any solution to this problem" (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003, p. 13) 
One particular issue pointed out by Sabelfeld and Myers (2003) is the potential 
existence of so-called covert channels (Lampson, 1973) and emphasise the difficulty to 
detect them during information flow analysis. Covert channels denote means for 
information transfer in a computing system that exploit mechanisms not primarily 
intended for information transfer. For instance, the number of cycles in a loop or the 
observation whether a particular exception occurs or not may be exploited to convey 
information in a manner not conforming to confidentiality policies. This may occur i f 
looping or the condition for throwing a particular exception is based on confidential 
information thereby leaking this information via externally observable program 
behaviour. 
An overview of algebraic approaches to access control has been given by Wijesekera 
and Jajodia (2003). While this work is dedicated mostly to theoretical aspects of 
security policies and their vulnerability by certain semantics of a programming 
language, enforcement of access control policies is stated as a requirement. However, 
mechanisms for doing so being, for instance, based on execution monitoring are not 
considered in this work. 
Li and Zdancewic (2005) consider confidentiality and integrity specified by information 
flow policies. They describe flow control analysis in a security policy context where so-
called downgrading policies are established and enforced by the way of a type system 
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using X-calculus. The reason for considering downgrading policies as stated in their 
work is that noninterference being the only concept leads to overly strict limitation of 
allowed processing that would impede a lot of reasonable processing performed by a 
program. This theoretical approach to information flow analysis requires all pro-
gramming logic being expressed in terms of ^.-calculus in order to be analysed. In 
business processes invoking Web services for performing computational tasks or data 
manipulations, this approach seems to be impractical since, in general, it is unusual that 
formal specifications in terms of ^ -calculus is available or can be made available for all 
of the programming logic contained in the Web services invoked during the course of a 
business process. 
Another group of approaches to analysing confidentiality and integrity of programs 
written in different kinds of high-level languages investigate the information flow with 
respect to classified information. Within this group, type-based approaches and 
semantic-based approaches can be distinguished. In type-based approaches, for every 
security level an item of information may be assigned to, a certain type is defined and 
variables have to be of the same type as the information they contain. With these 
approaches, checking security properties such as noninterference can be performed by 
checking the type safety of a program {e.g.. Walker, 2000). 
Echahed and Prost (2005) present an approach for proofing compliance of a program 
with information flow restrictions derived from a security policy. For their approach to 
be applicable, both the information flow restrictions and the program have to be 
available as algebraic formulations, the former using declarative programming, the 
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latter as rules of a term rewriting system. The information flow restrictions are 
formulated based on an ordered lattice of privacy levels where the order is defined fi-om 
higher to lower privacy levels. This way, allowed or disallowed flows fi-om higher to 
lower privacy level can be defined as rules in a term rewriting systems. 
The approach described by Barbuti et al. (2002) is another example of the semantic-
based approaches. The authors address security of programs written in Java by checking 
the Java bytecode. In particular, they investigate a security property of Java programs 
called o-security that is weaker than noninterference. The approach employs infor-
mation flow analysis in abstract interpretation of the program. To this purpose, the 
semantics of each operation in Java bytecode are defined by inference rules. Given a 
partially ordered set of security levels and a particular threshold security level a, they 
define a program being o-secure, i f only information assigned to security level a and 
below are leaked by the program, while information of higher security levels be kept 
secret. In their information flow analysis, they also take into account the risk of covert 
channels called implicit flows in their approach as possible ways to disclose infor-
mation. Abstract interpretation of a program considers the security levels of values 
stored in variables and in the stack instead of the concrete values. The authors proof that 
information flow analysis of all possible concrete traces of a program, that is the 
concrete transition system of the program, can be replaced by information flow analysis 
of abstract interpretation of the program. 
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3.4 Verification of Consistency bet>veen Program Code and Security Policies 
Another approach to cope with compliance of programs with security policy is based on 
the proposal, that programs are accompanied by information that proofs their 
compliance with particular security policies, Necula (1997) proposed a scheme to 
extend a program by verifications that particular security policies are obeyed. This 
approach is known as Proof Carrying Code (PCC). The proof is performed by the 
supplier of the code and the executing side has the obligation to verify that the proof 
provided with the program holds. In order to provide the proof that certain security 
requirements are met, the security requirements and a formal specification of the 
restrictions derived from them as well as of the program being executed, is required. 
The proof that particular security requirements are obeyed may be supported by 
verifying compilation, which is a compilation that verifies certain security-relevant 
properties of the code. While the proofs on the side of the producer of the mobile code 
are comparatively complicated, the verification of the proofs on the executing side is 
comparatively simple. One important observation states that no n-ust relation is required 
between the producing and the executing side besides disclosing the security policy to 
the producing side. Proofs can only be conducted against known policies. Therefore, the 
policies have to be disclosed to the producer of the code, hi order to embrace them in 
proofing particular security properties, the policies have to be formulated in a specific 
formalism in order to be used in formal reasoning. 
A combination of the PCC approach with static analysis to overcome some 
shortcomings of pure PCC approaches has been proposed by Nordio et al. f2004). The 
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main advantages of this approach are to provide proof of compliance when proofs based 
on type systems fail. The authors state that the size of proofs along their approach is 
linear to the size of the program considered. Since BPEL scripts usually are not 
compiled, this approach is of limited applicability to BPEL scripts since they are not 
going to be compiled before execution. 
Walker (2000) also considers certified code, where certification is based on strong type 
analysis as in Java. However, the approach goes beyond type checking by combining 
type checking with the approach of Schneider (2000) that employs dynamic checking 
by code instrumentation. Such instrumentation adds specific code to enforce 
preconditions and postconditions of function invocations to be met. 
Ribeiro et ai (2000a) describe a framework to specify security policies in a formal 
manner and methods to reason about the self-consistency of a security policy defined 
this way as well as about consistency between such a security policy and another set of 
rules or constraints. Such other sets of rules or constraints could, for instance, be 
derived from a workflow specification. In their approach, Ribeiro et ai define a Java-
like notation for their policy definition language based on first-order predicate logic for 
specifying constraints with respect to allowed events. Ribeiro et al. (2000b) show that a 
broad range of security policies including discretionary access control (DAC) and MAC 
policies may be expressed. For the purpose of verifying the consistency of a policy or of 
several policies they use a tool named Policy Consistency Verifier (PCV), This PCV 
operates as a term rewriting tool that is controlled by so-called Constraint Handling 
Rules (CHR) and a solver tool trying to verify different sets of constraint rules with 
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respect to a set of consistency definitions. To verify the consistency of a workflow 
specified in a workflow definition language with a particular security policy, the policy 
first has to be specified in their specific security policy language. As a next step, this 
formal specification of the security policy and the formal specification of the workflow 
both have to be converted to sets of CHR rules. As a last step, the PCV tool is used to 
verify the consistence between these set of rules or detect their inconsistency. In their 
paper (Ribeiro e/ a/., 2000b) they state that compilers for the conversions of the formal 
specification of the security policy as well as the workflow into sets of CHR rules have 
been developed such that the verification process can be performed automatically using 
these compilers and their PCV tool. However, with respect to verifying consistency 
between workflows and security policy they concede that they "have not exhaustively 
tested with many different inconsistency types" (Ribeiro et ai, 2000a., p. 11). Never-
theless, they state, "the results we have obtained so far and the flexibility of the under-
lying platform lead us to believe that PCV is able to find most types of inconsistencies 
within and between security policies and other specifications" {ibid, p. 12). 
3.5 Securit>' Policy Enforcement via Code Instrumentation and Runtime 
Monitoring 
The enforcement of security policies by means of code instrumentation and runtime 
monitoring is also a broadly used concept in several approaches in literature. 
Schneider (2000) discusses which kind of safety properties being part of security 
policies may be enforced by execution monitoring (EM) and finds that there are safety 
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properties that may not be enforced by EM of such information flow properties. Like 
Sabelfeld and Myers (2003), Schneider points out that security mechanisms based on 
static analysis and semantics of programming languages offer benefits over other 
approaches not using such mechanisms. 
Venkatakrishnan et ai (2002) propose a code-rewriting system for Java byte code to 
enable enforcement of security policies while executing mobile code. This approach 
aims at allowing for mobile Java code as much functionality as possible without 
violating security policies. In their system, security-relevant events are intercepted and 
forwarded to policy enforcement automata prior to execution. They argue that using 
extended finite state automata (EFSA) for the purpose of runtime monitoring of mobile 
code avoids the requirement for costly stack inspection techniques. As being an 
approach particular to Java byte code, this approach is, in general, not suited to be 
applied to BPDL script-defined business processes. 
A similar approach to the problem of executing untrusted code in general {i.e.. not 
specific to Java byte code or business process languages) was proposed by Sekar et al. 
(2003). After having derived information as to the behaviour of the code at the level of 
system calls from execution monitoring or static analysis at the developing site, this 
information is mapped to a model describing security-relevant behaviour and carried 
together with the code to the executing site where this information can both be checked 
against security policies and used during execution in order to monitor potential 
deviations from the stated behaviour. Applicability of this approach to business process 
running on a BPEL-enabled platform seems to be arguable because of lack of means to 
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monitor system calls and relate them to specific activities of a particular business 
process. The requirement of extensive testing as explicidy stated in their paper, and the 
need for observation at the level of system calls during execution, at least, wi l l make the 
application of the approach in this context very complex. 
Sirer and Wang (2002) propose a system where policy enforcement code is derived 
from security policies by an enforcement machine and translated into platform-specific 
prologues and epilogues to Web service invocations. The specific enforcement code 
will be executed by the respective web server, thereby performing access control to 
Web services as required by security policies. This approach is limited to run-time 
checking of compliance of Web service invocations and security policies. If applied on 
its own, this approach shares the drawback of monitoring approaches that a possible 
violation of security policies may be detected too late to be prevented by intervention. 
However, when combined with other mediods of security policy enforcement this kind 
of intervening programs may be supportive in order to prevent security policy 
violations. 
In the approach of Vachharajani et al. (2004), a specific runtime information fiow 
engine is derived from binary program code prior to execution using special hardware 
that enables tracking of information flow. It provides dynamic information flow control 
during execution of program code thereby enabling access control policies or non-
disclosure policies to be enforced. This approach, at least, requires binary code of the 
program being executed to be available for such an 'instrumentation'. For Web services 
invoked by a business process, in particular in a distributed environment, access to 
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binary program code cannot be assumed in general. Also when running business 
processes specified by BPDL scripts, the binary code being buried in the platform 
running these scripts may not be available for instrumentation. In general, the relation 
between sequences of binary code within the platform running a business process and 
particular parts of the business process is difficult to be determined. This is particularly 
true when such relations would be required prior to execution in order to enable 
instrumentation of the appropriate parts of the binary code. 
3.6 Summary 
As the discussion of the WS-* specifications for security purposes above shows, most 
of these specifications deal with aspects related to Web service communication and 
access control. Since BPEL as a specification language does not provide elements that 
address access control and secure communication (cf , Section 4.2), these aspects of 
business process execution are expected to be provided by the platform running these 
processes (cf, e.g., Mendling et al., 2004). Therefore, when mapped onto the layered 
SOC architecture in Figure 1, mechanisms required for these tasks reside in the layers 
below the business process layer, that is, the content layer and the communication layer. 
With the exception of WS-Policy and XACML, which may be used for specifying any 
kind of security policy, these standards do not address aspects that are relevant to the 
scope of the research project namely assessment of BPEL scripts with respect to 
compliance with security policies. 
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Concerning WS-Policy and XACML, since they address policy definition, they could be 
employed as standardized means to specify security policies when a BPEL script is 
checked for compliance with them. However, it turned out that they were not considered 
to be advantageously employed in the context of this research project. The reasons for 
this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Also other approaches to the specification of security requirements of Web services as 
discussed in Section 3.2 address aspects residing in layers 1 and 2 of Figure 1 or are 
dedicated to the second security issue in the list of Section 2.3. Therefore, they are not 
applicable to the security issue stated in the first item of the list in Section 2.3 being the 
main scope of the current research project. 
The approaches in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 do not specifically address security aspects of 
remotely defined BPEL scripts. Since all these approaches are based on algebraic 
formulations on programming language semantics and security policies, they are not 
particularly suited to be applied by practitioners in the field of Web service definition 
and business process specification. The specific skill required to define and interpret 
such formal specification may not generally be anticipated to be available for people 
occupied with specifying Web services and business processes. 
Despite the observation that the results from other research mentioned in this section do 
not particulariy address distributed definition and deployment of BPEL scripts in the 
sense laid out in Chapter 2, some of their approaches may also be applicable to this 
topic, at least to a certain extent. Particularly, results concerned with access control in 
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general and access control to Web services in particular, may be applicable to the 
second security aspect arising in this context as listed in Section 2.3. 
Furthermore, the observation by several authors that access control on its own is 
insufficient for enforcing confidentiality and integrity of information as well as the 
potential risk of covert channels as discussed above in Section 3.3 was adopted in the 
methods developed in this research project. 
Though none of the results discussed in this chapter deals specifically with the first 
security aspect given in Section 2.3 (which is the concern of the research project 
presented in this thesis), some of the work on language-based techniques for 
information flow control and on instrumentation and monitoring are applicable to this 
aspect, at least in principle. However, as already discussed above, the algebraic and 
language-based approaches mentioned may only be of limited use in the business 
process context because of the program size of the platform running business processes, 
the fact that program logic of Web services involved is only known to a limited degree 
and, in general, is far away from being specified in an algebraic formalism that would 
be required for most of these approaches. 
Because of the fast pace of development and updating or reworking cycles that seems to 
be typical for Web services and business processes, it may be disputed whether such 
formal algebraic specifications wil l be produced in the future for applications in this 
field. In addition, at least for the time being, skills required for providing such algebra-
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based formulation seems not to be typically available when developing Web services 
and business processes. 
The research project, therefore, aimed to provide methods for analysing and assessing 
security-relevant semantics of BPEL scripts that may be applied without requiring 
profound skills in special formalisms such as algebraic formulation of programming 
logic. By contrast, the methods developed was to be based on technology and methods 
well-known to developers of Web services and business processes in order to be 
comparatively easy to be applied and, therefore, can be expected to be adopted by 
practitioners in this field. 
The next chapters present the approaches taken in this PhD research to reach this aim. 
To start with, BPEL is analysed with respect to its intrinsic potential to specify 
behaviour of business processes that could violate restrictions imposed by security 
policies. 
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4 ANALYSIS O F S E C U R I T Y - R E L E V A N T SEMANTICS OF B P E L 
In this section, the results of the analysis of BPEL as a specification language conducted 
during the PhD project will be presented. The purpose of this analysis was to identify 
the intrinsic potential of BPEL to specify business process behaviour that is able to 
violate restrictions imposed by security policies. Here and in the following chapters, the 
term "security relevance" when used with respect to particular elements of a program-
ming or scripting language {e.g., BPEL) or to combinations of such elements denotes 
the potential of these elements or combinations to specify behaviour of a program (or a 
business process in the case of BPEL) that could violate a security policy-implied 
restriction. Once the security-relevant semantics of BPEL has been identified, the 
assessment of compliance between a BPEL-defined business process and a particular 
security policy wil l become more operable since checking the BPEL script for com-
pliance can be restricted to looking for security-relevant semantics contained therein. 
4.1 Scope of Analysis 
For the sake of general applicability, the aim is to analyse security relevance of 
semantics expressible via BPEL as a specification language as broadly as possible, 
without referring to specific types of application to which a particular BPEL script-
defined business process may be related. For this purpose, the smallest possible pieces 
of BPEL scripts had to be identified for which assertions with respect to security 
relevance could sensibly be made. This cannot be the language constructs of BPEL on 
their own because, similar to many other programming languages or scripting 
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languages, most or even all of the individual language constructs do not present any 
security relevance or the security relevance cannot be determined at this "atomic" level. 
As can be easily seen, for instance, the security relevance of an assignment operator or 
command (as present in nearly all programming or scripting languages) cannot be 
determined when considered in isolation since an assignment operation simply copies 
values from one location to another usually within registers or main memory of a 
computer. In order to decide the security relevance of such an operation, further 
information on the values and the locations involved in this operation is required such 
as what kind of values are to be copied (e.g., values representing security-classified 
information) and what operation are to be performed to the target location during the 
further processing of the program (e.g., stored on an externally accessible storage or 
displayed to a user on a terminal screen). When considered together with the restrictions 
that could be imposed to the values and locations involved, the security relevance of an 
assignment operation becomes easier to be investigated, but still it is not generally 
decidable for all types of restrictions whether an operation is secure or not. 
The whole of a specific program and even the environment in which the program will 
be executed may have to be considered to decide this. For instance, i f the values copied 
represent information that is restricted by the security policy to not be leaked to users of 
the program unless they possess a special authorisation to access this information and 
the target location would be known to get displayed on a user terminal in the further 
processing of the program, also knowledge about the environment in which the program 
will be executed would be required to decide whether the assignment operation violates 
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the security policy or not. I f the environment assures that only appropriately authorised 
persons have access to the room where the particular terminal is installed then the 
operation may be considered secure. If, however, also people without such authorisation 
may watch the screen where this information is going to be displayed, that is the 
environment does not provide measures to avoid this, then the assignment operation 
would have to be considered insecure. 
Admittedly, approaches to security analysis of a programming language usually do not 
claim to be so far-reaching as to also include considerations concerning the prospective 
environmental conditions of program execution, but are based on implicit or explicit 
expectations that these conditions will be appropriate to support security requirements, 
for example, to prevent inadvertently leakage of information to observers not ad-
equately authorized. Also in this analysis, considerations with respect to environmental 
conditions as mentioned above will be out of scope. As usual in this type of analyses it 
is anticipated that appropriately secure environmental conditions are provided by the 
organisation running the platform on which a business processes is executed. Since here 
a specification language at business process level is subject to the analysis, which is 
unable to directly present any information to users (this could, at most, be achieved 
indirectly via messages sent to a Web service or to an invoker of a business process 
which usually is also a program), this approach is particulariy justified. 
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4, L1 Search for Security-Relevant Building Blocks of BPEL Semantics 
From the above considerations, combinations of the language constructs with typical 
restrictions implied by security policies were deemed to be suitable as the smallest parts 
of BPEL scripts for which sensible statements with respect to their security relevance 
could be established. Before examining the semantics of these combinations, restric-
tions derived from security policies for BPEL-defined business processes have been 
investigated. From this investigation, categories or classes of such policy-derived 
restrictions have been determined at the abstraction level at which a business process is 
specified and executed on an appropriate platform. 
It turned out that the combination of language constructs of BPEL with classes of 
restrictions derived from security policies were suitable to identify the security-relevant 
features of BPEL. The analysis shows that only a subset of the language constructs 
entails the risk to violate certain classes of restrictions while the rest do not possess any 
security relevance. 
The knowledge of the security-relevant language features in terms of combinations of 
restriction classes and BPEL constructs provides a clear conception what to look for 
when analysing a BPEL script for compliance with security policies. In this way, 
assessment of compliance with security policy is considerably facilitated since a 
thorough analysis of each and every particular aspect of the semantics of a BPEL script 
under consideration and comparison with security policy is no longer required. Instead, 
a direct scan of a BPEL script looking only for the features identified to be capable of 
violating the security policy will be sufficient for this purpose. Classifying the 
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restrictions derived from the rules in a particular security policy and relating them with 
their relevance for BPEL scripts will further make the assessment easier to handle since 
only those rules in such a policy remain to be considered that are applicable at the level 
of business process execution. 
4, L2 Trade-Off Behveen Policy Strictness and Functional Richness 
To allow as much functionality as possible in a business process within the limitations 
imposed by security policies, it is postulated that the restrictions derived from such 
policies shall be as weak as possible, but at the same time as strict as required to avoid 
any violation of security policies. This requires a fine-grained concept of specifying 
access restrictions and information flow restrictions. If, for instance, all internal Web 
services of the gearbox manufacturer in the example of Figure 4 would either be 
allowed or forbidden to be invoked by a business process brought into domain B by the 
car manufacturer, then only such process logic could be specified by a cross-domain 
deployed BPEL script that could also be performed when running the BPEL script 
within domain A of the car manufacturer. The only additional requirement for this to 
happen would be that access would be admitted across the security domain border 
between the car manufacturer and the gearbox manufacturer for those Web services that 
were allowed to be accessed in a BPEL script from the car manufacturer when running 
in domain B. 
Though the difficulties to allow such cross-domain access to particular Web services 
from within domain A (e.g., difficulties to re-define rules for mechanisms controlling 
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remote access to Web services, typically firewall rules, in such a way that in addition to 
access privileges to the particular Web services existing before, access would only be 
allowed for invocations from domain A) could already justify the cross-organisational 
deployment of a BPEL script, the more interesting cases involve fine-grained access or 
information flow restrictions. Such restrictions may allow access to a Web service only 
when passing values returned by former invocations of other Web services or allow 
information returned by a Web service only to be used in a specific way. 
These kind of restrictions could not be controlled when the business process were 
running outside domain B unless the existing Web services (or at least some of them) 
would be changed considerably. Without modifications to the Web services in domain 
B to provide additional mechanisms for authentication and integrity-protection of values 
passed to a Web service, the source of input values to a Web service invoked from 
domain A could not be determined by a control mechanism residing in domain B. 
Similarly, without additional mechanisms for providing confidentiality, values returned 
across the domain border could not be controlled by domain B as to where they are 
going to be used in domain A. Allowing cross-organisational deployment of the script 
defining the business process and checking the script for compliance with the 
restrictions implied by such fine-grained rules for access control and information flow 
control would avoid modification to existing Web services and the computational 
overhead to provide the security mechanisms mentioned above. 
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4,L3 Need for Information Flow Analysis in Policy Compliance Assessment 
Since the strategy of compliance assessment aims at avoidance of any infringement of 
security policies, following Dobson (1994, p. 11) access control and information flow 
control are the mechanisms to be applied. While access control to the Web service 
offered by the business process under consideration to its environment (being the 
concern of a complementary security issue as indicated in Section 2.3) was not 
considered in this research project, access control with respect to the Web services 
invoked during the execution of the business process and the flow of information from 
and to these Web services and from and to its environment are to be considered. Hence, 
the analysis aims at examining whether information or resources accessed and the flow 
of information are consistent with the limitations of the security policy. 
The investigation of restrictions to business processes (in particular those defined 
remotely from the location of intended execution) imposed by security policy came up 
with following aspects addressed by them: 
• Access control as a whole or to particular parameters of a Web service 
• Information flow control as a whole or to particular parameters of a Web service 
While the decision whether access to a resource is allowed within the limitations of a 
policy is comparatively easy to define, distinguishing allowed and disallowed infor-
mation flow needs further consideration. As discussed in Chapter 3, many approaches 
addressing information flow control policies use the concept of classified information 
sources and sinks in order to investigate and even prove noninterference {i.e., the 
property of a program that no information flow exists from higher to lower security 
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levels) {e.g., Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003) or that such information flow occurs only in a 
controlled fashion (Chong and Myers, 2004; Li and Zdancewic, 2005). As stated by 
Joshi et al. (2001), MAC and RBAC (the latter with role hierarchies and constraints) 
also make use of classified information and thereby allow for information flow control 
between different levels. 
4.L4 Approach to Dispensability of Security Classification System 
To avoid unnecessarily complicating matters, the approach taken here does not 
explicitly make use of a more or less elaborate classification system of information and 
resources, but instead simply differentiates between allowed and disallowed information 
flows in terms of Web service invocations and message exchange with invokers of a 
business process. To further simplify the definition of allowed and disallowed 
information flow, it is assumed that 
o information flow restrictions in the forward direction (see below for an 
explanation) are not required within the domain executing the business process 
(referred to as the executing domain), 
o all Web services (both inside and outside the executing domain) a business 
process is allowed to invoke are explicitly identified, 
o restrictions to information flow in the forward direction relate to all external 
sinks (i.e., information flow crossing domain boundaries is generally affected by 
such restrictions, possibly with some indicated exceptions) while internal sinks 
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are excepted from these kind of restrictions for information coming from the 
same domain, and 
• restrictions to information flow in the backward direction relate to particular 
sources an information has to originate from or restricts information to comply 
with a particular range of allowed values. 
Note: It may be argued that the second aspect of the last item should rather be 
considered an access restriction than an information flow restriction. For the 
purpose of the discussion here, and in the following chapters, it does not matter 
whether a restriction to a particular set of allowed values is treated as belonging 
to access control or to information flow control. 
Thereby, use of classified information is made only implicitly, avoiding the need of 
defining a classification system (or making use of an existing one) and assigning classes 
or levels from this system to all resources and users or roles involved in a business 
process. As a consequence of the assumptions on information flow rules stated above, 
the implied classification system basically consists of the following security levels: 
• information sinks and resources inside the executing domain; 
• information sinks and resources outside the executing domain. 
However, whenever requirements for a refined classification system occur, refinement 
takes place implicitly by stating information flow restrictions or indicating relaxations 
of general restrictions implied by those assumptions. Since no explicit use of classified 
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information is made when stating information flow rules, there is no need for adapting a 
classification system prior to making use of its refined version. Therefore, such rules 
can be formulated as required without caring about predefined security levels and 
formal aspects of level-crossing information flows. 
Besides simplifying the definition of information flow restrictions, this approach also 
helps to facilitate assessment of compliance with these rules. Since neariy all sinks and 
sources of information in BPEL-defined business processes are bound to Web services 
invoked and messages exchanged with invokers of the business process (i.e., invocation 
of this process' Web service from its environment). Rules formulated in terms of 
restrictions to Web service invocations, and the information flow related thereto, cover 
most of the information flow restrictions that apply at all. In addition to explicit 
information flow to and from Web services and the environment of the business 
process, the possibility for covert channels is to be taken into account during 
information flow analysis of a BPEL script since also implicit information flow 
violating any restriction has to be avoided. 
Information flow analysis in the forward direction is understood to consider the flow of 
information from the point in time during execution that a particular piece of 
information is brought into a business process {e.g., output of a Web service invocation 
returned to the business process) to destinations this particular piece of information 
could flow to in the further processing of the process. By contrast, information flow 
analysis in the backward direction is understood to consider the flow of information 
from any sources introducing pieces of information into a process in the past before the 
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point in time that such pieces of information are passed to a particular sink (e.g., input 
to a Web service invoked by the business process). Put simply, backward information 
flow analysis is concerned with the past and forward information flow analysis is 
concerned with the future of information involved at a particular point during business 
process execution. 
4, L 5 Risks of Policy Violations of Remotely Defined Business Processes 
As motivated by the discussion in Section 3.1 relating to security aspects of Web 
services that can be expressed in the framework provided by WS-* specification, such 
security requirements are to a large extent dealt with at layers below the business 
process layer in Figure 1 (namely at the communication layer and the content layer). In 
particular, access control requirements to Web services as a whole and to parts of the 
resources and information made available by them may be treated in these layers. 
However, when remotely defined BPEL scripts are running within the security domain 
they may inherit access privileges fi-om the local environment. As a consequence, 
access attempts from within the business process may pass the control mechanisms in 
the lower layers and be granted in a way not intended for such remotely defined 
business processes. Therefore, in addition to security policy rules typically applicable to 
the business process layer, the scope of the analysis of such remotely defined BPEL 
scripts for potential conflicts with local security policies has to be broadened to 
accommodate this special situation. In particular, it has to pay attention to policy 
violations that will made possible by the fact that these scripts are executed within the 
local security domain, but would have been prevented by other (usually access control) 
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mechanisms in layers below the business process layer when executed outside {e.g., in 
the domain where they were defined). Risks of policy violations by those cross-domain 
deployed BPEL scripts fall into one of the following categories: 
• making information or use of resources available outside the executing domain 
beyond the limitations imposed by the policy (e.g., reading information with 
restrictions relating to forward information flow from a database and sending it 
to an external partner); 
• bringing information from outside into an internal data storage that is not 
allowed to be written to from external sources; and 
• using functionality or resources that are not allowed to be used (e.g., altering 
data in a data base or exercising a system control function). 
In the following sections of this chapter, after an overview of BPEL as a specification 
language, security policy-induced restrictions to Web service invocation are categorised 
and combined with BPEL constructs. The aim here is the identification of security-
relevant building blocks of business process behaviour specified by such combinations. 
4.2 Overview of B P E L Semantics 
The standardised business process definition language BPEL has been brought into an 
OASIS standardisation process based on a proposition that originated from merging two 
vendor-specific BPDLs, namely Microsoft's XLANG (Thatte, 2001) and IBM's WSFL 
(Leymann, 2001). The approaches to specify business process logic were different in 
these two BPDLs and as a compromise in the standardisation process, BPEL still 
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contains the different approaches to express business logic inherited ft'om these two 
vendor-specific predecessors. This is the reason why BPEL (in the version adopted as 
an OASIS standard (Alves et al., 2007)) still comprises two essentially different ways of 
expressing process flow logic. These are a graph-structured modelling style inherited 
fi*om WFSL and a block-structured modelling style inherited from XLANG. 
Since the beginning of this PhD research in 2004, the definition of BPEL has undergone 
some modifications that the project has strived to keep pace with. While the discussion 
in this chapter is based on the version 2.0 of BPEL, which finally has been accepted as 
OASIS standard, the research prototype is based on previous versions of BPEL 
specifications. The reasons for this and why this is not deemed to void the proof of 
concept that has been aimed to be achieved will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Basically, BPEL only provides means for specifying Web service invocation and the 
exchange of messages with the environment of the business process being specified as 
well as means for specifying the flow of control and infonnation between these 
invocations and message exchanges. In addition, BPEL comprises means to specify 
what should happen when exceptions are raised or errors occur. 
While a detailed description of BPEL can be found in its specification (Alves et ai, 
2007), a comprehensive analysis of its semantics was conducted by Wohed et al. (2002) 
based on a previous version of the BPEL specification. An overview of the language 
and a comprehensive example is given by Leymann and Roller (2004). The nature of 
BPEL accommodates the analysis of security-relevant semantics by offering only little 
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or no means for defining data processing or computational tasks as part of the language 
itself. For these purposes, BPEL scripts have to invoke Web services, or must import 
constructs from other X M L standards such as XPath (Berglund et ai, 2006). In 
addition, security aspects such as authentication, provision of secure communication 
channels, and non-repudiation do not have to be considered in this context, since the 
language does not provide any means related to these security aspects. These aspects 
usually are catered for by the platform running BPEL scripts. Thus, the analysis can be 
concentrated on the business or workflow logic that may be expressed in BPEL in order 
to identify security-relevant semantics. 
In BPEL, two types of processes may be modelled: executable and abstract processes. 
Abstract processes are used to specify a business protocol in order to define the 
potential sequence of messages exchanged between business partners. Since such 
protocols should allow the internals of business processes actually performed by the 
partners to be hidden, abstract processes may comprise some kind of vagueness with 
respect to process logic performed internally by the business partners. Since abstract 
processes are not executable by their definition, they are not in the scope of this analysis 
where BPEL scripts intended for actual execution on a remote platform are considered. 
Therefore, only executable processes are subject to this analysis. BPEL scripts intended 
for this purpose specify workflow logic in terms of activities. The prevalent semanfics 
expressed in BPEL is the exchange of messages with one or several external partners 
that can be thought of as invoking Web services provided by partners or being invoked 
as a Web service by partners. In a declaration part, BPEL scripts define the potential 
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links to external partners by references to WSDL definitions of the Web services 
involved. Thus, analysing these declarations in a first step yields the set of Web services 
that may be invoked or are offered by a business process under consideration. 
4,2. / General Structure of BPEL Scripts 
In BPEL, like in high level programming languages, there exists a predefined structure 
of several groups of declarations serving different purposes. Each BPEL script 
represents an instance of an X M L element <process> that may contain several parts 
for defining elements not directly related to normal process flow (except event handlers, 
c f explanation below) and one element specifying the process logic of the business 
process called an activity. This single activity at the top level of a process definition is 
usually a structured one, which means an activity containing other activities. The parts 
not directly related to normal process flow are all optional (though at least some of them 
are required to compose a BPEL script defining a proper process). These parts contain 
declarations of the interfaces to the environment of the business process (called partner 
links in BPEL), the variables to be used, and so-called event handlers and fault handlers. 
In addition, some of these parts may define links to other specifications via X M L 
namespace definitions and by explicit import via an <import> element or even 
extensions of process logic not expressible with BPEL-defined activities. In particular, 
declarations of partner links refer to WSDL definitions of Web services to be invoked 
by a business process or defining the Web service provided by the business process 
specified in a BPEL script. Also the declaration of variables may refer to WSDL 
definitions but also may be related to definitions of arbitrary X M L schemas. The latter 
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is new in BPEL 2.0 since in former versions of BPEL variables were only allowed to be 
declared in terms of types imported from WSDL definitions. 
While the other declaration parts do not contain any process logic and, therefore, only 
indirectly influence security-relevant semantics of BPEL, event handlers and fault 
handlers directly contribute to the process logic. Fault handlers are intended to define 
process logic to be performed in response to exceptions and errors that may occur 
during the execution of the normal process. Besides indicating the condition for being 
selected and executed (i.e., specifying the fault to which a handler reacts), fault handlers 
specify process logic using activities as in the part specifying the normal process flow. 
In addition, there are some activities especially reserved to only be used within fault 
handlers. Since the occurrence of a fault is not considered normal in a process 
definition, fault handlers specify exceptional process behaviour that might never be 
executed i f no exception or error caught by any of these handlers occurs. However, 
since the occurrence of such faults cannot be ruled out during the analysis and since 
these faults may occur unpredictably at any time during process execution, all process 
logic specified in such fault handlers may be deemed to represent potential parallel 
flows to the normal flow of the process and may be treated as such when analysing a 
BPEL script for compliance with security policies. 
Event handlers also specified in the declaration part of a <proceBs> element specify 
how a process should react when particular events occur such as incoming messages or 
timeout events. On one hand side like fault handlers, event handlers specify the event or 
the timeout condition that trigger their process logic to be executed. On the other hand 
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side, unlike fault handlers these declarations specify not exceptional, but normal 
behaviour of a process and, therefore, have to be considered an integral part of the 
normal flow of process logic. The semantics of such event handlers is very similar to 
those of the p i c k activity, which will be discussed below. As with fault handlers, the 
trigger events specified in such a handler may occur at any time during process 
execution and, thus, the process logic of these handlers may be thought of as potential 
parallel flows to the process logic specified in the main process stream specified in the 
BPEL script. 
4,2.2 Primitive and Structured Activities in Normal Process Flow 
The activities expressing the semantics of a process either in the main stream or in the 
exceptional or event-triggered streams of a business process may be either primitive or 
structured. BPEL provides the following primitive activities to be used in the normal 
flow of process logic {i.e., the process flow collectively specified in the activity of the 
main stream and the event handlers in contrast to exceptional process flow specified in 
fault handlers): 
• invoke invocation of a Web service 
• r ece ive waiting for a message to arrive 
• r e p l y sending a reply to a message received 
• ass ign assignment of values between two different locations 
• w a i t waiting for a specified amount of time 
• throw indication of exceptions such as failures during execution 
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• e x i t termination of a process instance. (Note: Was t e rmina te in 
previous versions of BPEL) 
• v a l i d a t e validation of the content of variables against their type 
definition in WSDL documents or X M L schemas 
• empty no operation 
The structured activities provided by BPEL are: 
• sequence definition of a fixed execution order 
• f l o w parallel execution of activities 
• i f branching between several alternate activities depending on 
conditions. (Note: Replaces the s w i t c h activity of previous 
versions of BPEL) 
• w h i l e iterative execution, i.e., looping as long as loop condition holds 
• r e p e a t U n t i l iterative execution, i.e., looping provided loop condition holds. 
(Note: Added during standardisation process of version 2.0) 
• fo rEach iterative execution, i.e., multiple execution for a specified 
number of iterations either consecufively or in parallel. (Note: 
Added during standardisation process of version 2.0) 
• p i c k waiting simultaneously for several events to occur and 
proceeding depending on the event that actually occurs; 
typically, one event waited for is a timeout event 
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4,2,3 Additional Flow Control and Structuring Elements 
Additional control of parallel and sequential flows within a f l o w activity may be 
expressed by so-called links (not to be confijsed with partner links) that are used to 
specify dependencies and sequencing of parallel flows. The language constructs 
applicable for this purpose are: 
• l i n k s definition of links to be used within a f l o w activity (not to be 
confused with partner links defining external interfaces) 
• source used to specify an activity to be a predecessor of another one 
• t a r g e t used to specify an activity to be a successor of another one 
In the examples in Listings 1 and 2, the graph-structured and block-structured modelling 
provided by BPEL are compared. It should be noted that both examples, though one 
uses a f l o w activity and the other uses a sequence activity, result in identical process 
semantics. This is caused by the l i n k element used in Listing 1. Although the example 
activities a c t i v i t y l and a c t i v i t y 2 which actually serve as placeholders for any 
BPEL activity occur lexically in reverse order within the f l o w activity, they will be 
executed in the same order as in the sequence activity of Listing 2 due to the l i n k 
named r eve r se . By defining the activity occurring first within the flow as the target 
of this link while the activity occurring second is defined as the source of the same link, 
the actual execution order of these two activities will be reversed. Note that reversion of 
execution order is not effectuated by the name of this link, but only by the way this link 
is used as a target and source, respectively, in both activities. 
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<f low> 
< l i n k s > 
< l i n k name="reverse"/> 
< / l i n k s > 
< a c t i v i t y 2 > 
< t a rge t 
l inkNames"reverse"/> 
< / a c t i v i t y 2 > 
< a c t i v i t y l > 
<source 
1 inkName="reverse"/> 
<seguence> 
a c t i v i t y l 
a c t i v i t y 2 
</sequence> 
Listing 1: Graph-Structured Modelling Listing 2: Block-Structured Modelling 
In addition to structured activities, there is another language construct, named scope, 
similar to structured activities since it also serves structuring purposes but is not 
considered a structured activity (however, terminology in BPEL standard (Alves et al., 
2007) is not consistent with respect to this). This construct is used to define nested 
structures of scopes for the declaration of particular constructs. Actually, a scope 
provides virtually the same structure for the declaration of partner links, variables, fault 
handlers, event handlers, and a single activity as the <procees> element which may be 
considered the top-level scope of the hierarchy of nested scopes. In addition, two other 
types of declarations are particular to scopes - namely termination handlers and comp-
ensation handlers'. Each scope definition may contain at most one of each of these 
declarations. The purpose of these declarations is to specify process logic in the case of 
(normal) termination of the activity defined in a scope or in the case the activity of a 
The concept of lerminaiion handlers is new in version 2.0. For compensation handlers, there used to be 
the possibility to define them at process level in former BPEL versions, but this has been removed in the 
final version of BPEL 2.0 
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scope needs kind of roll back, called compensation in BPEL. Rolling back the effects 
of a (usually structured) activity of a scope could be required in response to an error 
occurring during the execution of this scope. Typically, activities to be reversed by a 
compensation handler are those that have been performed within the particular scope to 
which the compensation handler refers. 
4,2,4 Special Activities for Fault Handling 
There are some fiirther primitive activities, compensate and compensateScope, 
collectively referred to as compensation activities used to initiate rollback actions in 
transaction-based application contexts, and rethrow for passing faults to the enclosing 
nesting level. They are only allowed to be used within fault handlers. Since 
compensation activities initiate the execution of one or several compensation handlers 
they logically link activities defined in such handlers to fault handlers containing these 
compensation activities. While compensateScope is intended to initiate the compen-
sation for a particular scope, compensate initiates compensation for the scope related 
to fault handler issuing this activity as well as for all nested scopes within this con-
taining scope. The rethrow activity passes the information that a particular exception 
occurred possibly accompanied by some fault variable containing flirther information to 
its containing scope level or to the process level. Therefore, a rethrow activity needs 
attention in information flow analysis with respect to the fault variable and the 
exception passed to the next higher nesting level. 
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4.2.5 Concept of Multiple Instantiation in BPEL 
In addition to the activities representing the main part of the semantics of BPEL, there is 
a concept of multiple instantiation in BPEL that enable several instances of the same 
business process being defined by one script and being created by messages arrival from 
external partners. As long as the different instances do not share common variables that 
is usually not the case though the standard does not compel that each instance uses a 
separate copy of its variables, these instances may be considered separate copies of the 
same BPEL script running in parallel. Therefore, multiple instantiation does not add any 
particular security relevance and, therefore, no particular consideration of multiple 
instantiation is required during this analysis. Instead, the results applicable for a BPEL 
script not using multiple instantiation can be applied to each copy independently 
whether it runs as separate processes or as instances of a single process. I f several 
instances should communicate with each other, this is performed via mutual message 
exchange as with external Web services invoked by a business process and, thus, does 
not represent any special case not considered otherwise in this analysis. In essence, 
multiple instantiation will not be investigated separately and only the requirement is 
stated that multiply instantiated processes shall not share identical variables because 
doing so could impose covert channels. 
4.2.6 Extensibility of BPEL and Problems for Compliance Assessment Involved 
BPEL provides extensibility in several ways. First, BPEL allows for namespace-
qualified attributes in any BPEL element and also elements from arbitrary namespaces 
to appear within elements defined in BPEL. Further, BPEL 2.0 (Alves et a!., 2007) 
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provides three elements for explicitly defining extensions within a BPEL script. These 
elements are extensions, e x t e n s i o n A c t i v i t y , and extensionAssignOpera-
t i o n the last one occurring as part of an a s s i g n activity. The standard cleariy defines 
the conditions when a BPEL implementation may ignore such extensions, but still 
execute the rest of the script containing these extensions and when it is required to reject 
a BPEL script for execution that contains particular extensions not supported by the 
implementation. 
Obviously, for the purpose of assessing the compliance of a BPEL-defined business 
process with local security policies, the presence of any extension in a BPEL script is 
detrimental since it introduces new semantics that could not be analysed in advance for 
its security relevance as the other language elements. For the approach to facilitate 
compliance assessment for BPEL-defined business processes based on an analysis of 
the security relevance of BPEL as a specification language, BPEL scripts containing 
such extensions have to be excluded since they escape from this approach. It is 
anticipated, that business processes in a collaborative environment, in general, can 
avoid the use of such extensions. However, i f the requirement for such extensions exists 
and it can be assumed that they wil l be agreed upon between the business partners 
before using them, the approach proposed in this research may be adapted to also 
comprise such extensions. Given particular extensions to be used are known before-
hand, they can be subject to an analysis for their security relevance similar the one 
conducted in this research for the standardised language elements. After that, the 
methods deduced from this analysis as described in the following chapters may be 
adapted accordingly to also accommodate such pre-defined extensions. However, 
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dealing with such extensions in BPEL scripts is expected to increase complexity of the 
assessment procedure and may be particularly difficult to incorporate in automatic 
compliance assessment. For the considerations on security relevance of BPEL in this 
research, scripts containing extensions have been excluded. 
4.3 Classification of Securit>' Policy-Derived Restrictions for WS Invocation 
As discussed above, the language constructs wi l l be investigated in conjunction with 
different types of Web services because in BPEL scripts access to information or 
resources may only be gained via Web services. Given a particular set of restrictions 
implied by a security policy that is associated to a particular set of privileges {i.e., a 
particular role), Web services may be distinguished with respect to access allowance or 
restrictions to their input and output parameters. Table 1 shows six different classes of 
access restrictions to Web services as a whole or to Web service parameters that will be 
considered in the analysis of security relevance of BPEL. There are additional access 
restrictions derived from security policy rules that are not covered by these six classes. 
Reasons for not including them into Table 1 for consideration in this analysis will be 
given during the discussion in this chapter. 
The classes 1 and 2 relate to Web services as a whole while classes 3 through 6 relate to 
the input and output parameters of Web services. Obviously, class 1 denoting Web 
services with unrestricted access to all resources and information offered by them does 
not represent an actual restriction category (since no restriction applies at all) but is 
added here for completeness of this classification. Class 2 represents the opposite of 
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class I , Web ser/ices that are disallowed to be invoked at all whatever parts of their 
resources or information would be concemed. 
The restrictions in class 3 relate to output parameters of a Web service invocation and 
denote the restriction that information provided by those parameter to the invoking 
party are not allowed to be carried to particular destinations. Following the simplifica-
tion rules stated in Section 4.1.4, this type of restriction is meant to denote information 
flow restriction from the domain executing a business process to any destination outside 
this domain. In order to allow for more flexibility, when applied to an output parameter 
of a Web service this restriction can be amended by a relaxation statement indicating 
one or several external destinations to which information flow wil l be allowed despite 
this restriction. 
The restriction classes 4 through 6 relate to input parameters of a Web service. Class 4 
denotes the restrictions with respect to the use of optional parameters. Despite the 
definition of a Web service parameter as being optional, security policy can require that 
such a parameter is not allowed to be used or, contrary, has to be used in any invocation 
of the particular Web service. Reason for prohibited use of an optional parameter could 
be that the security policy-derived rules applicable for the particular role would prevent 
an input parameter to be used because it would offer access to resources or information 
that is not allowed to be used by this role. For instance in the CBP example of Figure 4, 
an optional input parameter to Web service checkStock could effectuate a preferential 
treatment of the order. In case this functionality would not be made accessible to a 
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business process remotely defined by the car manufacturer, this parameter would be 
disallowed to be used by a BPEL script imported from the car manufacturer. 
Classes Description 
1 Web service with unrestricted access to all parts of resources or information offered 
2 Web service with completely restricted access {i.e., Web service that is not 
allowed to be invoked) 
3 
Output parameter of a Web service with restricted visibility of values 
returned {i.e., restriction with respect to forward information flow): 
Some information made accessible is not allowed to be carried outside the 
executing domain {i.e., parameter returned is only allowed to be used within 
the executing domain, but not in outbound messages to targets outside this 
domain). Some relaxation of this restriction to dedicated targets may apply 
as explicitly indicated. 
4 
Optional input parameter of a Web service with usage restrictions (in two 
alternate versions): 
a) optional parameter is not allowed to be used at all 
b) optional parameter always has to be passed to avoid default definition 
for this parameter to take effect 
5 
Input parameter of a Web service with constrained set of values allowed: 
input parameter may only be used with particular values being a subset of 
the values allowed by the syntactic definition of this parameter 
6 
Input parameter of a Web service with values restricted to specific sources: 
only values from particular sources may be used, for instance, only values 
returned by a particular Web service or a particular Web service parameter 
Table 1: Classification of Access Restrictions to Web Services and WS Parameters 
As another case of class 4 restrictions, it could be required that an optional input 
parameter is required to be used in every invocation of the particular Web service. An 
example of such a restriction in the business process of Figure 4 could be that an 
optional parameter of Web service cakulateOffer would indicate the amount of rebate 
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offered to the client. In case that this optional parameter has a default value indicating a 
rebate level that will not be offered to the car manufacturer, restriction rules would 
require that this parameter would be passed with every invocation from a business 
process defined by the car manufacturer and that its value lies in a certain range. This 
example reveals that requiring an optional parameter to be present in a Web service 
invocation often results in an additional restriction of class 5 or 6 (see below). 
Restrictions of class 5 require that only values from a particular set of allowed values be 
used for the respective input parameters of a Web service. Obviously, this restricted set 
of allowed values will be a subset of the syntactic allowed values of the particular 
parameter. An example for this kind of restrictions in the CBP of Figure 4 could be that 
an input parameter of the calciilateOffer Web service could indicate the level of rebate 
provided for in calculating the offer. I f the syntax of this parameter would be defined to 
take on values from the range 5%-50%, but for the car manufacturer only rebates in the 
range of 5%-30% are offered, then this input parameter would be constrained to the 
value range [5%-30%] though the syntax of the parameter would allow values in the 
range [5%-50%]. It should be noted, though this kind of restriction looks like a 
syntactic one, it actually represents a restriction with respect to the semantics of this 
parameter since the syntax of the parameter being defined to adopt values in the range 
[5%-50%] and being checked by a parser in the executing platform would not be 
changed because of this security policy induced constraint of the value range. 
Therefore, this restriction cannot be considered a syntactic one because the parameter 
still is capable to accept values in the range [5%-50%]. 
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Class 6 denotes restrictions with respect to the source of values that are allowed to be 
passed to an input parameter of a Web service. This kind of restriction does not impose 
any constraint to input parameters with respect to allowed values but only requires that 
values passed to these input parameters are restricted to only come from particular 
sources. In business process context, such sources usually are output parameters of 
previous Web service invocations. 
As can be easily seen, Web services with unrestricted access permission (class 1) as 
well as Web services with total access restriction (class 2) do not pose any particular 
challenge for analysis. With these classes, any further distinction between combinations 
with different activities of BPEL is not relevant. The reason for this is that their allowed 
or forbidden use in a BPEL script may already be detected by examining the declaration 
part. No Web service with total access restriction (class 2) must occur in the declaration 
part, or at least, i f such a Web service should occur in the declaration part, it must not be 
used in any message exchange performed in the business process. Conversely, Web 
services with unrestricted access permission (class 1) may be invoked freely throughout 
a business process, irrespective of particular combinations with BPEL activities. The 
only aspect relevant with Web services of class I is the information flow to and from 
parameters of such a Web service prior and succeeding its invocation, respectively. Any 
value passed to input parameters of such a Web service must obey possible information 
flow restrictions of class 3 imposed to output parameters of other Web services. 
Equally, any value returned by an output parameter of such a Web service is required to 
observe the restrictions of class 5 and 6 imposed to Web service invocations in the 
further course of the business process. 
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The distinction between classes 3 through 6 requires detailed knowledge of the seman-
tics of a Web service. Since such detailed knowledge of external Web services may not 
be available in the executing domain, external Web services, in general, tend to fall into 
classes 1 or 2. Conversely, the semantics of internal Web services can be assumed to be 
well-known within the executing domain such that the differentiation between classes 3 
through 6 will be possible. 
There is another distinguishable aspect in Web service invocation. This distinction 
differentiates between Web services accessible independent from the location of the 
invoker or Web services only allowed to be accessed from inside the executing domain, 
but not from inside the remote domain defining the BPEL script. For Web services of 
the executing domain, the latter may be very common since this usually is the reason for 
bringing the BPEL script from the remote domain to the executing domain. I f all Web 
services invoked would be accessible independent of the location of the invoker, there 
would be no obvious reason for not running the script in the domain where it is defined 
with the possible exception that enabling cross-domain invocation would pose problems 
in the lower layers responsible for access control {e.g., problems with appropriately 
redefinition of firewall rules to just allow remote access to particular Web services from 
one particular external domain but still preventing such access from other domains). 
Since the location-dependent allowance for invoking a Web service is nothing special 
for local Web services in the executing domain (e.g., domain B in the example of Figure 
4), this situation needs no special observation. However, there may also be external 
Web services, for example the Web services p r i c e Q u o t a t i o n in domain C in Figure 
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4, that are only allowed to be invoked ft-om inside the executing domain B, but not fi-om 
inside domain A. In fact, for purposes of the analysis in this section, it has to be 
determined whether the semantics of the external Web services are known to an extent 
that allows for classification into classes I through 6 above. I f this is not the case, such 
Web services have to be treated as belonging to class 1, because classification of its 
parameters into classes different from class 1 is not possible due to lack of knowledge 
about their semantics. 
If only Web services with unrestricted accessibility occur (class 1), the business process 
could also be executed at the domain where it is specified (with the possible exception 
relating to accessibility mentioned above). The only difference in having such a busi-
ness process executed in a different domain is the fact, that computational and commu-
nicational load involved is moved to this other domain. With respect to security, this is 
only relevant as bearing the potential for making exhaustive use of computational or 
communicational resources of this other domain. When driven to an extreme, this could 
cause a form of denial of service attack in this domain. As such exceptional behaviour 
may easily be controlled by the runtime environment executing the BPEL script, this is 
not considered to constitute a security threat in this context that needs particular 
examination before running a BPEL script. However, detecting such behaviour by 
analysing the BPEL script prior to execution is also feasible. This aspect, although 
neglectable in a CBP context, may require further consideration in other contexts where 
appropriate measures to prevent exaggerated usage of resources cannot be anticipated. 
A further discussion on this aspect will take place in Chapter 8. 
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4.4 Security Analysis of Semantic Patterns of B P E L 
In this section, the building blocks of BPEL-definable semantics of a business process 
that are used for the purposes of the security analysis conducted in this PhD project are 
identified and the results of this analysis are presented. 
4.4.1 Definition of Semantic Patterns of BPEL 
To determine their relevance with respect to security policies, in particular access 
control and information flow control, combinations of information passed to or received 
from Web services associated with restrictions belonging to the classes of Table 1 with 
the activities defined in BPEL are investigated. These combinations are denoted 
semantic patterns in this research project and considered appropriate building blocks of 
BPEL-definable business process semantics for the purposes of analysis of the security 
relevance of BPEL as a specification language. When activities are directly concerned 
with Web service invocation or message exchange with partners, the meaning of such 
combinations is obvious. Combinations with activities not directly concerned with Web 
service invocation need further explanation. Combining a parameter subject to a 
restriction of a certain class and a particular BPEL activity denotes the situation where 
the information passed to or returned by such a parameter has been or will be used in 
combination with this type of activity. Of course, a particular Web service parameter 
may belong to more than one of the classes 3 through 6 simultaneously. For the ease of 
discussion, no combined classes are analysed, since for a Web service parameter 
belonging to more than one of these classes, the results related to each of the classes it 
belongs to may be applied simultaneously in this situation. 
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4.4,2 Results of Security A nalysis of Semantic Patterns 
As already mentioned in Section 4.3, semantic patterns involving access restrictions of 
classes 1 and 2 need no further investigation. The results of the analysis of semantic 
patterns involving information flow restrictions of classes 3 through 6 are depicted in 
Tables 2 and 3 and discussed in this section. While Table 2 presents the results for 
semantic patterns formed by combination with primitive activities. Table 3 indicates the 
results for structured activities. 
Tables 2 and 3 each comprise five columns. The second column contains a short de-
scription of the semantics of the respective BPEL activity in the first column. In 
columns three through five, the implications for security assessment are indicated, when 
the respective BPEL activity is combined with information exchanged with a Web 
service subject to restrictions of classes 3 through 6. Since the entries for classes 5 and 6 
only differ slightly, the indications for these classes are combined in the fifth column. 
An entry o f " - " indicates that the respective semantic pattern is not relevant in scope of 
access control and information flow. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, some semantic 
pattems require special attention with respect to information flow indicated by entry IFA 
followed by a parenthesised letter. The meanings of the different variants of this type 
are as follows: An entry IFA(v) denotes the requirement of forward information flow 
analysis with respect to information returned by Web service parameters subject to 
class 3 restrictions. The entry IFA{r)) denotes the requirement for backward information 
flow analysis with respect to Web service parameters subject to class 5 restriction {i.e., 
restricted value range) and entry IFA(s)) denotes the requirement for backward infor-
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mation flow analysis with respect to Web service parameters subject to class 6 
restriction (i.e., restricted source of values passed to these parameters). 
Security patterns involving class 3 restricted information and one of the activities 
invoke (with respect to the inbound parameters, i.e., the output parameters of the Web 
service invoked), r e ce ive or the on message part of p i c k (in the latter cases with 
respect to the inbound parameters of a message received from a partner) are security-
relevant since information received from these activities may cause security policy 
violations when passed to targets outside the executing domain (except those targets 
were indicated explicitly as exceptions from the general visibility restriction). As can be 
seen in Table 2, information flow analysis in forward direction is required to determine 
whether visibility-restricted information returned by the Web service is kept inside the 
security domain and is not sent outside via one of the activities invoke (within an out-
bound parameter) or r e p l y unless the target is indicated explicifly as allowed within 
the exceptions to the particular information flow restriction. 
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Primitive Activities Class 3 Class 4 CI. 5/6 
invoke Invocation of a Web service IFA(v) u IFA(r/s) 
r e ce ive Waiting for a message to arrive IFA(v) - -
reply- Sending a reply to a message received - u IFA(r/s) 
ass ign Assignment of values between two dif-
ferent locations (see note) (relevant in IFA only) 
w a i t Waiting for a specified amount of time time(v) - -
throw Indication of exceptions such as 
failures during execution except(v) - -
re throw* Forwarding of exceptions causing fault 
handler execution to containing scope 
- - -
empty No operation - - -
v a l i d a t e Validate values against type declara-
tion of variable val(v) - -
e x i t Termination of a process instance exit(v) - -
compensate* 
Initiate compensation as specified by 
compensation handlers of correspon-
ding scope and all nested scopes 
- - -
compensate 
Scope* 
Initiate compensation of activities as 
specified by compensation handler of a 
specific scope 
scope(v) - -
Note: For attribute v a l i d a t e possibly contained in this activity see discussion 
below on activity v a l i d a t e . 
* = activity only to be used within fault handlers 
IFA= information flow analysis, 
(v) with respect to visibility of values returned from WS, 
(r) with respect to ranges of values passed to WS, 
(s) with respect to sources of values passed to WS 
Table 2: Securit>' Relevance of Semantic Patterns with Primitive Activities 
For class 4, only invoke (with respect to the outbound parameters, i.e., the input 
parameters of the Web service invoked) and r e p l y need special attention to check that 
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the restricted input parameters of the Web service or the output parameter in a message 
sent to a partner will be used conforming to the particular usage restriction indicated by 
entry u {i.e., not used or always present depending on the embodiment of this 
restriction). Classes 5 and 6 are similar, since with invoke (with respect to the 
outbound parameters) and r e p l y information flow analysis is required to determine 
whether the restricted use of values is obeyed. With class 5, backward information flow 
analysis related to the values written to restricted outbound parameters is required (indi-
cated by entry IFA(r)), whereas with class 6, analysis is required with respect to the 
sources of such values (indicated by entry IFA(s)). 
As indicated in Table 2, analysis of information flow has to embrace a s s i g n activities 
to observe the movement of information within the business process. If processing such 
as calculation or string manipulation is performed within a BPEL script using language 
constructs imported from, for instance, XPath (Berglund et ai, 2006), it has to be 
analysed that no restricted information is involved, or at least, that results from the 
processing is not used in a manner violating the security policies. Since allowing such 
kind of processing on restricted information could cause obfliscation of information 
flow, thereby complicating the analysis of information flow, as a matter of precaution 
such processing should be generally considered incompatible with security policy, 
independent of the further use of its results. Since it can be assumed that any such 
processing will be performed in Web services invoked by a business process such that 
no need for any such processing exists within the process itself, for the purpose of this 
research project, incorporation of any elements from XPath or other X M L specifications 
providing data manipulation has been excluded. 
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The activities empty, compensate, and rethrow involve no security relevance 
whatsoever. This is quite obvious for the empty activity. For the compensate activity, 
this can be seen by the consideration that this activity only initiates compensation from 
within a fault handler but, by its own, has no effect with respect to observable behaviour 
of the business process. The business logic performed in the course of a compensation is 
specified by activities in the respective compensation handlers. The security relevance 
of these activities is subject to separate examination of the compensation handlers and 
the outcome of this examination is not associated with the activity initiating these 
handlers to be executed. Also for the rethrow activity, the reason for not being 
security-relevant relates to the fact that this activity simply forwards the exception that 
caused the fault handler containing this activity to be executed to the environment of 
this fault handler that is the scope at the next higher nesting level or the process level. 
Since passing of information stays within the process being executed, and the exception 
to be passed is predetermined without any choice for passing different information, no 
risk for violation of information flow restrictions exist. 
However, the compensateScope activity which is quite similar to compensate 
bears security relevance of its own. Reason for this is that this activity selects one 
particular compensation handler for execution. I f this selection would depend on 
visibility-restricted information, the fact that this particulariy selected compensation 
took place could be observed from outside to conclude on the value of the class 3 
information and thereby could be exploited to establish a covert channel for information 
leakage. 
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Similariy, use of visibility-restricted information gained from Web services of class 3 in 
the activities w a i t (with respect to duration), throw (with respect to exception thrown 
and information passed along with exception), e x i t (with respect to condition for 
termination), i f (with respect to definition of alternate flows), w h i l e and 
r e p e a t U n t i l (both with respect to loop control), f o r E a c h (with respect to loop 
boundaries as well as to conditions for pre-emptive termination of iteration), and p i c k 
(with respect to timeout interval) also tum out to be security-relevant as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 because of the risk of establishing covert channels. Defining any of the 
terms indicated in parenthesis with the above activities dependent on visibility-restricted 
information could be exploited to circumvent restrictions implied by security policy. 
For instance, i f the visibility-restricted information / is used to control the amount of 
loop cycles in a w h i l e activity, providing some externally observable behaviour such 
as sending a message to an external Web service from within the loop body could be 
used to circumvent the visibility restriction on /. In this way, an extemal observer would 
be able to count the numbers of such messages and deduce the value of / from this 
observation. However, revealing / to an extemal observer would violate the security 
policy restricting this information from being disclosed outside the domain. 
With respect to potential covert channels, also the activity v a l i d a t e as well as the 
attribute v a l i d a t e of the a s s i g n activity require special attention. I f variables 
declared within a BPEL script containing visibility-restricted information are to be 
validated, possible value range restrictions specified in their types' definition could leak 
information contradicting security policy implied information flow restrictions. Con-
sider, for example, a variable r e c e i v e P r i c e i n f o declared to be of a fictitious type 
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belowThousand which has been derived from the simple XML-type i n t e g e r with 
the additional restriction xsd:maxlnclusive value= " 9 9 9 ' ' . I f this variable would 
be used to store the visibility-restricted output parameter p r i c e returned from a Web 
service invocation {e.g., an inquiry similar to Web service priceQuotation in Figure 4 
indicating the price of a single item), then validation of this variable after storing the 
price would leak information about the price via externally observable behaviour of the 
business process. The negative outcome of this validation would cause a standard 
b p e l : i n v a l i d v a r i a b l e s fault to be thrown. An observer who has written the BPEL 
script and sent it to the executing domain for performing the business process 
corresponding to this script would know that the price returned from this Web service 
was greater than or equal to 1000 when this exception would occur and that the price 
was less than 1000 when no exception occurs. Obviously, by cascading of validations 
against varying types, a visibility-restricted information could be propagated to an 
arbitrary level of detail by causing or avoiding b p e l : i n v a l i d v a r i a b l e s faults in 
v a l i d a t e activities. 
The additional flow control and structuring elements of BPEL as introduced in 
Section 4.2.3 are not included in Tables 2 and 3 because they are not considered 
activities. The additional flow control via links in t a r g e t and source elements of 
activities within a flow activity expose security relevance as indicated above with 
w h i l e or i f activities i f their flow control mechanisms are made dependent on 
information flow restricted information (class 3 restriction) thereby bearing the risk of 
establishing a covert channel. The Boolean expressions contained in a j o i n C o n d i t i o n 
with element target, and in a t r a n s i t i o n C o n d i t i o n with element source, must 
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not depend on any visibility-restricted information in order to avoid covert channels 
with these constructs. 
Structured Activities Class 3 Class 4 Classes 5/6 
sequence Definition of a fixed execution 
order - - -
f l o w Parallel execution of activities - - -
i f 
Branching between several 
alternate activities depending on 
conditions 
branch 
cond(v) 
- -
w h i l e 
Iterative execution, i.e., looping loop cond(v) - -r e p e a t 
U n t i l 
forEach Iterative consecutive or parallel 
execution 
iteration 
bounds(v) - -
preempt(v) 
p i c k 
Waiting simultaneously for 
several events to occur and pro-
ceeding with the first event that 
actually occurs (see note) 
IFA(v) - -
time(v) - -
Note: Typically, one of the events waited for is a timeout event, while the other events 
are messages to arrive 
IFA(v) = information flow analysis with respect to visibility of values returned from 
WS 
Table 3: Security Relevance of Semantic Patterns with Structured Activities 
From the additional structuring elements of BPEL, event handlers contribute additional 
security-relevant semantics as will be discussed below. The other structuring elements, 
that are scopes, fault handlers, compensation handlers and termination handlers, do not 
provide any security-relevant semantics on their own. Of course, the activities contained 
in all of these handlers exhibit the same security relevance as i f they were used in the 
90 
Chapter 4 - Analysis of Security-Relevant Semantics of BPEL 
definition of the main stream of a business process. Nevertheless, these structuring 
elements need to be observed during compliance assessment of particular BPEL scripts 
since they provide particular execution semantics to the activities contained in them. 
Fault handlers as well as compensation handlers that can be linked to the execution path 
of fault handlers via the compensation activities represent process logic to be executed 
in the case of exceptions or errors, collectively denoted as faults. Since such faults may 
happen at virtually any time during process execution these fault handlers and the 
compensation handlers eventually initiated by them can be thought of as potential flows 
parallel to the main processing flow of the process and, therefore, have to be treated as 
such during information flow analysis. 
In contrast, event handlers contribute to the security-relevant semantics of BPEL in that 
they specify possible interaction with the environment of the business process. The 
onEvent and onAlann elements contained in such handlers taken together exhibit 
similar semantics as a p i c k activity. The onEvent elements of event handlers like the 
onMeseage elements of a p i c k activity work like a r e c e i v e activity, that is they 
wait for messages to arrive on partner links. Therefore, these elements represent 
security-relevant semantics when information flow-restricted information (class 3 
restriction) is received this way and information flow analysis in forward direction is 
required in this case to verify that such information is only used in a way conforming to 
these restrictions. Furthermore, in the same way as the onAlarm elements of a p i c k 
activity, these elements provide the capability of establishing covert channels when the 
duration of such a timeout surveillance is made dependent on visibility-restricted 
information. 
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Though very similar to a p i c k activity, there is a significant difference behveen event 
handlers and this activity. While a p i c k activity blocks further processing in its flow 
until one of the messages waited for has arrived or a timeout occurred, event handlers 
do not block normal processing but wait for the messages or timeout events in parallel 
to normal process flow. Furthermore, i f one of the messages specified in event handlers 
arrives or a specified timeout occurs, this waiting for messages or timeout events is not 
terminated as in the case of a p i c k activity but remains active until the containing 
scope or the process as a whole (in the case of event handlers specified at process level) 
terminates. For information flow purposes, event handlers may be thought of as a p i c k 
activity contained in a endless loop (wh i l e activity with Boolean constant true as 
looping condition) that executes parallel to the activity specified in a scope or parallel to 
the activity specified at process level, that is contained in a flow activity together with 
this scope-level or process-level activity. From this consideration it becomes clear how 
event handlers have to be treated during information flow analysis during security 
policy assessment of a BPEL script containing such handlers. 
4.5 Considerations with Respect to Separation of Duty Constraints 
In addition to the security policy-derived restrictions to Web service invocation from 
within a business process discussed in Section 4.3, there is another type of restriction 
derived from security policies not considered in this analysis. This type of restriction is 
known as separation of duty (SoD) and well-studied in literature (Wijesekera and 
Jajodia. 2003; Schaad and Moffett, 2002, Schaad et al., 2006, Ribeiro et a/., 2000b). 
Restrictions of this type are either static or dynamic. The static version demands that 
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multiple roles of a particular set of roles cannot be adopted by the same principal (user) 
over time (i.e., once a principal has adopted one role he will never adopt any fiirther role 
of the same set). Applying such constraints to Web service invocations implies that 
different Web services requiring access privileges associated with different roles in such 
a set cannot be invoked by the same principal. With respect to business processes, this 
means that the same process is not allowed to invoke Web services belonging to 
different sets of access privileges constrained by so-called static SoD policies. 
The other form of SoD, called dynamic SoD, is a relaxation of the static variant in that it 
allows the same principal to adopt different roles subject to SoD constraints, but not at 
the same time or not in the same operational context. It should be noted that these 
alternate dynamic conditions sometimes are treated as separate subtypes of dynamic 
SoD (Schaad and Moffett, 2002, pp. 19, 20). The typical example for this type of con-
straint is a payment process where the issuer of a payment order is not allowed to 
release or authorize the same order while he may well be allowed to release a payment 
not initiated by himself. In the context of Web services and business processes, 
enforcement of dynamic SoD constraints is based on the history of Web services 
invoked and instances of business objects handled. 
While static SoD constraints may be enforced at business process level by not invoking 
Web services associated to conflicting privileges in the same process, controlling the 
obedience of dynamic SoD constraints in business processes based on mechanisms 
provided by BPEL seems to be difficult or even impossible. Reasons for this are the 
lack of information and the lack of influence on who is going to invoke the Web service 
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offered by a business process. Remember that BPEL does not offer any mechanisms for 
access control. This difficulty exists independently of whether the process has been 
defined locally or remotely. Approaches to cover dynamic SoD requirements not 
necessarily specific to business processes or Web services exist {e.g., Schaad and 
Moffett, 2002, Botha and Eloff, 2001). Obviously, enforcement of dynamic SoD con-
straints require mechanisms applied at runtime. 
Since the approach presented in this PhD thesis is mainly based on static analysis of 
business process semantics, it is not claimed that this approach will be appropriate to 
contribute to enforcement of dynamic SoD requirements. However, static SoD con-
straints may be adequately addressed in this approach. A discussion of this and some 
sort of workaround for dynamic SoD constraints are contained in Chapter 5. 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the results of analysing BPEL as a specification language for its 
security-relevant semantics have been presented. In order to aim for universal results 
not bound to particular examples of BPEL scripts or application contexts in which 
business processes are defined, preferably small building blocks of BPEL-definable 
business process semantics were searched for which sensible observations with respect 
to security relevance could be made. Combinations of BPEL activities with policy-
induced restrictions to Web service invocations have turned out to be suitable for that 
purpose. These combinations were referred to as security-relevant semantic patterns of 
BPEL. Such a pattern may be thought of passing information sent or received in 
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messages exchanged with Web services or invokers of the business process (i.e., 
invokers of the Web service provided by the business process) and subject to particular 
access of information flow restrictions through a particular language construct of BPEL. 
For the purpose of this analysis, security policy derived restrictions to be obeyed at 
business process layer (and not already dealt with by security mechanisms provided in 
layers below the business process layer) when considering CBPs in a business-to-
business context have been categorised. Investigation of their security relevance when 
combined with the different BPEL activities leads to requirements for information flow 
analysis to be performed when assessing a BPEL-defined business process for 
compliance with security policy. 
The results of the analysis of security-relevant semantics of BPEL-defined business 
processes, as described in this section, have been published as a conference paper 
(Fischer ei al, 2006), with an extended version being presented in a related journal 
paper (Fischer et al., 2007b). 
Based on these results concerning the security relevance of the semantic pattems, a 
formalism was defined to specify existing security policies in such a way that checking 
BPEL scripts for compliance with these policies will considerably be facilitated. How 
this formalism was established and how security assessment can gain from this 
formalism, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5 SPECIFICATION O F S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y FOR COMPLIANCE 
ASSESSMENT OF CBPS 
The analysis of BPEL as a specification language in the former chapter has revealed the 
potential of violating security policy-implied restrictions to Web service invocation, in 
particular with respect to information flow of values passed to and returned from Web 
services. One major aim of this research was to define methods that support assessment 
of remotely defined business processes for compliance with security policies in force at 
the location of execution. 
The methods proposed herein for facilitating this compliance assessment were inspired 
by concepts developed in conformance testing methodology of open systems as defined 
in a series of International Standards (CTMF, Conformance Testing Methodology and 
Framework, ISO/IEC 9646, part 1-7; particularly (ISO, 1994)). In this series of 
International Standards, a so-called Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement 
proforma (PICS proforma) has been defined for the following purpose: Having defined 
a (standardised) test suite for conformance testing of implementations claiming to 
comply to a specific communication protocol in the OSI protocol stack, the problem 
occurs that this test suite has to be adapted before testing a particular implementation. 
Given the variety of implementation options provided by those OSI protocol 
specifications, it has to be assured that only the ftinctionality an implementation claims 
to support will be subject to conformance testing. Therefore, the PICS proforma which 
is specific to a particular OSI protocol specification provides a checklist to be filled in 
by the implementing side to indicate which options provided by the protocol 
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specification for implementation choice has been actually chosen and which alternatives 
have been adopted. Submitting this filled-in PICS proforma to a test centre as a first 
step during conformance assessment enables the test centre to perform a static analysis 
of the choices taken for the implementation in order to assess that this particular set of 
choices is conformant to the standard in question. For instance, a standard may require 
that a particular choice of an option A may only be allowed i f a choice of a related 
option B is made in a specific manner (e.g., support both options or none of them). After 
checking a PICS proforma for conformant choices of options, the test centre will be able 
to adapt the test suite to be used during conformance testing of the particular protocol 
implementation to the indications made in this proforma. For example, i f a PICS 
proforma for an implementation under test (fUT) would state that the optional 
functionality Fl is not supported by the current implementation and the test centre has 
already verified that this was in accordance with the standard, then the test suite would 
be adapted in such a manner that test cases that are to test support of functionality Fl 
would not be performed during the process of conformance testing for that particular 
lUT and that the non-support of this functionality would be consistent throughout the 
implementation. For instance, refusing to support optional functionality Fl in one 
context (e.g., during connection establishment), but supporting the same functionality 
Fl in another context (e.g., during data transmission) would usually result in a fail 
verdict of the conformance test assessment. 
This approach of indicating a variable set of implementation options to be used for 
adapting the type and amount of test cases to be performed during conformance testing 
of a particular implementation that claims to comply to a protocol standard gave raise to 
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the method proposed in this project in order to support and facilitate the assessment of 
compliance with security policies for remotely defined BPEL scripts. After analysis of 
the security-relevant features of BPEL, a checklist comparable to a PICS proforma 
(ISO, 1994) can be provided, that allows for specification of security policy-derived 
restrictions to be obeyed during execution of remotely defined BPEL scripts. This way, 
the security policy of a domain executing remotely defined BPEL scripts is re-specified 
in order to only contain rules that are relevant at the business process layer in this 
context. This checklist is called a security policy statement (SPS) proforma or template 
here and will be used to indicate allowed features of BPEL in compliance with the 
security policy. Unlike with PICS proformas in conformance testing of OSI protocol 
standards, the roles of filling in and using the filled-in checklist are distributed 
differently in a compliance assessment of remotely defined BPEL scripts. The SPS 
proforma will be filled in by the executing domain to indicate the security policy-
implied restrictions applicable to such BPEL scripts. A separate SPS proforma will be 
required to be filled in for each remote domain that is allowed to remotely define BPEL 
scripts for execution in a particular executing domain. The indications made in a filled-
in SPS proforma (simply called SPS in the following) will determine the kind of 
inspections to be performed during compliance assessment of a BPEL script from the 
domain indicated in the SPS as originator. A role comparable to that of a test centre in 
the conformance testing context is taken by the site performing the compliance 
assessment with security policies. 
It should be noted that though the concept of using an SPS proforma to direct the 
compliance assessment procedure was inspired by experiences from the field of 
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conformance testing of open communication protocols, in other respects the methods 
proposed here for compliance assessment expressly are not based on testing techniques 
but are rather comparable with code inspection techniques. This distinction matters in 
particular because testing always requires some sort of execution of the code or script 
under test but code inspection does not since it may and usually will be performed prior 
to execution of the object under consideration. 
5.1 Redefinition of Security Policy in Terms of Security-Relevant Semantic 
Patterns 
As already indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the security policy is to be re-
specified to express the restrictions applicable to remotely defined business processes. 
This re-specification shall be performed in such a manner that assessing a remotely 
defined BPEL script for compliance with these restrictions can be performed in an as 
straightforward as possible way. The results of the analysis of security-relevant 
semantics of BPEL in the former chapter have shown that such semantics is closely 
related to restrictions implied by security policies to Web service invocations. 
Therefore, the idea for re-specifying security policies in order to facilitate compliance 
assessment is to provide indications of the classified restrictions summarised in Table 1 
for all Web services, a remotely defined BPEL script is allowed to invoke. In this way, 
the assessment process receives its directives what to watch out when assessing a BPEL 
script. Based on the information contained in an SPS, the assessment process can check 
whether only allowed Web services are to be invoked in a BPEL script under 
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consideration and that invocations occur in a manner compliant to the restrictions 
imposed to them by security policies of the executing domain. 
As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3 above, most restrictions imposed to Web service 
invocations with respect to particular input and output parameters imply information 
flow analysis in forward and backward direction in order to verify that the restrictions 
are obeyed. Therefore, indications made relating to restriction classes of Web service 
invocations already provide an outline of the particular checking methods to be applied 
when a BPEL script is subject to compliance assessment. 
5.2 Security Policy Statement 
In a security policy statement (SPS), the security policy of one particular domain {e.g., 
domain B in Figure 2 that is the executing domain) with respect to one particular other 
domain {e.g., domain A in Figure 2 that is the domain specifying a BPEL script and 
sending it for remote execution) is expressed in terms of restrictions or allowance of 
security patterns identified and analysed in Chapter 4. To this end, the internal and 
external Web services, that are allowed to be invoked by a business process executing in 
domain B on behalf of domain A will be indicated together with the restrictions 
applying to their respective input and output parameters. In order to structure the 
information contained in it, the SPS is composed of several parts each of which 
containing particulars related to a group of related restrictions, for instance, related to a 
specific Web service that is allowed to be invoked. 
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In order to discuss this approach in more detail, an example presenting some typical 
information contained in an SPS template is shown in Figure 5. The exemplary entries 
contained in this SPS are taken from the example CBP in Chapter 2. 
5.2. / Security Policy Statement Template 
The SPS starts with its main part, called Security Policy Statement Template. In its top 
part, it comprises information identifying the issuing domain that is the executing 
domain to which the security policy expressed in the SPS relates (i.e., the domain of the 
gearbox manufacturer in this example). Furthermore, the application context and the 
foreign domain to which the restrictions in the SPS relate are identified. Here, this is the 
application context of processing orders for gearboxes and parts of it for the domain of 
the car manufacturer sending a BPEL script for execution in domain B. 
It should be noted that distinguishing be^veen different application contexts in different 
SPSs provides the capability to indicate different sets of allowed and disallowed Web 
service invocations for the same pair of executing domain and defining domain. For 
example, i f the same car manufacturer is also allowed to send BPEL scripts for business 
processes executed in a context where construction plans for new gearbox models are to 
be exchanged between the car manufacturer and the gearbox manufacturer and 
manipulated in cooperation between the development units of both organisations, it can 
easily be imagined that a totally different set of Web services would be involved and, 
therefore, a different SPS would apply to this application context even though the same 
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organisations (/.e., the car manufacturer and the gearbox manufacturer) would be 
involved. 
Security Policy Statement 
For executing domain: GearBoxManufacturerdomainB 
(possibly additional identifying information not of interest in this example) 
For application context: Order management of gear boxes and part of it 
Relating to BPEL scripts from domain: CarManufacturer.domainA 
Invocation of Web services residing outside current domain allowed? Y/N: Y 
If yes. indicate allowed external Web services: 
UR1: priceQuotation.SubSubplierl.domainCI Reference to E W S R S EWSR1 
URI: priceQuotation.SubSubplier2.domainC2 Reference to E W S R S EWSR2 
URI: checkOffer.CarManufacturer.domainA Reference to E W S R S EWSR3 
Indicate restricted internal Web sen/ices: 
URI: checkStock.domainB Reference to IWSRS tWSR1 
URI: calculateOffer.domainB Reference to IWSRS IWSR2 
URI: completeOffer.domainB Reference to IWSRS IWSR3 
Indicate unrestricted Internal Web Services: 
URI: none 
(Further indications with respect to allowed semantics (e.g. allowed processing on 
information gainedfrom Web service invocation may be indicated here) 
Figure 5: Security Policy Statement Template with Exemplary Entries 
After this identification part, information follows indicating Web services that are 
allowed to be invoked by a business process defined by and executed on behalf of the 
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foreign domain (domain B in this example). First, there is a general indication as to 
whether invocation of Web services in foreign domains will be allowed at all or not. I f 
invocation of such Web services is not generally prohibited, there wil l be indications of 
particular foreign Web services that are allowed to be invoked each identified by its 
respective LIRI. In this example, the respective Web services priceQiiotation of the two 
sub-suppliers Ci and C 2 as well as the call-back Web service checkOffer of the car 
manufacturer are foreign Web services allowed to be invoked. For each allowed 
external Web service, a so-called External Web Service Restriction Statement (EWSRS) 
will be referenced that contains further information concerning restrictions with respect 
to the particular Web service. In this example, three external Web services have been 
indicated. Only those external Web services indicated explicidy in this part of the SPS 
will be allowed to be invoked by a remotely defined BPEL script from domain A. One 
could think of some sort of wildcard indication, for example in place of a constituent 
of an URI, i f all Web services of a particular domain or sub-domain are allowed to be 
invoked. However, since only examples involving a small number of allowed Web 
services are used in this PhD project, the definition of such notational shortcuts is out of 
scope in this research. 
After indication of the allowed extemal Web services, there are two flirther groups of 
indications in Figure 5 relating to Web services of the executing domain: one group 
relating to internal Web services for which invocation is restricted and one group 
relating to internal Web services that may be invoked without any restrictions. 
Remember that the last group corresponds to class 1 of Table 1, albeit only for internal 
Web services. For the purpose of this study it is supposed that only intemal Web 
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services of class I actually occur and that all external Web services fall into one of the 
classes 2 through 6. In cases where unrestricted external Web ser\'ices actually occur, 
this could be indicated by omission of the reference to an EWSRS for the particular 
Web service. 
While the last type of entry {i.e., Web service of class 1) does not require any further in-
formation besides the LTRI of the particular Web service, for each restricted internal 
Web service there is a field indicating a reference to a so-called Internal Web Service 
Restriction Statement (IWSRS) similar to the indication for external Web services 
above. In this example, the three intemal Web services of the gearbox manufacturer 
depicted in Figure 4 are indicated as allowed intemal Web services with restrictions. 
Both the group of EWSRS and the group of [WSRS referenced in Figure 5 are 
considered part of the SPS as a whole. 
The SPS is understood to indicate all of the security-relevant semantics in a BPEL script 
from the specific foreign domain (domain A in this example) acceptable for cross-
domain deployment. Therefore, all other security-relevant semantics not explicitly 
stated in an SPS as being allowed, will be prohibited. In particular, only the Web 
services explicitly stated in this part of the SPS will be allowed for invocation in a 
BPEL script from domain A. It should be noted that Web services with class 2 
restriction {i.e., Web services that are not allowed to be invoked at all) will never occur 
in an SPS. 
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At the bottom of the SPS template, there is lef^ room for further indications with respect 
to allowed semantics in a BPEL script from the particular defining domain. Such 
indications may include allowed processing to be performed on information returned by 
Web services invoked. As discussed above, BPEL does not provide any means for any 
kind of data manipulation (besides assignment from one location to another location). 
Should there be a requirement to perform data processing within a BPEL script, 
language elements of other XML-based specifications have to be imported. Usually, 
XPath (Berglund et a!., 2006) will be used for such purposes of data processing in 
BPEL scripts. In this research, performing data processing as part of a BPEL-defined 
business process is supposed to always be achieved by Web service invocation such that 
import of elements of Xpath (or similar specifications) are not required. Thereby, 
considerations with respect to the security relevance of performing data processing 
within the BPEL script could be avoided. Note that it is always possible to define a Web 
service to perform a particular data processing (though it may sometimes be more 
convenient to perform it directly within the BPEL script). Therefore, this assumption 
made here does not restrict general applicability of the approach proposed in this thesis. 
5.2.2 Internal IVeb Service Restriction Statement 
In Figure 6, there is an example of an IWSRS template in order to clarify the typical 
information contained in this part of an SPS. The example relates to the checkStock 
Web service of the gearbox manufacturer. In this template, there is room for indicating 
security policy-induced restrictions of any kind that relates to the input and output 
parameters of the particular Web service. In the heading of this template, the identifier 
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of the IWSRS used for referencing it in the main part of the SPS is indicated. Further, 
the URJ for invoking the particular Web service and the URJ of the WSDL definition of 
this Web service are given. 
Restrictions relating to Web service parameters are those of the classes 3 through 6 in 
Table 1 above. The indications are grouped by restriction classes starting with the 
restrictions to input parameters. For class 4 restrictions that always relate to optional 
input parameters indications may be made whether the particular parameter is 
prohibited to be used or always required in order to avoid default mechanisms defined 
for this parameter to be applied. For class 5 restrictions, the input parameters along with 
the respective allowed values or range of values are to be indicated here. Similariy, for 
class 6 restrictions, the input parameters along with the respective allowed sources of 
values passed to these parameters are to be indicated. Such sources may be other Web 
services or particular output parameters of other Web services. 
For the output parameters of a Web service, only class 3 restrictions apply. For every 
restricted output parameter, a target relaxation may be indicated. While class 3 
restricted output parameters are generally allowed to be passed freely to domain-intemal 
Web services (this was anticipated in Section 4,1.4), the values returned by those 
parameters are restricted to be carried to any external Web service or passed as message 
or part of a message sent back to the invoker of the business process in a r e p l y 
activity. I f there are any exceptions to this restriction, they may be indicated in a 
separate column by specifying possible external targets (Web services or particular 
parameters of Web services) to which a visibility-restricted value may exceptionally be 
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passed while still being restricted from passing to all other external target. This type of 
relaxation for visibility-restricted information is called target relaxation in Figure 6 and 
the following parts of the thesis. 
Internal Web Service Restriction Statement IWSRS-ID IWSR1 
URI for invocation: checkStock.domainB 
URI of WSDL: wsdI.checkStock.domainB 
Restrictions with respect to Input parameters 
Usage restrictions of optional parameters 
Parameter: ListOfltems (indicate required or forbidden) required 
Value range restrictions Allowed values or value range: 
Parameter: Processing Priority Prio1, Prio2 
Restrictions related to sources of values Allowed source(s) of values: 
Parameter: none -
Restrictions with respect to output parameters Target relaxation 
Parameter: ListOfltemsToOrderFromSubSupplierl C1.priceQuotatfon.iist 
Parameter: AccessCredentiaForSubSupplierl C1 .priceQuotation. credential 
Parameter: ListOfltems ToOrderFromSubSupplier2 C2.priceQuotation.list 
Parameter: AccessCredentiaForSubSupplier2 C2.priceQuotation. credential 
Figure 6: Example oflnternal Web Service Restriction Statement 
In the case of the checkStock Web service of Figure 4, the input parameter passing the 
list of items to be ordered is supposed to be an optional parameter for exemplary 
purposes only. In practice, it may not be particularly sensible to have this parameter as 
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an optional input parameter. In the fWSRS of Figure 6, however, though being defined 
as an optional parameter, the ListOfltems input parameter is indicated as required when 
this Web service is invoked in a BPEL script from the car manufacturer. Also for the 
purpose of this example, a parameter controlling the priority of order processing is 
anticipated. Suppose that this parameter is capable of adopting one of the values in the 
set {Prio1, Prio2, Prio3} where Prio1 indicates the lowest and Prio3 the highest priority. 
The IWSRS in Figure 6 indicates that business processes specified by the car 
manufacturer for controlling the order processing in domain B are restricted to the two 
lowest priority levels while the highest priority level of order processing is not allowed 
to be used. Source-restricted input parameters (class 6 restrictions) are not present in 
this example. 
With respect to the output parameters of this Web service, several restrictions apply. As 
discussed in Section 2.2, the checkStock Web service is supposed to possibly return two 
lists of items that are found to be out of stock and, therefore, have to be ordered from 
the two sub-suppliers. Along with the respective list of items to be ordered, the Web 
service returns a credential required to access the respective Web service 
priceQuotation. These two pairs of output parameters intended to be passed to sub-
supplier I and sub-supplier 2, respectively, are visibility-restricted since they are not 
allowed to be carried outside the domain of the gearbox manufacturer except to the 
respective Web service of the two sub-suppliers. Therefore, in the FWSRS example it is 
indicated that the list of items to be ordered from sub-supplier 1 though declared as 
visibility-restricted is allowed to be passed to the input parameter list of Web ser\'ice 
priceQuotation of sub-supplier 1. Similarly, the credentials required to be granted 
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access to this Web service from within the domain B are also declared as visibility-
restricted with a target relaxation to the input parameter credential of Web service 
priceQiiotation of sub-supplier I . In an analogue manner, the output parameters of Web 
service checkStock intended for sub-supplier 2 are indicated as visibility-restricted in 
the IWSRS with target relaxations to the respective input parameters of Web service 
priceQuotation of sub-supplier 2. 
5.2. J External Web Service Restriction Statement 
In Figure 7, an example of an EWSRS is shown in order to clarify the typical informa-
tion contained in this part of an SPS. The content of an EWSRS is quite similar to an 
IWSRS discussed in the previous section. Both templates differ in the indication 
whether values of output parameters of the external Web service are allowed to be 
assigned to input parameters of internal Web services. Such assignments may be 
prohibited as a matter of precaution in cases where the nature of output values returned 
by an external Web service is to a large extent unknown at the domain issuing the SPS 
and, therefore, should not be used as input parameters in invocations of internal Web 
services. When this restriction applies, the values returned by such an external Web 
service, unless they are visibility-restricted, may still be used for flow control purposes 
within the BPEL script or may be passed as input parameters to other extemal Web 
services, preferably in the same domain as the Web service addressed by the current 
EWSRS. 
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External Web Service Restriction Statement EWSRS-ID EWSR1 
URI for invocation: priceQuotation.domainCI 
URI of WSDL: wsdl.pn'ceQuotation.domainCI 
Restrictions with respect to input parameters 
Usage restrictions of optional parameters 
Parameter: credential (indicate required or forbidden) required 
Value range restrictions Allowed values or value range: 
Parameter: none -
Restrictions related to sources of values Allowed source(s) of values: 
Parameter: list 6. checkStock. ListOfItems ToOrder 
FromSubSupplierl 
Parameter: credential B. checkStock.AccessCredentiaFor 
SubSupplierl 
Restrictions with respect to output parameters Target relaxation 
Parameter: priceDeliverylnformation 6. calculateOffer. infoSupplierl 
Assignment of output values to internal Web services allowed? Y/N: / 
Figure 7: Example of External Web Service Restriction Statement 
The example EWSRS in Figure 7 relates to the external Web service priceQuotadon of 
sub-supplier I from the CBP example in Figure 4. The Web service is supposed to take 
two input parameters, list and credential. The input parameter list accepts the list of 
items inquired while the input parameter credential receives the credential required for 
granting access to this Web service. As can be seen in Figure 7, the input parameter 
credential has simultaneously two kinds of restrictions, namely a usage restriction 
(class 4) and a source restriction (class 6). This means that though this input parameter 
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has been defined to be optional, this parameter is required when used within a BPEL 
script from the car manufacturer and the input value has to be equal to the value of the 
output parameter AccessCredentialForSubSupplierl returned by Web service 
checkStock. Also for the second input parameter of the priceQuotation Web service, a 
restriction apply with respect to sources of the values passed to it. The value passed has 
to be the value of output parameter ListOfltemsToOrderFromSubSupplierl returned by 
Web service checkStock. 
The only output parameter of this Web service is visibility-restricted. In the case of an 
extemal Web service, such a restriction includes internal Web services of the invoking 
domain unless exceptions related to specific internal targets apply. In the current 
example, with the output parameter priceDeliverylnformation a target relaxation is 
contained in the EWSRS indicating that values returned in this parameter may be passed 
to the parameter infoSupplierl of Web service calciilateOffer in domain B. In addition, 
the EWSRS indicates that values returned by this Web service may be used as input 
parameters of Web services internal to domain B, an indication with no specific 
meaning in this case since the only output parameter is visibility-restricted with an 
exception referring to an input parameter of a specific Web service in domain B. In 
other cases, this indication would allow output parameters without visibility restriction 
to be used throughout domain B as input parameters of internal Web services. 
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5.3 Approach to Reduce Complexit> of Security Policy Statements 
In cases where the differentiation between allowed and disallowed semantics (mainly 
relating to allowed and disallowed processing of information within a remotely defined 
business process) would be too complicated leading to complex rules in the 
corresponding security policy statement, the complexity may be reduced in a manner 
described in this section. 
allowed 
area of complicated 
differentiation 
(a) (b) 
Figure 8: Steps for Reduction of Complexity of Security Policy Statement (Part 1) 
In Figure 8a, the allowed and disallowed semantics of a remotely defined business 
process is depicted within the circle. Consider the situation where part of the allowed 
semantics would impose complicated differentiation from disallowed semantics as 
indicated in Figure 8b by the differently coloured section in the allowed part. In order to 
reduce the complexity of the security policy statement, a local Web service could be 
established providing the semantics represented by this area. This is indicated in Figure 
9a by the section taken out of the circle. After having defined a Web serv ice for this 
purpose, there is no longer any need for a business process to encompass this part of the 
allowed semantics as part of its intrinsic processing. Instead, a business process can 
invoke this newly defined Web service for this purpose. 
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aiiov^d 
dsallowed 
encapsulate allowed 
semantics in this area 
into new Web service 
allowed 
disallowecL 
move boundary 
between allowed and 
disallowed semantics 
for business process 
(a) (b) 
Figure 9: Steps for Reduction of Complexity of Security Policy Statement (Part 2) 
Since there is no requirement to perform such processing within a business process, this 
formerly allowed semantics may be forbidden for a business process. Doing so means to 
move the boundary between allowed and disallowed semantics to enclose the formerly 
allowed section into the disallowed area. This step is depicted in Figure 9b. In order to 
disallow the formerly allowed part being used, the security policy statement would drop 
the complicated specification of the semantics in the removed area. 
altowed 
disallo 
additionally allow 
•invocation of new 
Web service 
allowed 
disallowed 
union of restncted 
semantics for 
business process 
and of new Web 
service provides 
originally intended 
semantics 
(a) (b) 
Figure 10: Steps for Reduction of Complexity of Security Policy Statement (Part 3) 
Further, to allow the new Web service being invoked by a business process, the security 
policy statement has to be modified as indicated in Figure lOa. The new security policy 
113 
Chapter 5 - Specification of Security Policy for Compliance Assessment of CBPs 
would instead add the new Web service to the list of local Web services allowed to be 
invoked. 
Finally, the complicated differentiation beUveen allowed and disallowed semantics in 
the security policy statement can be avoided, still preserving the originally allowed 
semantics of Figure 8a as the overall semantics for a business process. However, as 
indicated in Figure 10b, the original semantics now is provided by the union of the 
semantics of the new Web service and the remaining allowed semantics for the business 
process. 
5.4 Coping with Dynamic Aspects in Static Compliance Analysis 
The approach presented in the former sections relies on static analysis of a BPEL script 
prior to execution. Therefore, this approach inherently is not suited to be applied for 
checking restrictions with respect to Web service invocations that involve dynamic 
aspects. Obviously, such checking may only be performed at runtime. An example of a 
restriction to Web service parameters that require dynamic checking can also be given 
by reference to the example CBP in Figure 4. Consider a restriction of the input 
parameter listOfltems of Web service checkStock requiring that only items from a 
predefined set of items are allowed to be included in this list when this Web service is 
invoked by the control business process on behalf of the car manufacturer. The reasons 
for such a restriction could be that the gearbox manufacturer produces gearboxes for 
different car manufacturers and each car manufacturer is only allowed to make inquiries 
with respect to the gearboxes (or parts thereof) produced for his own types of cars, but 
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not with respect to gearboxes of competitive car manufacturers. Since the contents of 
this list passed from the invoker of the business process (i.e., from the car manufacturer 
in this example) will only be known at runtime, any static analysis will fail to assert the 
observance of this restriction in a BPEL script received from the car manufacturer. 
However, similar to the approach to reducing complexity of the restrictions in an SPS 
introduced in the former section, a method for coping with dynamic aspects of policy-
induced restrictions can be provided. While in Section 5.3, parts of the processing logic 
of a potential business process requiring too complicate a specification of restrictions 
has been moved to a separate Web service thereby relieving the requirement to express 
the complex restrictions in the SPS, here for enabling dynamic validation of restrictions, 
dynamic checks are moved to Web services defined for this purpose. 
In this way, checking of restricted value ranges of input parameters that only can be 
performed at runtime will be moved from the static analysis prior to execution to 
dynamic analysis during runtime. In order to still validate that a BPEL script conforms 
to the security policy during pre-execution assessment, the SPS needs to be amended in 
order to cope with dynamic aspects of compliance assessment. To this end, the input 
parameter of the Web service with value range restrictions to be checked during runtime 
will be specified as an input parameter with source restrictions and the Web service 
containing the dynamic check of this input parameter against the list of allowed values 
will be indicated as the only allowed source of values for this parameter. 
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In the example above, a new Web service checkltemUstFromDomainA would have to 
be defined at the site of the gearbox manufacturer (domain B) that would accept the 
listOfltems passed from the car manufacturer as its input parameter and return this list as 
output parameter in case its content conformed to the value range restriction with 
respect to the car manufacturer (domain A). When the check failed, this new Web 
service could return an empty list to indicate this situation or raise some particular sort 
of exception. In addition to provide this new Web service, the SPS of domain B with 
respect to BPEL scripts received from domain A would have to be modified to require 
that values for the input parameter listOfltems of Web service checkStock are source-
restricted (class 6 restriction) with allowed source to be the output parameter of this new 
Web service checkitemListFromDomahiA. In this way, it could be checked prior to 
execution of a BPEL script received from the car manufacturer that the restrictions with 
respect to the list content passed to the Web service checkStock either would have been 
obeyed or an empty list will get passed to this Web service (possibly causing a fault in 
this Web service or, altematively, an exception already would have been raised before 
invoking this Web service). With this modified SPS, the compliance assessment can 
still be performed as usual prior to executing a BPEL script and result in a pass verdict 
even though the actual list contents passed from the car manufacturer is not known at 
this time. Of course, after this extension to the SPS has been made, a compliant BPEL 
script from the car manufacturer actually has to invoke the new Web service prior to 
invoking the Web service checkStock and pass the output parameter from this new Web 
service to the input parameter listOfltems of checkStock. Important but not particular to 
this new Web service is the requirement that provisions are in place to securely prevent 
tampering of the processing logic of this Web service, particularly from outside 
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domain B or by activities performed in a business process remotely defined and brought 
into domain B for execution. 
This approach to introduce specific Web services for the purpose of perfomiing 
dynamic compliance checks of Web service parameters at runtime is, to a certain extent, 
similar to that proposed by Sirer and Wang (2002) where also Web services are 
amended by specific security policy enforcement code to perform dynamic compliance 
assessment during execution. In their approach, the security policy first has to be 
expressed in a special purpose specification language based on first order logic and 
temporal logic. Once security policies have been specified in this formal manner, 
instrumentation code is generated automatically to be executed as a preamble in Web 
service invocation. While this approach relies completely on security policy enforce-
ment at runtime enforcement, the approach presented in this thesis performs as much 
enforcement as possible during compliance assessment based on static analysis of BPEL 
scripts prior to execution and uses instrumentation of the business process only for 
checking that need to be performed at runtime. In contrast to the approach proposed by 
Sirer and Wang, the additional Web services used herein for checking value (range) 
restrictions of input parameters of specific Web services are not generated automati-
cally, but have to be hand-coded to suit the particular purposes. This may be considered 
a drawback compared to the approach of Sirer and Wang. However, rendering specifi-
cation of security policy in terms of formal logic unnecessary which is the case in the 
approach proposed here is deemed to over-compensate this possible drawback of not 
providing automatic generation of Web services for dynamic security checking. 
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5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the transformation of the results from the analysis of BPEL with respect 
to its intrinsic security relevance into a method to re-formulate the security policies in 
terms of allowed and disallowed security-relevant semantic patterns in a BPEL script 
has been described. The purpose of this is to support the compliance assessment of 
remotely defined BPEL scripts with security policies in force at the executing site in 
such a manner that this assessment is facilitated considerably and becomes suited to be 
performed automatically. To this end, a set of checklist-typed tabular forms have been 
introduced in this chapter that are intended to accommodate the policy-implied rules to 
be observed by all BPEL scripts coming from a particular remote site. The whole of the 
rules derived from security policies and determined to be relevant in the business 
process layer are referred to as security policy statement (SPS). The rules indicated in 
these forms relate to Web services allowed to be invoked by such BPEL scripts. I f 
invocations of a Web service is only acceptable with certain restrictions to its input and 
output parameters, such restrictions are indicated in special forms on a per Web service 
basis. Though presented in this chapter in a form intended for human readability, it is 
obvious that the contents of SPSs have to be converted to a form better suited for 
machine processing when the compliance assessment is to be performed in a automatic 
manner. This will be further discussed in Chapter 7. 
Though compliance assessment is based on static analysis of a BPEL script prior to its 
execution that by nature is not able to cope with restrictions only checkable at runtime, 
an approach to also cover such restrictions as much as possible during static analysis 
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has also been shown. Comparable approaches to the one proposed here to complement 
the static compliance assessment towards dynamic aspects of information flow control 
also have been proposed in related work. Though not original to this research, however, 
this approach to cope with restrictions that can only be checked dynamically combined 
with the original work presented here seems to be useful to broaden the applicability of 
the methods proposed for compliance assessment in practice. 
In the next chapter, the process of assessing the compliance of BPEL scripts with 
security policies will be discussed in more detail. Also, different ways to delegate the 
task of compliance assessment to dedicated nodes within or outside the security domain 
of an organisation and to share the resources used for compliance assessment (even 
across organisational boundaries) will be proposed. 
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6 S E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT FOR B P E L 
SCRIPTS 
After analysis of security-relevant behaviour of BPEL and re-specification of security 
policies in terms of so-called security-relevant semantic patterns of BPEL, the 
procedure of assessing compliance of remotely defined BPEL scripts with security 
policies of the executing domain wil l be described in this chapter. Further, the workflow 
of cross-organisational deployment of BPEL scripts including assessment of compliance 
prior to executing them is considered in more detail. Finally, approaches to delegation 
of compliance assessment in a distributed environment are presented. 
6.1 Procedure of Compliance Assessment 
The function of compliance assessment as used in the context of this research is to make 
sure that only BPEL scripts completely observing the restrictions implied by the 
security policies of the executing domain will be accepted for execution. Such 
assessment of a remotely defined BPEL script can be (and usually will be) conducted 
prior to executing the business process specified by this script. Therefore, the methods 
proposed here are chosen such that they do not require the business process defined by a 
particular BPEL script to be executed for testing or monitoring purposes in order to 
assess its compliance with the policy-induced rules derived from security policies for 
the business process layer. Since possible violations of such rules can be detected in this 
way before these violations would be committed by the business process being 
executed, the approach proposed here provides a very effective way of security policy 
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enforcement. This procedure of assessing compliance with security policies prior to 
execution may be considered a check point in the sense of security patterns (Yoder and 
Barcalow, 1997). 
6, L1 Prerequisites for Compliance Assessment 
The main prerequisite for the compliance assessment besides the BPEL script under 
consideration is the SPS specified by the executing domain with respect to the remote 
domain sending a BPEL script for execution and the application context of the business 
process to be defined by this script. Furthermore, the WSDL definitions of all Web 
services indicated in the SPS are required. Finally, the WSDL definition of the Web 
service provided by the business process resulting from execution of the BPEL script 
will be required, in particular in cases when this WSDL definition is specified 
beforehand by the executing domain in order to indicate the required Web service this 
business process has to provide to its environment, fri the latter case, the messages to be 
exchanged with the environment are predefined and, therefore, are likely to be 
addressed in the SPS i f subject to security policy-implied restrictions. When, for 
example, the predefined input messages to be accepted by the business process under 
consideration are restricted with respect to particular value ranges (class 4 restrictions), 
then this could be indicated in the SPS as a restriction to the internal Web service that is 
going to be provided by this business process^. Since the names of the Web service and 
^ Though this Web service will usually be invoked from outside the executing domain, it is considered an 
internal Web service of the executing domain because it will be provided within this domain. 
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its input and output parameters will be known from the WSDL definition, restrictions 
with respect to its input and output parameters can be specified in the SPS, 
I f such a WSDL definition of the Web service provided by the business process under 
consideration is not available beforehand because, for example, this definition is 
provided by the site specifying the BPEL script and varies between different BPEL 
scripts coming from this site, then this WSDL definition usually will not be available at 
the time when an SPS is specified and, thus, restrictions to input and output parameters 
of this Web service cannot be included in the SPS. Nevertheless, restrictions to input 
and output parameters of this Web service may be implied by other restrictions in the 
SPS. For instance, one restriction generally applicable to messages sent to an invoker of 
the Web service in a reply to a message received from this invoker states that such 
outgoing messages must never contain any visibility-restricted information unless the 
receiver of this message is indicated as an allowed extemal target of this information. 
Even though not addressed in the SPS, the WSDL definition of the business process 
under consideration is usually required for the purpose of information flow analysis to 
be conducted during compliance assessment. 
6.7.2 Analysis of Declaration Part in BPEL Script 
Given all these prerequisites are available, the process of compliance assessment can 
start with searching the partner link declarations of the BPEL script for Web services 
invoked by the business process. Each Web service found this way has to be present in 
the SPS since this contains an exhaustive list of all Web services allowed to be invoked 
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with or without further restrictions. A Web service found in a partner link declaration, 
but not in the SPS, could still be acceptable i f it can be verified by static analysis o f the 
BPEL script that the particular partner Hnk w i l l not be used in the process definition 
part. I f this cannot be verified or i f a more rigorous approach is taken not to accept any 
Web service in the declaration part that is not indicated in the SPS (independent of its 
actual use in the business process), then the assessment o f the BPEL script already is 
terminated here with a fai l verdict that means the BPEL script does not comply with the 
applicable security policy. 
6,1,3 Checking BPEL Script for Security-Relevant Semantic Patterns 
I f the BPEL script has passed this first stage o f compliance assessment, then the parts 
defining the process logic have to be searched for invocations o f Web services allowed 
by the SPS. For every Web service invocation it is checked whether for the particular 
Web service there are restrictions associated wi th its input and output parameters in the 
SPS. I f restrictions are found, their obedience has to be assessed. For restrictions o f 
classes 3, 5, and 6, information f low analysis in forward or backward direction has to be 
performed as required. Restrictions o f class 4 may be checked by simply verifying that 
optional input parameters are provided i f they are indicated as required or not used i f 
indicated as forbidden. During information flow analysis in forward direction with 
respect to visibility-restricted information, care has to be taken to watch out for possible 
covert channels o f information f low. Semantic patterns susceptible for the establishment 
of covert channels have already been identified in Tables 2 and 3 above. Therefore, it is 
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known what to look for with respect to covert channel detection during compliance 
assessment. 
6,1,4 Example of Covert Channel Establishment in BPEL Script 
An example for the establishment o f a covert channel is depicted in Figure 11. Suppose 
that Web service IVA has an output parameter priceA indicating the price o f an item A 
that is visibility-restricted (class 3 restriction), that is, it must not be leaked to an 
information sink outside the executing domain. This Web service is invoked and its 
output parameter priceA is assigned to a variable P. After this assignment, a branch 
occurs in the process f low using an i f activity. The branching condition depends on the 
variable P containing the visibility-restricted price o f item A. I f this value is smaller 
than 100 currency units (of an arbitrary currency that does not matter in this example) 
then the process f low branches to the invocation o f a Web service Wj. I f the value is 
greater than or equal 100 currency units, then Web service W^^  is invoked. 
I f at least one or even both o f these Web services and f f ^ are external Web services 
(e.g., Web services within the domain where the BPEL script was specified) or happen 
to exhibit otherwise externally observable behaviour, then by observing the behaviour 
of the business process defined by the BPEL script containing the snippet in Figure 11 
conclusions can be drawn on the price o f item A. Supposing that only the invocation o f 
Web service IVj is observable f rom outside the executing domain then, i f the observer 
recognises that Wj is invoked (either directly because IVi resides in the domain o f the 
observer or indirectly via the externally observable behaviour o f Wj), he knows that this 
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price is below 100 currency units. Othenvise, i f the invocation o f Wi cannot be 
observed, the observer who can be assumed to know the BPEL script because it was 
specified at his site can conclude from this observation that Wf has not been invoked at 
that point in the business process but that has been invoked and, therefore, that the 
price o f item A is greater than or equal to 100 currency units. Thus, a covert channel 
relating to the visibility-restricted information on the price o f item A would have been 
established by the snippet o f a BPEL script in Figure 11. 
invoke WS 
f P<100 
Invoke WS,^  nvoke 
Figure 11: Covert Channel Example 
It can easily be seen that the leakage o f information relating to the price o f item A that 
is only at a very coarse level in this example (either P<100 or P>IOO) can be refined to 
arbitrary granularity by cascading a series o f such branching dependent on the value o f 
variable P. In order to avoid such covert channels, any f low control decision based on 
class 3 restricted information would be banned here and, therefore, when detected in 
compliance assessment, would cause a BPEL script containing such semantic patterns 
to be considered non-conformant to the security policies under consideration. Note that 
this rigorous approach to cope with avoidance o f covert channels could be relaxed by 
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applying more sophisticated algorithms for covert channels detection, for instance, 
checking whether alternative flows selected by branching on visibility-restricted 
information actually exhibits any distinguishing behaviour observable from outside. 
However, elaborating such algorithms is beyond the scope of this research project and. 
therefore, left for further studies. 
6,L5 Information Flow Analysis in Parallel Flows 
Besides covert channel detection, also analysis o f information f low in parallel flows 
needs fiirther consideration. During this analysis, actual and potential parallel flows are 
distinguished. Actual parallel flows are those specified in parallel versions o f f o r E a c h 
activities or in f l o w activities without any links that restrict the activities contained in a 
f l o w activity from being performed in parallel. These parallel flows w i l l actually be 
performed in parallel when the business process is executed. By contrast, potential 
parallel flows w i l l not be performed in parallel during business process execution but 
only specify alternatives for the f low o f business logic from which only one at a time 
wi l l actually be chosen during execution. Such potential parallel flows are presented by 
the alternate flows in an i f activity and in a p i c k activity as well as the flows specified 
in event handlers, fault handlers (including flows specified in compensation handlers 
initiated by those fault handlers), and termination handlers. The flows specified in these 
handlers can be considered alternate flows to the main flow o f the process since the 
reason for activating the flows specified in these handlers may occur at any time during 
normal process execution. For example, the activities in a fault handler w i l l be executed 
instead o f the main process flow when the corresponding exception caught by this fault 
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handler occurs. This usually can happen at virtually every moment during process 
execution. Therefore, fault handlers establish potential parallel flows to each other and 
to the part o f the process (a particular scope or the whole process) to which they relate. 
The same is true for event handlers and termination handlers. 
For the purpose o f information f l o w analysis, actual and potential flows are not 
distinguished since the static analysis performed here considers all potential flows in a 
process at once instead o f only one actual choice o f them as w i l l be the case during 
business process execution. For instance, when analysing information f low in backward 
direction as required for restrictions o f classes 5 and 6 applicable to input parameters o f 
a Web service invoked, all potential values that could have been assigned to a variable 
that w i l l be passed as a particular restricted input parameter have to be considered. 
Hence, all parallel flows in backward direction from the Web service invocation 
towards the start o f the business process have to be checked for assignments to the 
particular variable irrespective o f whether these flows are actual parallel flows or only 
potential parallel flows. I f at least one value assigned to this variable in any o f the 
(actual or potential) parallel flows would contradict the restriction imposed to the input 
parameter o f the Web service for which the variable is used as actual value, then a 
violation o f the SPS would have been detected resulting in a fai l verdict for the 
compliance assessment. Although the process described here may appear to be 
complicated, an implementation o f this process (or at least important parts o f it) in a 
research prototype has shown that the proposed approach to compliance assessment o f 
BPEL scripts prior to execution is viable and appropriate for automatic processing. O f 
course, the notation o f an SPS as introduced here in a tabular form that accommodates 
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human readability w i l l have to be converted into another fonm that is better suited for 
machine processing. This w i l l be explained in further detail in Chapter 7. 
6.2 Workflows in Distributed Definition and Execution of C B P s 
In this section, a set o f workflows w i l l be defined that combine the tasks required in 
defining, deploying, assessing and executing BPEL-defined business processes in such 
a manner that the temporal order o f them is clarified. When CBPs are defined and 
executed in a distributed manner as discussed in eariier chapters, the definition, 
deployment, and assessment o f compliance with security policies prior to execution 
represent a workf low o f its own and is not considered part o f executing the business 
process being defined by a cross-organisational deployed BPEL script. In fact, even 
several separate sub-workflows can be distinguished in the approach to security policy 
enforcement proposed in this project. On the executing side, when the approaches 
proposed in this thesis are to be used, prior to acceptance o f any remotely defined BPEL 
script f rom a foreign domain, an SPS has to be assembled to define the security policies 
in a way that is well-suited for compliance assessment o f the BPEL scripts accepted for 
execution. The tasks involved here are depicted in the workf low diagram o f Figure 12. 
As in the example o f a CBP in Figure 4, the executing domain is denoted domain B and 
the domain defining BPEL scripts for execution in domain B is denoted domain A. The 
workf low o f Figure 12 w i l l be performed within domain B. In general, domain B can 
allow different domains to bring in BPEL scripts for execution. To differentiate between 
these different domains, an index is added to the domain identifier {e.g., domain Aj ) 
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(start ) 
Analysis of security 
pollcyw.r.t execution 
of BPEL-deflned 
business processes 
Derivation of 
restrictions for BPEL 
scripts from external 
domains 
Specirication of 
SPSB(A„CtXj)forext 
domains A« and appl. 
contexts Ctxj 
I 
Figure 12: Workflow for Specification of Security Policy Statements 
The workf low in Figure 12 starts with an analysis o f local security policies to determine 
which parts o f them are relevant at the business process layer. As already discussed in 
Chapter 4, for example, providing secure communication between partners in a distribu-
ted environment is treated at layers below the business process layer. After determi-
nation o f the security policy-implied rules that are relevant at the business process layer, 
the restrictions for cross-domain deployed BPEL scripts for the different domains A j 
potentially sending such scripts to the executing domain B are derived from these rules. 
As a final step in this workflow, the security policy statements are specified for all 
foreign domains A j that w i l l be allowed to send BPEL scripts for execution and for all 
application contexts CtXj that are to be distinguished when assessing such scripts for 
compliance with local security policies. The SPS for the /-th foreign domain and they-th 
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application context is denoted SPSeCAj, Ctxj) where the index B is there to indicate that 
this is an SPS representing the security policy o f domain B. 
(start ) 
Accept BPEL script BS 
for appl. context CtXn 
from domain Am 
Assess script BS 
for compliance with 
SPSB(Am.CtXn) 
BPEL script Bl 
from domain Am 
P A S S 
Assign PASS 
verdict to script 
SPSo(A„Ctx,) 
Assign FAIL 
verdict to script 
QndJ 
Figure 13: Workflow for Compliance Assessment of B P E L Script 
Defining a BPEL script in domain Aj and sending it to domain B for execution 
constitutes a second workf low not depicted in a figure here because o f its trivial nature. 
This workf low in domain Aj corresponds to the workf low in domain B shown in Figure 
13. In this workflow, domain B receives a BPEL script BS for a particular application 
context CtXn f rom a domain Am- In the next step, the appropriate security policy 
statement SPSeCAm, CtXn) is retrieved and used for compliance assessment o f script BS 
with the local security policies in domain B, As discussed in Chapter 5, given all 
restrictions derived from security policies relevant at the business process layer have 
been formulated in terms o f allowed and disallowed semantic patterns o f BPEL, the 
security assessment can be performed prior to execution as a straightforward look-up o f 
130 
Chapter 6 - Security Policy Compliance Assessment for BPEL Scripts 
the script for allowed patterns and the validation that no disallowed information f low 
(explicit or implicit) occurs. I f the script BS passes the assessment, then a verdict o f 
PASS is assigned to this script. Otherwise, a verdict o f F A I L w i l l be assigned to it . It is 
taken for granted that appropriate provisions are made in the executing domain B to 
prevent tampering the BPEL script and the verdict assigned to it before and during its 
execution. Supplying a modification-secure checksum to the script and its verdict, for 
example, may be a means to f u l f i l this requirement. 
(start) 
Check outcome of 
assessment for 
BPEL-script BS 
Verdict 
B P E L s c r i > | B s 
fromdomai 
Y ^ \ N 
Verdict=PASS? 
Accept to deploy 
(script for executioi 
Execute business 
process defined 
by script BS 
\7 
Refuse to deploy 
and execute script 
( j n d j 
Figure 14: Workflow Deployment and Execution of B P E L Script 
As a final workflow, the deployment and execution o f the business process being 
defined by the BPEL script BS is depicted in Figure 14. This workflow, again, is 
performed in domain B. Before deployment and execution o f script BS, this workf low 
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checks the verdict assigned to the script by the workf low in Figure 13. Af^er termination 
o f this workflow, a BPEL script with a PASS verdict is installed on an appropriate 
platform of domain B in such a way that it can be used as part o f a CBP spanning at 
least the domains Am and B. This implies that invocation o f the business process (more 
precisely, invocation o f the Web service provided by this business process) w i l l be 
possible and allowed for invokers f rom domain Am (i.e., the defining domain o f the 
script BS). 
6.3 Delegation of Security Policy Compliance Assessment 
Even with the definition o f SPS in the manner described in Chapter 5, the task o f 
analysing security-relevant semantics o f BPEL scripts and matching against restrictions 
imposed by policies still is not, in every case, trivial and it might not always be capable 
o f being performed automatically. Therefore, it may be desirable to reduce the effort for 
installing appropriate resources in the executing domain by not having the workf low of 
Figure 13 performed at every node in domain B that w i l l execute remotely defined 
BPEL scripts. This can be achieved by delegation o f at least part o f the compliance 
assessment to dedicated locations. Based on the consideration o f the workflows 
involved as described in the former section, several approaches to distribution o f the 
tasks between different nodes in a cross-organisational environment w i l l be discussed. 
This distribution may occur within the domain executing the BPEL script under 
consideration or across domain boundaries. 
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6 . i . / Domain-Internal Delegation of Compliance Assessment 
A promising approach to reducing the effort o f compliance assessment is the delegation 
o f parts o f the assessment to a dedicated node within a domain B instead o f performing 
this task at every node in this domain. That means that the steps o f compliance assess-
ment (step 2) and assigning the verdict related to the outcome of this assessment to the 
script under consideration (step 3) in the workf low depicted in Figure 13 may be dele-
gated to a dedicated node in domain B. This node is called security assessment centre 
(SAC) for domain B. Hence, this node is labelled BSAC- Advantages related to this 
delegation o f security assessment to a domain-internal SAC include that human 
interaction, when required during the assessment o f scripts with respect to compliance 
with security restrictions, may be more easily provided at a single node (or only few 
nodes, i f single point of failure would be an issue) in a domain compared to the situation 
when being distributed across the domain. It may also facilitate use o f specific software 
required for this purpose when it only needs to be available at a single instance both 
with respect to potential license fees and effort for user training. 
domain B 
Figure 15: Domain-Internal Delegation of Security Assessment 
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In Figure 15, this domain-intemal delegation is illustrated. After delegation to node 
BsAC, all other nodes in domain B would access this specific node before executing a 
remotely defined B P E L script. This security look-up requires, that the B P E L script in 
question be sent to node BSAC by any executing node (node E P B I , EPB2, EPB3, ...EPen, 
in the example o f Figure 15 where E P means executing platform) together with an 
indication o f the domain from where the B P E L script originates, say Am, and the 
application context for which the script is intended for, say CtXk- On completion, the 
results o f the assessment process w i l l be sent back from node BSAC to the node sending 
the inquiry for assessment, say node EPsn, and depending on the result, the B P E L script 
may be executed on node EPsn or not. Since the SPSeCAm, CtXk) o f domain B with 
respect to domain Am as the origin o f the B P E L script and the application context CtXk 
may be supposed to be already available at node BSAC, there is no requirement to also 
transmit this SPS from node EPon to node BSAC in conjunction with the B P E L script. 
6,3,2 Domain-External Delegation of Compliance Assessment 
In cases where several domains in a C B P context allow for mutual exchange o f B P E L 
scripts and their execution (provided they comply to the respective local security 
policies), the analysis and assessment could fijrther be centralised to a particular node 
shared by all domains for this purpose. This node would desirably be a node extemal to 
all domains involved in the particular C B P context in order to avoid conflict o f interest 
as much as possible. Such a domain-independent assessment centre (denoted ESAC) is 
shown in Figure 16. After delegation has taken place, nodes o f all domains accepting 
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BPEL scripts f rom other domains in this CBP context would inquire node ESAC for 
security assessment when they receive a new script for execution. 
Figure 16: Outsourcing of Security Assessment 
In this case, not only the BPEL script subject to security assessment and the indication 
of its origin and application context has to be conveyed to the assessment centre, but 
also the SPS against which compliance assessment is required has to be provided to the 
SAC. This could be done prior to sending the BPEL script for assessment, for instance, 
at the time when a domain subscribes to the assessment service by sending all relevant 
SPSs to the SAC. Sending SPSs to the SAC would also be required each time an SPS 
changes or a new SPS has been defined. Alternatively, the SPS for a specific originating 
domain can also be sent each time a BPHL script received from this domain is conveyed 
to the SAC for compliance assessment. 
While security and trust aspects do not necessarily play a central role when the 
delegation o f the assessment task takes place within one single domain, these aspects 
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become important when delegation occurs across domain boundaries. Further, when the 
assessment task is outsourced to a node outside the own domain, say ESAC as shown in 
Figure 16, the communication to and from node ESAC is required to be secure both with 
respect to authentication and data integrity. The results o f assessing a particular BPEL 
script must unambiguously be attributed as coming from the SAC and have not been 
forged on their way back to the node mandating the assessment. Since mechanisms for 
achieving authenticated communication and providing integrity o f information 
conveyed over a communication channel are well-known, appropriate provisions are 
taken for granted and, therefore, this aspect is not discussed here in further detail. 
However, the issue o f privacy o f information contained in security policies that have to 
be conveyed to the external assessment service, as well as the issue o f trust implied in 
this delegation o f assessment, have to be considered in order to render this approach 
feasible (e.g., questions with respect to trustworthiness o f the results returned by the 
assessment centre have to be coped with). Furthermore, when assessment is delegated to 
a third party serving several domains, possible conflict o f interest may become an issue 
when the SAC serves both the originating domain and the executing domain o f a BPEL 
script. These aspects need to be considered carefully before taking the approach to 
install a centralised assessment centre for domain-independent use by different partners 
involved in a CBP context. However, detailed considerations concerning trust relations 
required in such a delegation process were beyond the scope o f this research project. 
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6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, based on the re-specification o f the security policies o f the executing site 
leading to a so-called SPS as introduced in Chapter 5, it has been described how the 
compliance assessment o f a BPEL script under consideration can be conducted as a 
check for observance o f the restrictions indicated in the SPS in a manner similar to desk 
check that is without any requirement to execute the script for checking purposes. Most 
o f the restrictions to be followed relate to information flow. Thus, the information flow 
in a BPEL script has to be analysed in order to check the compliance to these 
restrictions. As a special aspect, information flow analysis in potential parallel flows 
(i.e., alternate flows in a business process to be chosen a runtime) has to be conducted. 
It turned out that for the purpose o f static information flow prior to execution, potential 
parallel flows have to be treated quite the same as actual parallel flows in a business 
process. As already pointed out in the former chapter, detection o f potential covert 
channels that may be suited to leak protected information in an indirect manner by 
selection between different embodiments o f observable behaviour o f a business process 
dependent on such information is also very important. 
The different workflows involved in deployment o f BPEL-defined business processes 
across organisational boundaries and in compliance assessment wi th security policies o f 
the executing domain have also been discussed in this chapter. Ways o f delegating the 
task o f compliance assessment from the particular node where a BPEL script is 
executed to a centralised assessment centre within the same domain as the executing 
node or to a domain-external assessment centre serving several domains has been 
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discussed. In particular, with delegation o f compliance assessment beyond the 
boundaries o f one's own domain, the issues with respect to privacy o f information 
contained in security policies and to trust with respect to the results returned when 
domain-external assessment is employed have been addressed. However, the latter 
aspects were beyond the scope of this project. 
Having developed in the former chapters the approaches to facilitate security policy 
compliance assessment o f remotely defined business processes based on a thorough 
analysis o f security-relevant semantics o f BPEL and making use o f a specified form o f 
security policy definition (called SPS in this project), the proof o f concept for these 
approaches provided by developing a research prototype to show their viability and 
suitability for automatic processing w i l l be described in the next chapter. 
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7 PROOF O F CONCEPT BY R E S E A R C H PROTOTYPE 
In the former chapters, the ideas contributed during this research project have been 
developed and described in detail. In particular, the definition of SPS to facilitate the 
process of compliance assessment was explained and the procedure of checking a BPEL 
script for its compliance with local security policies has been outlined. In order to 
provide an effective and efficient method for security policy enforcement in the context 
of business process execution where the corresponding BPEL scripts defining the 
processes have been defined remotely from the location of their execution, the 
procedure of comphance assessment should preferably be capable of being performed 
automatically (at least major parts thereof). 
Although the aim from the outset was to potentially come up with methods that are 
suited for automatic processing, it is not clear from their description in the former 
chapters that this goal has actually been reached. Therefore, a research prototype has 
been developed in the course of this project that implements essential aspects of the 
ideas proposed. The purpose of this prototype was to serve as proof of concept for the 
viability of the approach. The prototype implementation is presented in this chapter and 
it is discussed to what extent the proof of concept has been achieved in this way. 
7.1 Scope of Research Prototype 
Before starting the development of the prototype, the scope of the proof of concept and 
the resulting requirements with respect to the ftinctionality to be covered by the 
prototype were established. 
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As already mentioned in Chapter 4, the BPEL standard has undergone modifications 
during the course of this research project. While the results presented in Chapters 4 
and 5 have been adapted to the version of BPEL that finally has been adopted as an 
OASIS standard (Alves et a!., 2007), the work on the research prototype started before 
this version was available and, hence, has been based on a former version of BPEL 
(Arkin et al., 2004) that distinguishes from the latest version with respect to some 
activities added or renamed during the last phases of the standardisation process. 
However, the principles of automatic compliance assessment based on an SPS can also 
be demonstrated using the former names of the activities in question. 
Since the only purpose of the prototype is to demonstrate that the approach developed 
during the research project, and presented in the former chapters, is actually suited for 
automatic processing, the implementation is restricted to a representative subset of the 
potential functionality. However, the selected elements had to cover all aspects that 
were essential and predominantly new in this approach. As a starting point for selecting 
the functionality to be incorporated, the indications in Tables 2 and 3 with respect to the 
security relevance of the different semantic patterns were taken. These indications 
denote the required checkings to be performed during compliance assessment in order 
to verify whether the particular restriction is obeyed or not. The coverage of the 
different checkings occurring in these tables that are provided by the prototype is 
indicated in Table 4. 
As can be seen from the last column in Table 4, aside from two exceptions, all types of 
checking required during the compliance assessment process developed in this research 
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project and described in the previous chapters have either been implemented in the 
prototype (I) or can be implemented in a trivial manner (T) or its implementation can be 
deduced from other implemented checking in a straightforward manner (D). 
The two exceptions are the checks for observation of value range restrictions in the case 
of dynamic values (i.e., values only know at runtime because they result from inbound 
messages received by the business process) being passed in a outgoing message 
(marked N in Table 4), and the checks for covert channel prevention with the 
v a l i d a t e activity (marked E in Table 4). In the first instance, this type of checking 
cannot be performed during static analysis of a BPEL script prior to execution since it 
requires dynamic checking only possible at runtime. However, an approach to cover the 
requirements for dynamic checking during static analysis as far as possible has been 
described already in Section 5.4. Following this approach, dynamic checking for 
compliance to value range restrictions (class 5 restrictions, denoted by IFA(r) in Table 2) 
is converted to source restrictions (class 6 restrictions, denoted by IFA(s) in Table 2). 
Since the checking for compliance to source restrictions is implemented in the 
prototype, this type of checking may be considered covered by the prototype as far as 
possible by its nature. 
Check ing 
Type P u r p o s e of C h e c k Coverage 
IFA(v) Check visibility restriction by information flow analysis in 
forward direction 1 
IFA(r) Check value range restriction by information flow analysis in 
backward direction (see note 1) TIN 
IFA(s) Check source restriction by information flow analysis in backward direction 1 
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C h e c k i n g 
Type P u r p o s e of C h e c k Coverage 
u Check whether usage of optional input parameter comphes to restriction of options (forbidden or required) T 
time(v) Check that no visibihty-restricted information is used to deter-mine timeout period D 
except(v) 
Check that no visibility-restricted information is used to deter-
mine exception to be thrown or be included as part of ex-
ception data passed along with the exception 
D 
exit(v) Check that no visibility-restricted information is used to deter-mine reason for termination D 
scope(v) Check that no visibility-restricted information is used to deter-mine <scope> to be compensated (see note 2) D 
val(v) 
Check that visibility-restricted information are not type-vali-
dated with respect to types implying restricted ranges of 
allowed values (see note 3) 
DIE 
branch 
cond(v) 
Check that no visibility-restricted information is used to deter-
mine branch to be selected in alternate flows (see note 4) 1 
loop 
cond(v) 
Check that no visibihty-restricted information is used to deter-
mine conditions controUing the iteration in a w h i l e or 
r e p e a t U n t i l activity 
D 
iteration 
bound(v) 
Check that no visibility-restricted information is used to deter-
mine bounds of iteration in a consecutive or parallel version 
of f orEach activity (see note 5) 
D 
preempt(v) 
Check that no visibiHty-restricted information is used to 
determine condition for pre-emptive termination of a 
f orEach activity (see note 5) 
D 
I Type of checking implemented 
D Type of checking not implemented, but implementation easily deducible from coven 
channel detection scheme as implemented for the switch activity 
T Type of checking not implemented, but implementation considered trivial 
N Type of checking not suitable for sialic analysis since requiring dynamic checking at 
runtime (viable by the scheme outlined in Section 5.4). 
E Type of checking not implemented requiring non-trivial extension of current flinctionaliiy 
(see note 3) 
Note 1: Checking of value range restrictions during static analysis is either trivial (if constant values 
specified within the BPEL script are involved) or impossible during static analysis (if dynamic 
values extracted from messages received during runtime are involved) 
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Note 2: The compensateScope aciivily requiring this type of checking has been introduced 
comparatively late during the standardisation process of BPEL. However, similar to checking for 
covert channel detection with other activities, its implementation is deducible in an easy way 
from the covert channel detection scheme implemented for the s w i t c h activity. 
Note 3: The v a l i d a t e activity has been introduced very late during the standardisation process of 
BPEL. Therefore, checking for covert channels with this activity is not implemenied. As long as 
it is acceptable to prevent type validation of variables containing visibility-restricted information, 
this check can be implemented as a straightforward extension of the covert channel detection 
scheme implemented for the s w i t c h activity. In this case, the indication D applies. However, 
when this approach is considered to be overly strict, then a more sophisticated algorithm has to 
be implemented as outlined in Appendix A.3 that cannot be considered easily deducible from the 
covert channel detection scheme implemented for the s w i t c h activity. In this case, the 
indication E applies. 
Note 4: At the time the research prototype was conceived, the branching functionality in BPEL was 
expressed by the s w i t c h activity that has been covered by the prototype implementation. Lately 
during the standardisation process of BPEL, the s w i t c h activhy has been replaced by the i f 
activity providing the same frinciionality. 
Note 5 The f o r E a c h activity has been introduced lately during the standardisation process of BPEL. 
The two new types of checking for covert channel detection required with this new activity 
(check that neither the iteration bounds nor the conditions for possible pre-emptive termination 
of the activity depend on visibility-restricted information) are deducible in an easy way from the 
covert channel detection scheme implemented for the s w i t c h activity. 
Table 4: Coverage of Checking Functionality by Prototype 
With respect to information flow analysis, the prototype was required to cover (real or 
potential) parallel flows in a BPEL script under consideration. That means, when a 
value is passed in an outbound message (either in an invoke activity or in a r e p l y 
activity), then it has to be checked that no visibility-restricted information encountered 
in any parallel flows possibly being extracted from an inbound message (either in an 
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invoke activity, a r ece ive activity, or a p i c k activity) occurred before this point in 
a BPEL script will be included in this message. 
The prototype is designed in such a way that it analyses the main activity in the 
<process> element of a BPEL script which is typically a sequence activity. The 
support of <scope> elements contained in a process definition was not deemed to be 
required for the prototype since these elements simply serve strucmring purposes to 
limit the scope of declarations and provide a nested structure as known from other 
programming languages. This nesting of scopes does not contribute to the security 
relevance of the behaviour specified in a BPEL script. However, it slightly complicates 
information flow analysis, as scopes of variable definitions would have to be observed. 
For instance, i f variable A would contain visibility-restricted information I | from a 
Web service invocation and would be declared again in an inner scope, then assignment 
of another information I2 to variable A within this inner scope (assumed to be not 
visibility-restricted) would only conceal the visibility-restricted information l i . Thus, 
passing variable A in an outbound message to an external Web service within this 
scope would not violate the security policy. However, once the inner scope is left, the 
variable A would again contain the visibility-restricted information I | . Therefore, 
passing variable A in an outbound message to an external Web service in the 
containing scope would violate the security policy. In principle, keeping track of 
respecifications of the same variable in nested scopes does not pose a problem for the 
implementation of the assessment process but only increases the complexity of the 
storage management used for the purpose of information flow analysis (see 
Section 7.4.3 below). 
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The checking of l i n k s in flow activities (cf Section 4.2.3) was not considered for 
implementation in the prototype. Such links are security-relevant when the flow conn-ol 
effectuated by these constructs is made dependent on visibility-restricted information. 
Checks that are required to prevent the establishment of covert channels using links are 
very similar to the check branch cond(v) that are required for covert channel prevention 
with if activities. Since this checking has been implemented in the prototype (in con-
junction with the former s w i t c h activity), the similar checks for l i n k s were not 
deemed to contribute new insights when implemented in the prototype. Ignoring links 
that are not dependent on visibility-restricted information may possibly make the 
assessment process overly strict, as sequential flow potentially induced by such links 
would be neglected in backward information flow analysis. However, this can only lead 
to refusal of BPEL scripts as non-compliant that could be accepted as compliant when 
the sequential flow caused by such links would have been honoured during information 
flow analysis. It is important that ignoring links not involving visibility-restricted 
information for flow control purposes can by no means lead to false acceptance of 
BPEL scripts that actually are not compliant with security policies. These 
considerations justified the decision to disregard links in the prototype. 
As for the different handlers a BPEL script may contain (event handler, termination 
handler, fault handler, compensation handler), these are also not supported by the 
prototype since this also would only increase the complexity of the implementation 
without contributing new insights. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, all such handlers 
except event handlers do not contribute security-relevant semantics but only increase 
complexity of information flow analysis since all these handlers represent additional 
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potential parallel flows to the main activity in a BPEL script. However, treatment of 
parallel flows in information flow analysis already has been catered for in the prototype 
such that supporting these handlers would not introduce new aspects to the imple-
mentation. 
Event handlers that contribute security-relevant behaviour to a business process may be 
treated in a similar manner as the p i c k activity as also argued above in Section 4.4.2. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the p i c k activity requires both the IFA(v) type of 
checking and the time(v) type of checking. Table 4 shows that these both types of 
checking are covered by the prototype (implemented or deducible from implemented 
functionality). Therefore, support of event handlers in the prototype has been deemed 
non-essential for the proof of concept and, hence, is not provided. 
Though initially envisaged in the research project, the idea to incorporate the imple-
mentation of the prototype within one or several BPEL enabled platforms has been 
abandoned. The reason for this was the consideration that striving for integration of the 
security policy assessment into such a platform on one hand side would cause a 
significant overhead for acquisition of required skills to be able to integrate such 
procedures properly, and on the other hand side would not contribute significantly to 
the proof of concept needed in the context of this research project. The question to be 
answered by the proof of concept was not to demonstrate that integration of compliance 
assessment procedures is feasible, but rather that checking for compliance between a 
BPEL script and restrictions indicated in an SPS could be performed automatically with 
as little as possible human intervention. Even when only available as a program exe-
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cutable separately from any BPEL-enabled platform resulting in an assessment of com-
pliance with local security policies, the proof of concept could be regarded as success-
ful. Therefore it was decided to implement the prototype as a stand-alone program not 
caring about possible integration in a BPEL-enabled platform. 
7.2 Machine-Readable Format of Security Policy Statement 
While the examples of SPS and its components in Chapter 5 were given in human-
readable tabular format, it is obvious that it is straightforward to define appropriate 
X M L schemas in order to be capable of presenting the information in machine-
processible form. Details of this XML-based format will be explained in this section. In 
particular, it is argued why existing approaches to expressing access control policies in 
terms of Xpath (Fundulaki and Marx, 2004; Kuper et a!., 2005), or standardised 
formalisms for expressing security policies as provided in XACML (Moses, 2005), or 
SAML (Cantor et al., 2005) have not been adopted and extended for being used for the 
proposed approach to express restrictions on allowed semantics of BPEL. 
A complete XML-based formal specification for the SPS used in the approach to 
security policy assessment is contained in Appendix A.2. While the schema is provided 
there using the formalisms of X M L Schema (Thompson et al., 2004), the excerpts 
shown in this chapter use a more condensed notation oriented on the meta syntax of 
regular expressions. This compact form of schema representation is also used in the 
BPEL specification (Alves et al., 2007). The notational conventions are explained there 
{ibid., p. 9) and provide the following meta characters for indicating repetition of 
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elements and optional parts. An asterisk sign (*) behind an X M L element indicates that 
zero, one or more occurrences of that element being allowed at this place. Similariy, a 
plus sign (+) behind an X M L element means that one or more occurrences are allowed. 
In addition, a question mark (?) behind an X M L element identifies an optional element 
that may occur once or may be absent. Finally, alternate choices are denoted by a bar (|) 
between alternatives. 
7.2. / Rationale for Definition of XML Schema in Current Form 
The X M L schema for the SPS was specified without any recourse to existing 
approaches for specifying security policies either from standardisation such as SAML 
(Cantor et aL, 2005) or XACML (Moses, 2005) or from research (e.g., Sirer and Wang, 
2002). Reason for this was that none of these approaches comprises means of 
expressing the aspects of security policies that were relevant in this context. On the 
other hand, defining the required X M L schema based on an existing approach to specify 
security policies would have implied too much an overhead that would have been 
inherited this way. It has been decided that definition of the required X M L schema for 
SPS based on such approaches only would have unnecessarily complicated the 
implementation of the research prototype without offering any significant advantages. 
In contrast, specifying an X M L schema to the very purposes of this project could result 
in a much more streamlined definition and, therefore, any overhead imposing additional 
effort to the implementation of the prototype could be avoided. The proof of concept 
achievable with the prototype was not diminished by not using an X M L schema based 
on any existing approach for expressing security semantics. 
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7,2,2 A nnotated SPS Schema in Condensed Notation 
In order to explain the X M L schema that has been provided to specify an SPS in a 
machine-readable form, the notational conventions as described above are used to 
depict parts of the schema in a condensed way. In Listing 3, the overall structure of an 
SPS is shown. 
<8pS> 
< i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s 
remoteDomains " f oreignDomain" 
localDomain= " localDoznain" 
a p p l i c a t i o n C o n t e x t s " c o n t e x t " / > 
<iwsrs> ... </iwsrs>* 
<ewsrs> ... </ewsrs>* 
<unrestrIntWB> ... </unrestrIntWs>* 
<unrestrExtWs> ... </unrestrExtWs>* 
</sps> 
Listing 3: Overall X M L Structure of SPS 
The element < i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s > indicates the domain defining the BPEL script and 
the domain where it is to be executed in the attributes remoteDomain and l o c a l -
Domain, respectively. The application context the SPS relates to can be specified in the 
attribute a p p l i c a t i o n C o n t e x t . For instance, for the car manufacturer from the 
example in Figure 4, a different set of security policy derived restrictions could apply i f 
he would also be entitled to remotely define business processes in the context of 
communicating construction plans for new gearboxes with the gearbox manufacturer. 
The elements <iwsrs> and <ewsrs> denote restrictions with respect to internal and 
external Web services, respectively, one element for each Web service indicated. Si-
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milarly, the elements <unrestrlntws> and <iinrestrExtWs> denote unrestricted 
internal and external Web services (class 1), respectively. 
In Listing 4, the structure of the element <iwsrs> is depicted. The element <ewsrs> 
has a similar internal structure. The element <operation> denotes the name of a Web 
service operation and indicates the corresponding port type by a URJ. The <input> and 
<output> elements indicate restrictions to the corresponding type of Web service 
parameters, one for each type of message a Web service operation is able to receive or 
send, respectively. 
<lwsrs> 
<operatlon name="operationName" 
portType="URIofPortType"> 
<input> ... </input>* 
<output> ... </output>* 
</operation>* 
</iwsrs> 
Listing 4: Structure of Internal Web Service Restriction Statement 
From Listing 5, the structure of the element <input> can be seen. It is used to indicate 
restrictions applying to the input parameters of a Web service. The element may contain 
the attribute s o u r c e R e s t r i c t e d to indicate whether all input parameters are source 
restricted (class 6) or not. I f this attribute is missing it defaults to the value false. I f so, 
the required originating Web service(s) for a value to be allowed is indicated in one or 
more <service> element(s) contained in the < s o u r c e R e s t r i c t i o n > element. More 
than one such originating Web service may be indicated to allow for alternative sources. 
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<input xnessage="messageNaine" 
sourceRestricted="true|£alse"?> 
<so u r c e R e 8 t r i c t i o n > 
< s e r v i c e portType=URIofPortType" 
operations"operationName"/>+ 
< / s o u r c e R e s t r i c t i o n > ? 
<part names"partName" 
r e s t r i c t e d O p t i o n a l = 
"presentOrNot|forbiddenPart|requiredPart"? 
v a l u e R e s t r i c t e d = " t r u e | f a l s e " ? > 
s o u r c e R e s t r i c t e d = " t r u e j f a l s e " ? 
< s o u r c e R e s t r i c t i o n > 
< s e r v i c e portType= "URIofPortType" 
operations"operationName"/>+ 
</sourceReBtriction>? 
< v a l u e R e s t r i c t i o n > 
<pennittedValue> . . . </pennittedValue>-f 
< / v a l u e R e s t r i c t i o n > 7 
</part>* 
</input> 
Listing 5: Structure of Restriction Indication for Input Parameters 
In addition, at the part level there is an optional indication (via attribute 
r e s t r i c t e d O p t i o n a l ) whether a specific input parameter in spite of being defined as 
optional must not be used or is required to be used (class 4). This information is not 
provided on the message level, that is, for all input parameters at once. Such a shortcut 
for indicating class 4 restrictions for all input parameters has not been recognized as 
being required in the schema. It should be noted that having class 4 restrictions for all 
input parameters is not equivalent to a class 2 restriction for the Web service as a whole. 
There may be cases, where it is forbidden to pass any value with a Web service invoca-
tion, but still the Web service is allowed to be invoked (without passing any value to it). 
I f not all, but only specific input parameters are restricted, this is indicated in the 
<part> element contained in an <input> element. Again, it may be indicated whether 
an input parameter contained in the message representing the union of all input para-
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meters of a Web service is source restricted or not (class 6). I f so, the <part> element 
in turn contains an element < s o u r c e R e s t r i c t i o n > with the same internal structure 
as discussed above for the message level. 
Furthermore, via the attribute v a l u e R e s t r i c t e d it can be indicated at the part level 
that a specific input parameter may only be used with certain values (class 5). The 
permitted values are specified in one or more <permittedvalue> elements contained 
in the element <part>. Obviously, the indication of value restriction is only sensible at 
the part level, since the permitted values have to be specified separately for each input 
parameter affected by a class 5 restriction. 
<output messages"messageName ri 
v i s i b i l i t y R e s t r i e t e d : = " t r u e | f a l s e " ? > 
< targe t R e l a x a t i o i i > 
<domain name="doinainURI" /> + 
</targetRelaxation>* 
<part naine="partName" 
v i s i b i l i t y R e s t r i e t e d = " t r u e | f a l s e " ? > 
< t argetRelaxation> 
<domain names"domaintJRI "/>+ 
</targetRelaxation>* 
</part>* 
</output> 
Listing 6: Structure of Restriction Indication for Output Parameters 
To conclude the discussion of the X M L schema for SPS, the structure of the element 
<output> is depicted in Listing 6. Similar to the indication of source restriction in the 
<input> element, visibility restriction may be indicated on the message level and on 
the part level via attribute v i s i b i l i t y R e s t r i c t e d . As a special case, visibility 
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restriction may be relaxed to cope with the situation in which one or several domains 
are allowed to see an otherwise visibility-restricted value. 
An example for such a relaxation is the lists of items to be ordered from the sub-
suppliers in the example of Figure 4. These lists have their visibility restriction relaxed 
since they are visibility-restricted to all external domains except the specific sub-
supplier the list is intended for. 
The relaxation of visibility restriction is indicated by the element <target-
Relaxation> contained within the <output> element and contains one or more 
<domain> elements to indicate the domain(s) to which the output parameter may 
exceptionally be passed. Similar to the <input> element, separate parts of the output 
message, that is, specific output parameters, could be indicated as being visibility-
restricted in one or more elements <part> contained in the <output> element. I f 
target relaxation applies to specific parts, this is indicated by < t a r g e t R e l a x a t i o n > 
elements contained within the <part> elements and specifying the domain(s) to which 
the parameter may be passed. The structures of <targetRelaxation> elements are 
the same at message level and at part level. It should be noted that in an <output> 
element relating to an internal Web service (i.e., an <output> element contained in an 
<iwsrs> element), visibility restriction does not apply to the local security domain 
where the BPEL script is to be executed. Therefore, in an <iwsrs> context, this domain 
will never be indicated in a <domain> element within the element <target-
Relaxation>. 
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7,3 Architecture of Research Prototy pe 
The research prototype was implemented using Java because of its known characteristic 
of platform independence. The prototype was designed to provide a GUI for entering 
the filenames of the SPS and the BPEL script under consideration as well as to display 
the outcome of the assessment (cf Figures 18 and 19). The WSDL definitions of the 
Web services specified in an SPS to be allowed in a compliant BPEL script as well as of 
the Web services actually being used in a BPEL script subject to compliance assessment 
should be made available to the prototype via namespace specifications in the respective 
header of the X M L documents containing the SPS and the BPEL script. 
Figure 17 provides an overview of the class hierarchy of the prototype. At the top of the 
diagram, the class CAnalysator denotes the top-level class of the prototype. This class 
will be instantiated by the GUI when the "Start" button has been actuated. The classes 
CSpsWsProducer and CBpelVariableProducer represent the parser and converter 
to internal representation for the SPS and the declaration part of the BPEL script, 
respectively. The classes depicted below the abstract class ASpsWs on the right hand 
side of the diagram provide the internal representation of the SPS while the classes 
C B p e l V a r i a b l e and below on the left hand side are used for the internal represen-
tation of variables declared in the BPEL script and the parts possibly contained therein. 
The abstract class A A c t i v i t y and the classes derived thereof contain the logic required 
to perform the compliance assessment checking for the different activities supported by 
the prototype. As can be seen from the class names, the prototype supports the activities 
invoke, assign, sequence, flow, and switch. 
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CBpelVariablesProducer CAnatysator 
t t 
CBpefVariable 
CSpsWsProducer 
• • 
< 
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CBpelVariablePart 
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ABasicActivitv AStnjcturedAdivitv 
CBpelRestBement 
C Invoke ActiviW 
CAssignActtvity 
CSequ enc eAct rvitv 
CSwitchActivitv 
CRowActivitv 
CSpsRestExtWs 
CSpsRestlntWs 
i 
1 
ASpsRestWs ASpsUnrestWs 
— 0 
CSpsRestOutput CSpsRestkiput 
CSpsUnrastExewd 
ICSpsUnrestlnttA/d 
CTarget Relaxation 
CSpsRestOutputPail CSpsRestlnputPart 
1 tSourceRestrictiori 
CDomain CService 
Figure 17: Class Diagram of Research Prototype 
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7.4 Functionality of Research Prototype at a Glance 
The BPEL script to be checked and the SPS defining the security pohcies are input to 
the prototype. Furthermore, the WSDL definitions (Chinnici et aL, 2006) of all Web 
services addressed in the BPEL script under consideration are made available to the 
prototype. While the names of the files containing the BPEL script and the appropriate 
SPS have to be entered in the GUI of the prototype, the filenames of the WSDL 
definitions of the Web services indicated in the SPS as well as of those actually invoked 
in the BPEL script were provided via namespace declarations in the header of the X M L 
document of the SPS. 
Entei URL of SPS: f i te : . . /e-^ua: ion/searPrca/SPS.CT.iml 
Enie i URL of BPEL i i i l p C [f i le . . . /e ' iaJui l lon/ceatPccd/oidgrCedrf 'dn^,b[jet 
V t i d i o : PASS 
M e i i i g t : BPCL i c i i p t p u i e d c o m p t i i n c c check 
Figure 18: Successful Assessment of B P E L Script in Research Prototype 
Without executing the BPEL script, the prototype inspects it step by step to ensure that 
the restrictions specified in the SPS are obeyed. I f any violation is detected, the program 
stops its analysis and returns a FAIL verdict. It also indicates the location in the BPEL 
script giving rise to this verdict together with the restriction in the SPS violated at that 
location. If the inspection is completed without detecting any violation of the SPS, then 
the prototype assigns a PASS verdict to the BPEL script. 
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C n m URL otSPS: f . le : . . /cvalua: ton/c€arf ' rca /SPS.CT,»ni l 
t n i e i URL o l BPEL t u I p L , f . le: . . /eM^lud' . lon/ceaiPrca/oidgrCtfarPdris , tpel 
V e i d i a TAJL 
M e t V I o U D o n gT t t c u r t t y po l l e r d c t t a c d 
Reatore The f o l l o w l n o Wtb i f i v i c * o p e i i U o n : t l l c - / n r a J u u l o n / g < u P i o d M n t e r n i r w s . C t a i P T o i l M t c l t / i n i c r n 3 l F T / c n e c L S t o d i 2 3 used 
I n an Invoke l O t v l i y (s n o i t p e c t f l e d In SPS 
Slir t 
Figure 19: Detection of SPS Violation in Research Protot>'pe 
7.4.1 Conversion of SPS into Internal Representation 
When the prototype is started via the "Start" button, it reads the X M L document 
containing the SPS and converts it into an internal representation. To this purpose, the 
SPS document is parsed using a DOM parser returning the structure of the X M L as a 
whole. By processing this structure step by step, the program creates internal 
representations for the Web services indicated in the SPS. For each restricted internal or 
external Web service (elements <iwsrs> and <ewsrs>, respectively) found in the SPS, 
an instance of class CSPSRestlntWs or CSPSRestExtWs, respectively, is created to 
contain the name and port type along with the restrictions with respect to the input and 
output parameters applicable to each Web service. For each unrestricted internal or 
external Web service (elements <unrestrIntWs> and <unrestrExtWs>, respective-
ly), an instance of the classes CSPSUnreetlntWs or CSPSUnrestExtWs, respectively, 
is created to contain just the name and port type of these Web services. 
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7,4,2 Conversion of Variable Declarations into Internal Representation 
After parsing the SPS and converting it into an internal representation, the XML 
document containing the BPEL script is parsed. Unlike the parsing of the SPS, the 
BPEL script is parsed using a SAX parser since this type of X M L parser returns the 
docutnent element by element, which has been found to be better suited for stepping 
through the BPEL script. For each declaration of a variable encountered, the program 
creates an instance of class c b p e i v a r i a b l e that contains the name of the variable, its 
message type along with the corresponding name space and all parts within this 
message type. The parts within a message type are determined by parsing the WSDL 
definition in which this message type is specified. For the purpose of the prototype it is 
assumed that the URJ indicated in the name space reference with the message type is a 
direct reference to the file containing the WSDL definition. It should be noted that, in 
general, such URJs need not to be direct references to files but may also contain some 
sort of indirect references that have to be resolved first to get access to the WSDL 
definition. Since such resolution of URIs is not essential for the proof of concept, it has 
not been implemented but only direct file references have been supported in the 
prototype. 
7,4.3 Combined Forward/Backward Information Flow Analysis 
One of the main tasks of the prototype is the information flow analysis both in forward 
and backward directions to decide whether restrictions of class 3 and class 6 would be 
obeyed by the BPEL script checked. In order to avoid repeated parsing of the BPEL 
script, the variables as being the containers of the information to be passed in outbound 
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messages to so-called partners of a BPEL script and received in inbound messages from 
these partners have been designed to be represented in a special manner. Besides 
accommodating the content representing the information stored in these variables, the 
internal representation of variables has been designed to also encompass both the 
restrictions associated with the particular information as found in the corresponding SPS 
(i.e., visibility restriction with or without target relaxation) and the source the 
information was gained from. This way, whenever an information contained in a 
variable is to be included in an outbound message of an invoke activity or a r e p l y 
activity, it can be checked whether visibihty restrictions are obeyed and, in case an 
input parameter of the Web service invoked is subject to source restriction (class 6), it 
can be determined whether the source of this information complies to this restriction. 
By collecting all restrictions implied to an output parameter of a Web service in the 
variable that accepts this parameter along with its name and the value returned by the 
Web service, information flow analysis may be performed in forward and backward 
direction by just evaluating this additional content beyond the pure value of the 
variable. 
As an example, the treatment of a Web service invocation is described in ftirther detail. 
As this treatment is the most complex one in the assessment since all types of restric-
tions may apply, describing the steps performed here gives an overview of the actions 
performed by the prototype with any BPEL activity. 
Upon encountering an invoke activity, the prototype determines the Web service 
invoked and looks up the internal representation of the SPS for the information present 
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therein for the specific Web service. I f the Web service is not found in the SPS, the pro-
cessing stops because invocation of a Web service not defined in SPS as being allowed 
represents a violation of the security policy. Remember that for every Web service that 
is allowed to be invoked an entry in the SPS has to exist as stated in Chapter 5. 
I f the Web service is found in SPS, the restrictions defined there are copied for further 
use. Since the output parameters of a Web service invocation are stored in a variable 
defined in the BPEL script, the restrictions contained in the <output> element corres-
ponding to the particular Web service are stored in the instance of the class 
C B p e l V a r i a b l e representing this variable. Along with the restrictions, the URI of the 
Web service invoked is stored in this variable for potential later use in validating poten-
tial source restrictions (class 6). 
Usually, this process of storing the restrictions for the output part of a Web service in 
the variable receiving this output will override the information stored there with former 
uses of this variable in Web service invocations. However, i f the Web service 
invocation was found in an (actual or potential) parallel flow (i.e., within a flow, 
switch**, or p i c k activity), then the information does not override the information 
already stored there but a special treatment of information flow analysis in parallel 
flows applies as will be described in Section 7.4.4. 
^ Remember that the prototype was based on a previous version of BPEL. The switch activity has been 
replaced by the i f activity in the latest version of BPEL providing esseniiaily the same functionality. 
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The variable used as input message to the Web service invoked is analysed with respect 
to the accumulated restrictions already stored in it. In this way it is checked whether 
visibility restricted (class 3) information is contained in the variable to determine whe-
ther conflicts with those restrictions would occur by passing this information to the 
current Web service. In the case that class 6 restrictions are present for the input 
parameters of a Web service, the origin of the information contained in the variable will 
be used to assess compliance or detect potential non-compliance with these class 6 
restrictions. 
Similar processing as with the input and output parameters in an invoke activity 
applies to the r e p l y and r e c e i v e activities (and the receiving parts in a p i c k 
activity), respectively. 
7.4.4 Handling of Parallel Flows in Information Flow Analysis 
I f an assignment of a message returned by an invoke activity or a receive activity is 
encountered within an (actual or potential) parallel flow in the BPEL script, the 
information stored in the variable will not be overridden. Instead, the information to be 
stored in the variable is labelled with a hierarchical flow identifier enabling 
simultaneous collection of information related to all (potential) parallel information 
flows. This way, the backward information flow analysis can use the restrictions from 
all former parallel information flows. When information from parallel flows is present 
and the same variable is re-used as container for the output of a Web service, the hierar-
161 
Chapter 7 - Proof of Concept by Research Prototype 
chical flow identifiers stored with the information has to be considered to decide which 
part of the information to override and which to keep. 
7.4,5 Implementation of Covert Channel Prevention 
In order to prevent covert channels (cf , Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003), the prototype takes 
a rigorous approach in disallowing any visibility restricted information to be used for 
flow control purposes {i.e., in the activities e x i t , throw, wait, compensateScope, 
while, r e p e a t U n t i l , s w i t c h ^ forEach, and the timeout part of p i c k ) or in a 
v a l i d a t e activity (or assign activity with attribute v a l i d a t e = " t r u e " ) . Remember 
that only the s w i t c h activity is actually implemented in the prototype. However, the 
same processing as implemented for the s w i t c h activity would also apply for covert 
channel detection when the prototype is to be amended to also support these other 
activities. 
Whenever such an activity is encountered during parsing the BPEL script, the prototype 
checks whether any variable is used in this activity. I f not, then the activity is 
considered uncritical with respect to covert channel establishment. However, i f a 
variable is detected in such an activity, then it is checked in the information flow history 
of this variable whether it contains visibility-restricted information (class 3 restriction) 
or may contain such information from potential parallel flows. If that is the case, then a 
violation of the restrictions in the SPS is assumed without further analysis whether the 
further processing actually would exhibit observable behaviour that is influenced by the 
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visibility-restricted information in such a manner that conclusion on this information 
could be drawn. 
This rigorous approach to covert channel prevention may be too strict in some 
instances, but it assures in any case that no BPEL script with undiscovered covert 
channels will pass the compliance assessment. I f refijsal based on falsely supposed 
covert channels because of this rigorous approach would be an issue then more 
sophisticated algorithms for differentiating between harmless and harmful use of 
visibility-restricted information in flow control would be required. For instance, a more 
sophisticated approach for covert channel prevention could try to analyse whether the 
externally observable behaviour would be distinguishably different depending on the 
information used in these activities for flow control purposes. One should bear in mind 
that such analysis is complex and increases the risk to overlook a covert channel that 
was possibly included in disguise. Therefore, the strict approach for covert channel 
prevention currently taken should only be weakened i f urgent needs would require 
doing so. Even under these circumstances, utmost care has to be taken not to overdo this 
relaxation of the rules for covert channel prevention. 
7.5 Evaluation of Research Prototype 
The research prototype has been evaluated in order to investigate whether the algo-
rithms defined for performing the different checks required during compliance 
assessment of a BPEL script are capable of distinguishing allowed and disallowed 
semantics expressed by it. For this purpose, variants of BPEL scripts for the control 
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process of the example in Figure 4 have been subject to an automated security assess-
ment processing simulated by the research prototype. The scope of this evaluation has 
been concentrated on the aspect, to which extent machine-based analysis of compliance 
with security policies defined in terms of security-relevant semantic patterns of BPEL 
scripts may be performed without human assistance. In particular, the reliability of 
machine-based assessment statements as to compliance with security policies was 
evaluated. In addition, syntax checking of SPS implemented in the prototype and the 
issued error messages in the case of syntax error detection were tested. 
The BPEL script and SPS examples used for evaluation purposes were chosen based on 
the CBP example in Figure 4. The BPEL scripts were supposed to define the control 
business process and the SPS to contain the restrictions with respect to Web service 
invocation as discussed in Chapter 2. BPEL scripts with the following characteristics 
were used: 
• BPEL script completely complying to SPS (example outcome depicted in 
Figure 18) 
• BPEL script invoking Web service not contained in SPS (example outcome 
depicted in Figure 19 with the BPEL snippet containing the violation depicted 
in Listing 7 where invalid WS operation is typed in red) 
• BPEL script passing visibility-restricted information to external Web service 
(not indicated in target relaxation) 
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• BPEL script passing information to source-restricted input message to a Web 
service where source of information passed does not comply to source 
restriction 
• BPEL script using visibility-restricted information in branch condition of a 
s w i t c h activity 
Further examples of BPEL scripts used for evaluation of the prototype can be found in 
Appendix A.5. 
<invoIce p a r t n e r L i n k = "gearProd" 
p o r t T y p e = " i n t : i n t e r n a l P T " 
operation="checkStock23" 
inputVaricible="gearProducerCheckInput" 
outputVariable="gearProducerCheckOutput" /> 
Listing 7: Extract from B P E L Script Invoking WS not Defined in SPS 
Evaluation of the prototype using these BPEL examples proved successful. The 
outcome of running the prototype with the particular BPEL script as input indicated the 
SPS violation intentionally introduced in the script. From these results and the 
considerations with respect to coverage of the prototype in Section 7.1, it could be 
concluded that implementing a procedure for automatic compliance assessment of 
BPEL scripts with security policies specified using the X M L schema described in 
Section 7.2.2 was feasible and the implementation of the assessment procedure as 
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described in Section 7.4 based on a class hierarchy as proposed in Section 7.3 turned out 
to be comparatively straightforward. 
By implementing selected parts of a compliance assessment procedure based on the 
methods described in Chapters 5 and 6 it could be shown that the approach proposed in 
this research project is suited for automatic compliance assessment. Having only 
realised part of the assessment procedure in the research prototype does not reduce the 
evidence gained because the discussion in Section 7.1 has clarified that the selection of 
fijnctionality covered the main aspects of this procedure. One aspect of functionality 
considered crucial for the automatic performance of compliance assessment is the 
information flow analysis in forward and backward direction while checking a BPEL 
script for possible violations of security policy. The essential basis for this information 
flow analysis has been realised in the prototype by storing the restrictions imposed to 
information gained from Web service invocations together with the source of an 
information item in the internal representations of the variables storing the information. 
Furthermore, as assembled in Table 4, the way to implement the missing parts of the 
functionality either can be deduced from the already implemented parts or is 
straightforward to realise such that no template for its implementation is required. 
However, even though the research prototype made clear that the construction of a 
compliance assessment tool covering the whole range of BPEL is feasible and 
introduced data structures and algorithms appropriate to serve as templates for the 
missing functionality, it should be noted that the overall effort for building such a tool 
in product quality would required a significant effort. 
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7.6 Summary 
The proof of concept of the approach to compliance assessment of BPEL scripts with 
local security policy of the executing site has been conducted by a research prototype 
implementing essential aspects of the compliance assessment procedure. Though the 
prototype was not aimed at implementing the ftill range of functionality of this 
procedure, it has shown that all kinds of checking required in the course of compliance 
assessment have either been covered by the prototype, are easy to be covered by 
straightforward amendment of functionally already implemented, or are straightforward 
to implement and would add nothing to the proof of concept. 
Only in the case, the rigorous approach to covert channel prevention adopted with all 
other activities prone to covert channels would be deemed not acceptable for the 
v a l i d a t e activity newly added to the BPEL standard, more sophisticated checking for 
covert channel prevention would be required that are not yet covered by the prototype 
and cannot be considered straightforward amendments of functionality already imple-
mented. However, these checks may be also implemented without posing essential 
problems. An outline of the procedure required to perform this type of checking for 
potential covert channels associated with the v a l i d a t e activity is included in 
Appendix A.3. 
During establishing the X M L schema for the machine-readable specification of the SPS 
and the initial design for the prototype based on the example of a CBP in Figure 4, 
several new insights have been gained that gave rise to adapting the X M L schema and 
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led to amendments of the approach described in Chapters 4 through 6. The following 
modifications of the initial approach were induced by the development of the prototype: 
• The need to provide target relaxation {i.e., allow visibility-restricted information 
to be sent to specific targets external to the local domain) has been recognised 
during the attempt to establish an SPS for the example in Figure 4. The 
capability to specify such target relaxation was not included in initial versions of 
the approach (e.g., as published in (Fischer et ai, 2006)). 
• In the same context, the need was recognised to extend the definition of the 
class 4 restriction that was initially defined to only encompass input parameters 
forbidden to be used. Since such a restriction can only be applied to optional 
input parameters of a Web service, the reverse restriction had to be added for 
completeness, that is, the requirement that a value for an optional parameter has 
always to be passed to avoid an eventual default value (or default mechanism) 
for such a parameter to take effect. 
• Further it turned out during the design of the prototype to not only allow for one 
instance of SPS for a particular pair of business partners exchanging BPEL 
scripts for remote execution, but also provide the capability for having different 
SPS instances depending on different application contexts in which these 
partners may perform collaborative business processes. Such instances would 
typically allow for different sets of restrictions on Web service invocations 
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(allowing different Web services to be invoked or having deviating restrictions 
on common subsets of Web services present in different SPSs). 
The description of the research results in Chapters 4 through 6 are based on the 
amendments added as consequences of these insights. 
The viability of further proposals made in this research project such as approaches for 
the delegation of the compliance assessment or for coping with the requirement for 
dynamic checking in pre-execution assessment of compliance is deemed to be given as 
granted from its description in the thesis without further requirements for proof of 
concept. Therefore, providing exemplary implementations thereof was not considered 
necessary to confirm their feasibility, but would only have resulted in increased efforts 
spent for software development without contributing new insights. 
The description of the X M L schema and of the functionality of the research prototype 
was published as part of Fischer et al (2007a). 
Having now presented the results achieved during the research project to the extent 
envisaged when the project was started, the next chapter considers possible application 
of these results to related fields. Since also based on BPEL scripts, Grid processes 
defined on top of Grid services have proven particulariy suited for such wider 
application of the research results. 
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8 EXAMINING T H E WIDER A P P L I C A B I L I T Y O F T H E 
R E S U L T S 
In this chapter, the results achieved during this project in the field of business processes 
are investigated with respect to their transferability to other fields where comparable 
circumstances prevail. Though not in the initial scope of the research project, the 
chapter has been included in the thesis to demonstrate that the techniques developed in 
the previous chapters for the CBP context can be generalised to also be applicable in 
related fields. Showing their applicability in a wider context is deemed to flirther the 
validity of the approach taken in this research. 
The field of Grid computing has been adopted for this purpose due to its similarity to 
business processes. In Grid processes, Grid services (Tuecke et al., 2003) play a role 
similar to Web services in the field of business processes. Therefore, BPEL also has 
found its way to application in Grid context for the specification of long-running 
processes modelled with BPEL invoking Grid services {e.g., Amnuaykanjanasin and 
Nupairoj 2005; Gannon et a!., 2005). Because of its analogy to using BPEL in 
collaborative business process (CBP) context, trying a transfer of the results on security 
policy enforcement for remotely defined business processes as presented in the former 
chapters to a Grid process context was suggesting itself Therefore, it was tried to 
transfer the method of defining security policies in terms of security-relevant semantics 
inherent in BPEL in order to facilitate the assessment of compliance with such policies 
from the field of business processes to the Grid context. The discussion evaluates the 
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extent to which this is successful, and where hmitations and issues for further study 
exist, 
A further aspect discussed here is the possibihty to delegate the task of assessing 
compliance of BPEL-defmed Grid processes with local security policies. An infra-
structure supporting the delegation of this task to one or several dedicated nodes in a 
network or to specific assessment centres has also been introduced for the CBP context 
(cf. Section 6.3). This possibility may be of even more interest in the Grid context 
where typically many small to medium size computers are involved, spread over 
different locations, and not necessarily belonging to a larger organization (as typically 
encountered in a CBP context) that can afford or provide the effort required for the task 
of performing the security policy assessment as proposed in this chapter. 
8.1 Motivation for Remote Definition of Grid Processes 
In order to motivate why remote definition of a BPEL-based Grid process may be 
sensible, a typical scenario of Grid service execution is considered. In Figure 20, a 
provider of processing resources is supposed to operate a BPEL-enabled platform. On 
this platform, Grid processes defined by BPEL scripts are running that invoke Grid 
services provided by a variety of service providers and offering enhanced Grid services 
to service requestors in different roles (roles A and B in the example of Figure 20). In a 
CBP context, availability of BPEL-enabled platforms at every site involved in such a 
business process could be assumed, since this already is or soon will be common 
practice in enterprises engaging in CBPs. Therefore, gaining access to a BPEL-enabled 
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node was not considered a motivation for remotely defining BPEL scripts. Instead, 
location-dependent access restrictions gave rise to defining business processes displaced 
from the intended location of execution. In a Grid context, however, the lack of access 
to a BPEL-enabled platform could very well motivate definition of BPEL scnpts for 
remote execution since not every location having the need for defining Grid processes 
may be assumed to have local access to a BPEL-enabled platform. In particular, having 
(local) access to such a platform may not be considered a standard situation in small or 
medium-sized organizations. Therefore, defining BPEL scripts for remote execution 
might be an interesting amendment of current state of the art of using BPEL in a Grid 
context. 
Service Requestors (Role A) Service Requestors (Role B) 
Prouder of Processing Resources 
B P E L - e n a b l e d platform for 
Grid p r o c e s s i n g 
Collection of Grid Services Offered by DrfTerent Providers 
Figure 20: Grid Process Execution Scenario 
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A further motivation for acceptance of remotely defined BPEL scripts in Grid 
processing could be the reduction of maintenance overhead that can be gained this way. 
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 21. Here it is assumed that one particular 
service requestor in role A, say service requestor A I , would have special requirements 
differing from the rest of service requestors within role A. These requirements could be 
accomplished by creating a variant of an existing Grid service on the platform of the 
Grid processing provider that would, for instance, invoke Grid services differently. As 
long as only one such variant would be required, the additional maintenance overhead 
for modifying the existing Grid process and operating the variant for service requestor 
A l may be moderate and, therefore, acceptable for the platform operator. However, i f 
an increasing number of service requestors have special requirements that would also 
lead to variants of existing Grid processes on the platform, the effort for the definition 
and maintenance of a large amount of variants may no longer be affordable for the 
platform operator. Therefore, the platform operator could allow that the different service 
requestors having requirements deviating from the main stream of the service requestors 
in a particular role (role A in this example) perform the modifications of BPEL scripts 
on their own and send the modified BPEL script to the Grid processing provider for 
execution of the Grid process defined by this script. In this way, the effort for the 
definition of the modified BPEL script and its maintenance in case of changing 
requirements would be moved to the requestor of the modified Grid service, thereby 
relieving the platform operator fi*om this effort. As in the CBP context, such definition 
of BPEL scripts remotely from the location of execution is technically feasible because 
of the nature of BPEL being a standardised process definition language. 
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a Grid context (Chadwick ei a/., 2006), the investigation of generally granting access to 
otherwise restricted Grid services as the reason for executing remotely defined BPEL 
scripts is left to further study. 
However, the transfer of the results from the CBP context to the Grid context seems to 
be most obvious for situations where Grid technology is used for forming virtual 
organizations (VOs) (Foster et al., 2001). In this context, the number of partners are 
limited and controlled by regulations for joining a VO, particularly with respect to 
authentication and authorization. When remotely defined BPEL scripts are used for 
controlling Grid processes in VOs, there are many analogies to business processes 
defined by remotely defined BPEL scripts in the CBP context. As with CBPs, local 
security policies of an organisation offering resources for being used in a VO usually 
determine access to these resources. These policies will result in restrictions to allowed 
semantics of remotely defined BPEL scripts that may be accepted for execution from a 
member of the VO. Such restrictions on allowed semantics may further restrict access to 
Grid services than access would be restricted by security policies of the sites offering 
these services alone. Reasons for this could be that allowing invocation of a Grid 
service in a particular context of a Grid process would violate a security policy such as 
prevention of generating or relaying mass e-mail from within the domain executing the 
BPEL script. 
Before the transfer of the research results is addressed, a comparison is drawn between 
the situations in CBP context and Grid context, as summarised in Table 5. With respect 
to the participants of a CBP or Grid process, the number is small and tends to be 
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constant over time in the CBP context while in the Grid context this number is larger 
and tends to vary over time. The number of Web processes possibly involved in a CBP 
tends to be small whereas the number of potentially involved Grid sercives may be 
large. In the CBP context, the location of a Web service matters, that means that it will 
be differentiated whether a Web service is provided locally in the domain executing the 
business process or externally either within the domain of the invoker of the business 
process or in other domains. 
Aspect CPB Context Grid Context 
Participants of a 
CBP/Grid process 
Small in number and tends to 
be constant over time 
Comparatively large in 
number and tends to vary 
over time 
Number of Web/Grid 
services potentially 
involved 
Comparatively small Tends to be high 
Location of Web/Grid 
services 
Differentiated between local 
and external Web service (wrt 
to executing site) 
Location of Grid services 
tends to be irrelevant 
Motivation for remote 
definition of BPEL 
scripts 
Reduction of coordination 
overhead (time) when 
modification of CBP is 
required 
Reduction of maintenance 
overhead (complexity) when 
diverging modifications are 
required 
Allowing controlled access to 
otherwise inaccessible 
resources (typically internal 
services of executing domain) 
Increasing flexibility in Grid 
process specification 
Offering access to BPEL-
enabled processing resources 
Main focus of security 
policies 
Protection of information and 
resources 
against unauthorized 
disclosure or use 
Protection against misuse or 
excessive use of processing 
resources 
(prevention of unreasonable 
or undue behaviour) 
Table 5: Comparison Bebveen CBP Context and Grid Context 
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The motivation for remote definition of BPEL scripts in the Grid process are the 
reduction of coordination overhead when modification of the CBP is required, while in 
the Grid context the reduction of complexity in maintaining lots of diverging 
modifications for different service requestors may motivate the acceptance or remotely 
defined Grid processes. Furthermore, allowing access to otherwise inaccessible 
resources or information in a controlled manner may also motivate remote definition of 
BPEL scripts in the CBP context whereas in the Grid context increasing the flexibility 
for Grid process specification and offering access to BPEL-enabled platforms may 
additionally motivate remote definition of BPEL scripts. The security policies in the 
CBP context may predominantly be focussed on the protection of information and 
resources against unauthorised disclosure or use. In contrast, protection against misuse 
or excessive use of processing resources or, in general, protection of the processing 
platform offered by a provider against exploitation to perform Grid processes with 
unreasonable or undue behaviour may amount to the main objective of security policies. 
8.2 Approaches to Specification of Grid Service Security 
Since security in the Grid context plays a paramount role, much research has been 
dedicated to this field on Grid computing. In particular, research concerned with 
expressing security policies in the context of VOs are related to the approach presented 
herein. Detsch et al. (2004), for example, proposed a security architecture for peer-to-
peer-based Grid computing where a security layer offering security-related functionality 
resides between the Grid application layer and the communication infrastructure. In this 
way, applications do not need to implement such functionality on their own. Security 
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requirements may be stated by each member of a VO on a peer-by-peer basis or for 
groups of peers. 
Welch et al. (2003) have investigated how security functionality can be made available 
to Grid services, in particular in the context of VOs. A security model for Open Grid 
Services Architecture (OGSA) (Foster et al., 2002) specifying security services to 
provide different security functionality is proposed for this purpose. The authors show 
how security-related specifications from the field of Web services can be used in the 
context of this security architecture. In their paper, expressing security policies for using 
a Web service in terms of WS-Policy specifications (Bajaj et al., 2006) and publishing 
these policies together with the WSDL specification (Chinnici et al., 2006) of the 
service is also addressed. 
It should be noted that security policy expressed in terms of WS-Policy deals with the 
requirements for security mechanisms to be applied or provided for using a Grid service 
(such as certificates to be required for accessing a service, or encryption methods to be 
apphed when communicating input and output parameters of a service). In a layered 
architecture as in Figure 1, these mechanisms are to be provided in layers below the 
business process layer as already discussed in Section 3.1.4. The security policies 
expressed in the two approaches above, therefore, address aspects of policies 
complementary to those that have to be obeyed in the business process layer when 
remotely defined BPEL scripts are to be executed. 
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8.3 Securit>'-Relevant Semantic Patterns in BPCL-Based Grid Processes 
In order to transfer the results of the analysis of security-relevant semantics of BPEL as 
a specification language (cf Chapter 4) to the Grid context, the classes of security 
policy-induced access restrictions discussed in Section 4.3 (cf. Table I) are reconsidered 
here with respect to Grid services (GS) as shown in Table 6. 
Compared to Table 1, the term 'Web service' had to be replaced by 'Grid service' 
throughout Table 6. Apart from that, most descriptions could be transferred otherwise 
unchanged (classes 1, 2, 4, and 5) or neariy unchanged (class 6). Only the description of 
class 3 was modified to better fit in the Grid context and a new class 7 was introduced. 
While in the CBP context the restriction in class 3 was specified in terms of restricted 
visibility to targets outside the domain executing a BPEL script, this distinction does not 
always play an important role in the Grid context. Therefore, the definition of class 3 
was abstracted from the location where a target resides to generally express restricted 
information flow to dedicated targets irrespective of their location. Hence, restrictions 
will be specified in terms of specific Grid services or particular input parameters thereof 
that are forbidden to receive the values returned from these parameters. In order, for 
instance, to prevent a list of e-mail addresses returned by a particular Grid service to be 
used for generating mass e-mail, this output parameter could be restricted not to be used 
as input parameter of particular other Grid services known to generate an e-mail to each 
address passed to it. Obviously, the location of the second Grid service (inside or 
outside the executing site) does not matter in this case. 
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Class Description of Restriction 
1 
Grid service with unrestricted access to all parts of resources or information 
offered 
2 
Grid service with completely restricted access (i.e., Grid service that are not 
allowed to be invoked) 
3 
Output parameter of a Grid service with restricted visibility of values returned 
with respect to specific targets: information returned by these parameters is not 
allowed to be carried to specific targets (i.e., to specific other Grid service or to 
particular parameters of specific Grid service) 
4 
Optional input parameter of a Grid service with usage restrictions in two 
different embodiments: 
a) optional parameter not allowed to be used 
b) optional parameter always required 
5 
Input parameter of a Grid service with constrained set of values allowed: input 
parameters may only be used with particular values from a subset of the values 
allowed by the syntactic definition of this parameter 
6 
Input parameter of a Grid service with values restricted to specific sources: 
only values from particular origins may be used, for instance, only values 
returned by a particular Grid service or a specific parameter of a particular Grid 
service 
7 
Grid service particularly prone to overload i f invoked excessively. For these 
Grid service, maximum invocation rates or maximum amount of data passed to 
it to prevent overloading will have to be observed 
Table 6: Classification of Access Restrictions to Grid Services and GS Parameters 
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Primitive Activities Class 3 Class 4 CI. 5/6 Class 7 
invoke Invocation of a Grid service IFA(v) u IFA(w/s) IFA(a) 
r e c e i v e Waiting for a message to arrive IFA(v) - - -
reply- Sending a reply to a message 
received 
- u IFA(w/s) -
a s s i g n Assignment of values between 
two different locations (relevant in IFA only) 
w a i t Waiting for a specified amount 
of time time(v) 
- - -
throw Indication of exceptions such 
as failures during execution except(v) 
- - -
rethrow' 
Forwarding of exceptions 
causing fault handler execution 
to containing scope 
- - - -
empty- No operation - - - -
v a l i d a t e Validate values against type 
declaration val(v) - - -
e x i t Termination of a process 
instance exit(v) - - -
compensate* 
Initiate compensation as 
specified by compensation 
handlers of corresponding 
scope and all nesting scopes 
- - - -
compensate 
Scope* 
Initiate compensation as 
specified by compensation 
handler of a specific scope 
scope(v) - - -
u = Observance of restricted use of opfional input parameters to Grid service 
IFA = Information flow analysis: 
(v) with respect to visibility of values read from Grid service 
(w) with respect to values written to Grid service 
(s) with respect to sources of values written to Grid service 
(a) with respect to amount of data written 
Table 7: Security Relevance of Semantic Patterns with Primitive Activities (Grid) 
181 
Chapter 8 - Examining the Wider Applicability of the Results 
Unlike in the CBP context, where effective runtime mechanisms for prevention of 
overloading a Web services could be deemed to be in place (in layers below the 
business layer) at a platform running these services, this might not, in general, be 
expected from sites running Grid services. Therefore, a security policy of a site 
accepting remotely defined BPEL scripts in a Grid context could require that a process 
running on resources of this site shall not cause overioad (running the risk to result in an 
intentional or unintentional denial of service attack) to specific Grid services known to 
be prone to overload when invoked in a particular manner. Since, in a Grid context, 
effective runtime prevention of overloading a Grid service shall not be expected to take 
place at all sites running these services, semantic patterns of BPEL potentially causing 
such overioad have to be identified and looked for in pre-execution compliance 
assessment to prevent BPEL scripts including such patterns from being executed. 
There are two types of overioad that may be caused to a Grid service. One type is 
sending more data in an invocation of a Grid service than can be handled. The other 
type is invoking a Grid service at a higher rate than this service can cope with. 
Therefore, performance-related restrictions related to these types of overioad may be 
indicated for a Grid service falling in this new class 7 in the Grid context. 
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Structured Activities Class 3 Class 4 CI. 5/6 Class 7 
sequence Definition of a fixed execution order - - - FQ 
flow Parallel execution of activities - - - FQ 
i f Branching between several alternate 
activities depending on conditions 
switch 
cond(v) - - -
w h i l e 
Iterative execution, i.e., looping loop cond(v) - - FQ repeat 
U n t i l 
f o r E a c h Iterative consecutive or parallel 
execution 
iteration 
bounds(v) - -
FQ 
preempt(v) PI 
p i c k 
Waiting simultaneously for several 
events to occur and proceeding with 
the event that occurs first 
IFA(v) - - -
time(v) - - -
IFA(v) = Information flow analysis with respect to visibility of values read from 
Grid service 
FQ = hivocation frequency to be checked against maximum 
PI = Check number of parallel instantiations 
Table 8: Security Relevance of Semantic Patterns with Structured Activities (Grid) 
The security-relevant semantic patterns again being formed as combinations of BPEL 
activities with restriction classes of Grid service invocation as in Section 4.4 were 
adapted from Tables 2 and 3. While all semantic patterns identified there are also 
relevant in the Grid context and, therefore, could be transferred by simply substituting 
the term "Grid service" for "Web service", some new semantic patterns were added as 
combinations of BPEL activities and the new restriction class 7 in the last column of 
Tables 7 and 8, respectively. As indicated in this column, attention has to be paid during 
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compliance assessment to semantic patterns identified there as being capable of 
generating high invocation frequencies of Grid services. This could be the case when a 
Grid service is invoked within while, r e p e a t U n t i l , sequence, flow, or f o r E a c h 
activities at a high rate or with short intermediate time intervals (marked 'FQ' in Table 
8) and by a high amount of parallel instantiations in the parallel version of the forEach 
activities (marked 'PI' in Table 8). Overloading a Grid service could also occur by 
passing large amount of data to Grid services not designed for coping with such data 
volumes in i n v o k e activities (marked MFA(a)' in Table 7). With the exception of the 
semantic patterns formed with the new restriction class 7 which had been added here, 
the results of the analysis of security-relevant semantics of BPEL leads to the same 
results as in the CBP context. 
8.4 Rewriting Security Policies to Support Pre-Execution Security Policy 
Assessment 
As in the CBP context, rewriting security policies in terms of security-relevant 
semantics is also proposed for the Grid process to support compliance assessment of 
remotely defined BPEL-based business processes with these policies. The concept of an 
SPS, as introduced in Chapter 5, will also prove useftil here to reflect the security 
policies of a specific domain. In the CBP context, such an SPS was defined domain-
specific with respect to two domains, namely the domain where the security policy is in 
effect {i.e., domain executing BPEL scripts) and the domain defining and sending BPEL 
scripts for execution. The XML-based schema for specifying an SPS in machine-
readable form which has been the basis for implementing the research prototype of an 
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automatic assessment of BPEL scripts for compliance with security policies has been 
introduced in Section 7.2. 
In the Grid context, since semantic patterns have been modified (definition of restriction 
class 3) and supplemented (patterns involving new restriction class 7) compared with 
those found in Section 4.4, the check list as basis of an SPS as well as the XML-based 
SPS schema for machine-readable versions thereof have to be modified accordingly in 
order to accommodate this new set of security-relevant semantic patterns. 
Unlike in the CBP context, an SPS may not be sensibly defined for a specific foreign 
domain, since Grid computing is concemed with a potentially large amount of foreign 
domains that are essentially indistinguishable from the point of view of the domain 
executing the BPEL-defined Grid processes. However, in a VO environment, when the 
identities of members and their privileges to execute Grid services are known in 
advance, defining an SPS similar to the CBP context for each other member in the VO 
that is allowed to send BPEL scripts for execution could make sense. 
Therefore, with the exception of the latter situation, only one or a few SPSs without any 
relation to a specific extemal domain will make sense in the Grid context. I f more than 
one SPS will be specified for a domain, they are expected to be differentiated with 
respect to different application contexts for which they apply (e.g., computational 
simulation in a particular field, collection of field-specific data such as in meteorology). 
Although details of application context-dependent SPSs are left to ftirther study, it is 
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anticipated that such SPSs will be tightly bound to access privileges or roles classifying 
the sender of a BPEL script. 
Specifying security policies in terms of security-relevant semantic patterns identified in 
Section 8.3 requires an exhaustive list of all Grid services allowed to be invoked by a 
remotely defined BPEL script. Furthermore, for every Grid service mentioned in this 
list, the security-relevant semantics of the service and its parameters has to be known in 
order to determine the access restriction classes appropriate for each of them (cf. Table 
6). This requirement may cause additional effort since specification of security-relevant 
semantics may not be available for Grid services in the first place. 
It should be noted that unavailability of semantic specification (at least as far as 
security-relevant semantics is concerned) may prevent the approach proposed here ft-om 
being applied. However, unavailability of such specification may also prevent the 
application of any other pre-execution approach to assessing compliance of Grid 
processes with security policies. This holds independently of both the location where a 
Grid process is being defined and executed, and also the manner in which the process is 
being specified {i.e., independent of using BPEL or any other means for specifying Grid 
processes). In case of unavailable semantic specifications, the only way of enforcing 
security policies is monitoring the execution of a Grid process and interfering in cases 
when violations of security policy have been detected involving the known 
shortcomings of such approaches mentioned above. And even with approaches based on 
monitoring it may be required to have some knowledge of the semantics of the Grid 
services invoked by a Grid process in order to decide whether the invocation of a 
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particular Grid service would violate any security policy-induced restriction or not. 
Therefore, also with these approaches, knowledge of the security-relevant semantics of 
Grid services as required for the assembly of an SPS wil l be required to a certain extent 
in order to make them applicable to Grid processes. 
Much current research is concerned with describing the semantics of Grid services in 
order to support identification of matching Grid services for automatic Grid process 
orchestration {e.g., Lorch et al., 2003; Ren e/ al., 2006). Bringing the results of this 
research together with the approach proposed in this chapter in order to define a 
framework for formally specifying security-relevant semantics of Grid services in terms 
of well-defined (maybe even standardized) categories is expected to be an interesting 
field of fiirther study. 
A further motivation for research in this direction could be the endeavour to facilitate 
specification of information flow restrictions of output parameters and value or source 
restrictions for input parameters with respect to particular characteristics of a Grid 
service by denoting particular semantics bound to this Grid service instead of particular 
Grid services themselves. Such semantic characteristics could be "returning lists of e-
mail addresses" or "causes sending e-mails to addresses passed". Means to specify 
restrictions this way would eliminate the need to analyse every potentially allowed Grid 
service for falling into a specific restriction class if, in parallel, Grid services and their 
parameters would have been specified in terms of such characteristics with respect to 
their (security-relevant) semantics. 
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If such classification of Grid services would be available, then, for instance, in order to 
enforce a security policy of avoiding the generation of Spam emails at a Grid node, one 
could require that any output parameter with the semantic characteristic "returning a 
(potentially large) list of email addresses" must not be input to any parameter with the 
characteristic "causes sending e-mails to addresses passed". Specifying allowed and 
disallowed semantic patterns with respect to such categories instead of individual Grid 
services and their parameters obviously would help to shorten the content of an SPS 
considerably. How far this idea of categorizing Grid parameter semantics for this 
purpose can be successfully based on or linked with research such as work on semantic 
Grid services (Goble and De Roure, 2002), semantic matchmaking of Grid service com-
position (Ludwig and Reyhani, 2005), or workflow ontology of Grid services (Beco et 
a/., 2005) requires ftirther investigation. 
Such amendments of addressing semantic characteristics of Grid service parameters in 
an SPS are expected to involve increased complexity of the assessment task because of 
required matching of SPS and semantic characteristics of the Grid services actually used 
in a BPEL script. Even before such amendments are available, it is not obvious and 
actually will require ftirther investigation whether the assessment of compliance with 
security policies specified in an SPS is similariy straightforward as it has been shown 
for the GBP context by implementing the research prototype (cf Chapter 7). In 
particular, it is expected that covering semantic patterns involving class 7 restrictions in 
automatic compliance assessment prior to execution will turn out to be complex or even 
impossible to a certain extent since this class of restrictions addresses dynamic aspects 
of a BPEL script that obviously are not easy to be analysed in a static pre-execution 
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assessment. However, applying the approach to cope with dynamic checking in pre-
execution analysis as proposed in Section 5.4 may also help here. For instance, in order 
to assure that the invocation frequency of a Grid service susceptible to overload by too 
high an invocation rate, a Grid service could be defined that works like a delay element 
and this Grid service could be indicated in the SPS as required to be invoked prior to the 
particular susceptible Grid service. 
8.5 Delegation of Security'Assessment 
As already discussed in Section 6.3, delegation of comphance assessment may be 
advantageously be applied in distributed environments in the CBP context and may 
occur in a variety of ways. Delegation of compliance assessment may also be made use 
of in the Grid context. Actually, it may make even more sense than it already made in 
the CBP context and additional variants are conceivable. 
Assessment can be performed against locally defined SPS (i.e., SPS specified by site 
executing BPEL script) or against remotely defined SPS {i.e., SPS specified by site 
defining BPEL script). The latter was not considered to be sensible in the CBP context. 
Such remotely defined SPS may be sent by the defining site together with the BPEL 
script as a kind of assertion what the business process defined by the BPEL script is 
going to do or not to do with respect to security-relevant semantics inherent in BPEL 
and the business services involved. When this approach is taken, means for checking the 
correspondence of the SPS and the BPEL script {i.e., SPS belongs to BPEL script and 
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both are not tampered in any way) may be provided based on appropriate certificates 
added to both the BPEL script and the SPS. 
A remotely defined SPS provided with a BPEL script may be checked against local 
security policy requirements (i.e., whether indications made in SPS fu l f i l these 
requirements or not). After positive assessment of compliance with these requirements, 
the local site: 
• may decide to trust in the assertion provided by the remote site and, after 
checking integrity and congruence of BPEL script and SPS, execute the BPEL 
script without any further compliance assessment, or 
• may initiate an assessment of compliance in any way mentioned below. 
In any of these cases, assessment of compliance with security policies expressed in an 
SPS may be performed in different ways as follows: 
• Locally at the executing site. The potential problem with this approach as 
already indicated above could be that performing security policy assessment 
locally might be too elaborate a task to be conducted by small footprint 
computers (e.g., stand-alone personal computers) or small organisations that 
cannot afford specific checking tools or acquire specific skill required for this 
task. 
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• Remotely (in an assessment centre) on behalf of the site executing the BPEL 
script. The SPS will be sent together with the BPEL script to the trusted 
assessment centre for checking compliance of BPEL script and SPS-defined 
security policies. In case of a centrally defined SPS, a reference to this centrally 
defined SPS may be sent instead of the SPS itself. The results will be returned to 
the executing site as certified verdicts {i.e., passed or failed, the latter possibly 
accompanied by the reason(s) for this verdict). 
• (Not applicable for locally defined SPS) Remotely (in an assessment centre) on 
behalf of the site defining the BPEL script with respect to an SPS defined by the 
remote site or centrally defined. BPEL script and SPS are sent to the assessment 
centre as in the previous case. The results of the assessment may be certified by 
the assessment centre and sent back to the defining site together with the 
certified (with respect to integrity and identity) BPEL script and SPS. The 
defining site may then pass the certified BPEL script and SPS to the executing 
site possibly accompanied by the certified results from the assessment centre. If 
an assessment centre adheres to a published policy to only certify BPEL scripts 
and SPSs that received a passed verdict when checked for compliance, then 
sending the result from the defining site to the executing site can be abandoned 
since, in this case, having a certificate from such an assessment centre implies 
the passed verdict for the BPEL script. 
From the current point of view, these alternatives for performing security assessment of 
remotely defined BPEL scripts seem to be versatile enough to cover the requirements in 
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the Grid context and, therefore, there seems to be no particular need for further research 
in this area. 
8.6 Summary 
In this chapter, an approach to transfer the results achieved in this research project for 
the field of BPEL-defined business processes to another field of application has been 
presented. Grid processes based on Grid services were chosen for this approach since 
BPEL is also used for the definition of the process logic in this context. Since the 
number of participants in a Grid process, as well as the Grid services potentially 
invoked by such a process may be considerably higher than in a CBP context, the 
transfer of the results (though to a large extent possible with no or only minor 
modifications) may render difficult to handle because of the size and amount of SPSs 
involved. However, the transfer of the results from the CBP context is comparatively 
easy to be accomplished with respect to VOs, where the number of participants (or at 
least the number of roles involved) is in the same order of magnitude as with CBPs. 
Also the admission to become a member of a VO usually is regulated at least to a 
certain degree such that the members of a VO are comparatively constant over time and 
known in number. Therefore, VOs are commensurable with the situation in CBPs and 
best suited for transfer of research results ft^om the CBP context. Transfer of the results 
from the CBP context to other areas of Grid computing may be for further study. 
Further research, in particular with respect to an alignment of this research on security 
relevance of BPEL with results of research on Grid service semantics, may help to 
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reduce the amount of information to be handled and may also prove successful in 
specifying restrictions indicated in an SPS at higher levels of abstraction. Advancing 
research in this direction was beyond the scope of the current project. 
The results of the attempt to transfer the achievements of the research project fi-om the 
field of collaborative business processes to the field of Grid processing have been 
published in Fischer et al. (2007d). 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS O F F U R T H E R R E S E A R C H 
To conclude the thesis, this chapter summarises the achievements and limitations of the 
research. It also considers possible directions of further research based on the results of 
this project. 
9.1 Achievements of the Research 
The increasing need for business-to-business applications has led to the specification of 
collaborative business processes (CBPs) using standardised specification languages. 
The de facto standard for this purpose is WS-BPEL (BPEL for short) that has been 
adopted as an OASIS standard in April 2007. Making full use of the fact that BPEL is a 
standard for specifying business processes and, therefore, allows for definition of 
processes in a platform-independent way motivates the approach to specify a CBP at 
one location and have the different parts constituting this CBP executed on BPEL-
enabled platforms of the respective partners involved in the CBP. Though technically 
feasible because BPEL-defined business processes are executable on any such platform, 
security issues involved in the execution of remotely defined business processes stand 
in the way of turning this approach into practical application. To mitigate or even 
eliminate these security issues, the research project aimed to develop methods for 
assessing the compliance of remotely defined business processes with local security 
policies prior to their execution. This assessment should preferably be performed 
automatically with as little as possible human intervention. Being able to have a 
remotely defined business process assessed for compliance with local security policies 
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in an automatic way should allow for execution of the business process without security 
concerns. 
In order to find methods that support compliance assessment in the manner aimed for in 
this research, the security-relevant behaviour expressible in BPEL scripts has been 
investigated. The results of this investigation have been presented in Chapter 4. Based 
on an analysis and classification of security policy-induced restrictions to Web service 
invocation, combinations of restriction classes with BPEL activities called semantic 
patterns have been analysed for their potential impact related to compliance with 
security policies. Checkings required for verifying whether a BPEL script specifies 
behaviour that would violate security policies have also been indicated in Chapter 4. 
Based on the identification of security-relevant semantics of BPEL, a method for 
specifying security policies in such a way that the assessment of compliance with these 
policies is essentially facilitated has been introduced in Chapter 5. To this purpose, so-
called security policy statements (SPSs) are used that indicate security policy-induced 
restrictions to Web services that are allowed to be invoked by a remotely defined 
business process. An approach to possibly reduce the complexity of an SPS is also 
introduced in this chapter, as well as an approach to cope with dynamic aspects of 
security policy-induced restrictions that by their very nature may only be checked at 
runtime of the process defined by a script. 
The procedure of compliance assessment resulting from and enabled by these 
preparations is described in Chapter 6. How a BPEL script under consideration is 
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examined in order to assess its compliance with security policies as indicated in an SPS 
was described there. Further, the workflows involved when the assessment is performed 
in a distributed environment have been considered in order to discuss possibilities for 
delegation of the assessment procedure for economising the efTorts required. 
The viability of the methods for automatic performance of compliance assessment in the 
way proposed has been proved by implementing the essential parts of the assessment 
procedure in a research prototype. Chapter? describes the machine-readable version of 
SPSs used and the architecture and algorithms implemented in this prototype. It fiirther 
discusses the coverage of the total functionality required for automatic compliance 
assessment that has been achieved by this implementation. The discussion comes to the 
conclusion that the essential functionality of automatic compliance assessment has been 
implemented and that the missing parts are deducible in an easy manner from the 
fiinctionality already realised or are straightforward to implement such that no templates 
are required to validate their feasibility. The evaluation performed led to the result that 
the methods proposed are suitable for automatic compliance assessment of BPEL 
scripts. 
To further complement the achievements reached so far, the result of the research 
project have been transferred to another field of application where similar conditions as 
with CBPs exist. The field chosen is the area of Grid processes that can also be defined 
by BPEL scripts. The extent to which this transfer was successflil within the given time 
scale of the project is discussed in Chapter 8. Most of the results could be transferred in 
a straightforward manner to the area of Grid processing when virtual organisations 
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(VOs) are considered. However, new semantic patterns not considered in the context of 
CBPs had to be taken into account in the context of Grid processing. Obvious 
limitations mainly resulting ft-om the larger amount of partners involved and of Grid 
services eligible for invocation in a BPEL script defining a Grid process give rise to 
further research in this area, but are not detrimental to the achievements reached with 
respect to the objectives of the research project because Grid processing was not in the 
initial scope of this research. However, having shown that the results are transferable in 
principal to a related field of application is deemed to increase their significance. 
Several papers referring to different aspects of the results achieved in this research 
project have been presented at refereed conferences or published in journals (cf. 
Appendix A. 1) and have received positive comments from delegates and reviewers. 
9.2 Limitations of the Research 
Despite having met the objectives of the research project, some decisions had to be 
taken that resulted in limitations imposed on the work. The decisions were caused by 
practical reasons, or to limit the effort spent in areas where no new insights could be 
expected. These limitations are summarised below. 
1. The research prototype was restricted to only implement as much functionality 
of the assessment procedure as required to prove that the approach taken for 
facilitating compliance assessment was viable and that the methods developed 
were actually suited for automatic performance of this assessment. Therefore, 
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the prototype does not cover all language features provided by the BPEL 
standard and, hence, is not suited to check arbitrary BPEL scripts for compliance 
with security policies. However, the X M L schema provided for SPSs is 
complete in the sense that any security policy-induced restriction to Web service 
invocation as discussed in Chapter 4 may be specified. The reason for restricting 
the range of functionality implemented in the prototype was to limit the effort 
spent for software development which as such was not in the scope of the 
research. Implementing the missing parts to cover all of the BPEL capabilities 
would have caused a lot of additional effort to be spent without contributing new 
insights with respect to feasibility of an automatic compliance assessment 
procedure. 
2. The algorithms used for covert channel detection in the prototype have been 
chosen to take a rigorous approach for effective prevention of any covert 
channel from being established. However, these algorithms could turn out to be 
overly strict in some situations, for instance, when a branch is made dependent 
on a visibility-restricted information and all alternative flows to be selected 
would not exhibit any distinguishable behaviour observable from outside. In 
such a situation, no covert channel would have been established by making the 
branch dependent on a visibility-restricted unit of information, but nevertheless a 
BPEL script containing this logic would have been refijsed by the prototypic 
compliance assessment procedure. Finding more sophisticated algorithms for 
covert channel detection that would be able to distinguish between actual covert 
channels and behaviour that only exhibits prima facie characteristics of a covert 
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channel without actually establishing one have not deemed to be essential for a 
proof of concept. As already stated above, the definition of such algorithms that 
are both more tolerant with respect to covert channel detection and still secure in 
the sense that they do not leave any covert channel undetected may be difficult. 
Leaving decisions on doubtful behaviour possibly not suited to establish a covert 
channel to human intervention may also be a viable approach in cases where the 
rigorous approach for covert channel prevention implemented in the research 
prototype is found to be overly strict. 
3. Similar to the previous item, restricting any inclusion of data manipulation 
facilities from other X M L specifications such as Xpath in a BPEL script in order 
to be acceptable as compliant may also be deemed to be overly strict under 
certain circumstances. However, relaxation of this restriction without taking the 
risk to miss possible security policy violations during compliance assessment 
could also turn out to be a difficult task. In the same way as described for 
reduction of the complexity of security policy statements in Section 5.3, also any 
need for data manipulation in accordance with security policy that would require 
elements from Xpath or other X M L specifications to be included in a BPEL 
script can be moved into a Web service defined for that purpose. Therefore, this 
limitation is also not considered essential for the approach proposed. 
4. Trying to integrate the prototypic implementation of a compliance assessment 
procedure into a BPEL-enabled platform though initially envisaged has been 
dropped. Reason for this was that access to such a platfomi for development 
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purposes was not easy to obtain and this task would have required a tremendous 
amount of platform-specific know how to be acquired before the actual work 
would be possible. After all, this integration would by no means have 
contributed any particular insight or increased the confidence of viability. In 
effect, the proposed approach does not require that an automatic assessment 
procedure is integrated into the platform where the BPEL script under 
consideration is intended to be executed once compliance assessment has been 
passed. In contrast, a stand-alone implementation of the assessment procedure 
serves even better the intended goal to prevent a non-compliant BPEL script to 
be executed since it in fact prevents such a script from entering the executing 
platform at all. 
5. Since the research has been limited to only investigate BPEL as the most 
prominent representative of a standardised business process definition language 
(BPDL), when it became obvious that BPEL had emerged the de facto standard 
in this field, the attempt to transfer the approach proposed in this research to 
other BPDLs could be the objective of further research. However, probably 
before starting such research, additional evidence should be obtained that the use 
of these other BPDLs has gained sufficient momentum to justify the dedication 
of research efforts to the particular BPDL chosen for such a transfer. 
Despite these limitations, the research project has led to valid contributions to 
knowledge and provided sufficient proof of concept for the approaches proposed. 
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9.3 Directions of Further Research 
The research project has advanced the field of security policy enforcement for script-
based business processes. However, a number of areas for future work can be identified 
that build upon the results achieved. Some ideas have already been addressed in former 
chapters. These areas and some new ones are detailed below. 
1. Though already discussed as potentially difficult to find, the development of 
more sophisticated algorithms for covert channel detection in order to get rid of 
the rigorous yet effective approach taken in the research prototype could be 
undertaken. The directions to be taken in an endeavour to relax this rigorous 
restriction have been indicated in the previous section. An outline of an 
algorithm for the relaxation of the restriction with respect to visibility-restricted 
information imposed to the v a l i d a t e activity and the attribute v a l i d a t e with 
a value of t r u e in an ass ign activity can be found in Appendix A.3. 
2. Additional effort could be spent for completion of the prototypic implementation 
of the compliance assessment procedure. Though no new insights are expected 
to be gained thereof as argued above, having an implementation covering the 
whole of the capabilities provided by BPEL can be used for application to real 
world examples of BPEL scripts. This could assist in propagation of the ideas 
developed in this project to a broader audience beyond academia. 
3. In the attempt to transfer the results from the CBP context to the Grid context, 
several issues for further research have been encountered. Amongst them the 
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classification of (security-relevant) semantics of Grid services and their 
parameters is deemed to be, at the same time, the most challenging and the most 
promising field for further study. Having such a classification of Grid service 
semantics could advantageously be applied to reduce the amount of indications 
required in an SPS since enumeration of all Grid services allowed for invocation 
in a BPEL script would no longer be required. In contrast, only the allowed Grid 
service semantics would have to be indicated in an SPS. This approach would 
allow for compliance assessment of BPEL scripts invoking arbitrary Grid 
services provided the semantics of the Grid services would also be specified in 
terms of the semantic classification scheme developed. 
4. Investigating how the approaches proposed in Chapter 8 could be applied based 
on Grid environments or Grid middleware such as The Globus Toolkit (2007) or 
OurGrid (2007) and which adaptation would be required in order to be 
successful in doing this could be another interesting direction of further 
research. 
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APPENDICES 
A . l . Published Papers 
In this appendix, the papers published in the context of this research project are Hsted 
together with their abstracts. Copies of selected f l i l l papers as published are provided 
following the References. 
1. Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., and Fumell, S. M. (2005) "A 
Security Infrastructure for Cross-Domain Deployment of Script-Based Business 
Processes in SOC Environments". In Proceedings of the 5'^ international 
Network Conference, INC'2005, pp. 207-216, 2005. 
Abstract: This paper addresses security aspects arising in service oriented 
computing (SOC) when scripts written in a standardized scripting language 
such as WS'BPEL (formerly: BPEL4WS or BP EL for short), BP ML, XPDL, 
WSCI in order to implement business processes on top of Web services are 
deployed across security domain boundaries. It proposes an infrastructure and 
methods for checking the scripts deployed, prior to execution, for compliance 
with security policies effective at the domain in which a remotely developed 
script-based business process is to be executed. 
2. Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., and Fumell, S. M. (2006) 
"Security-Relevant Semantic Patterns of BPEL in Cross-Organisational 
Business Processes". In Proceedings of the 6'^ International Ner^vork 
Conference. INC'2006, pp. 203-212, 2006. 
Abstract: This paper presents results of the analysis of security-relevant 
semantics of business processes being defined by WS-BPEL (Web Services 
Business Process Execution Language, BPEL for short) scripts. In particular, 
security issues arising when such scripts defining cross-organisational business 
processes on top of Web services are deployed across security domain 
boundaries, give rise to this investigation. The analysis of security-relevant 
semantics of this scripting language will help to overcome these security issues 
making further exploitation of BPEL as a standard for defining cross-organisa-
tional business processes more acceptable. Semantic patterns being com-
binations of particular language features and Web services with specific access 
restrictions implied by security policies are defined and analysed for this 
purpose. Applications of the results of this analysis to distributed definition and 
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execution of BPEL-defmed business processes may be found in a previous paper 
of the authors. 
Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., and Fumell, S.M. (2007a) 
"Security Policy Enforcement in BPEL-Defmed Collaborative Business 
Processes". In Proceedings of the I^' International Workshop on Security 
Technologies for Next Generation Collaborative Business Applications 
(SECOBAP'07), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 685-694, 2007. 
Abstract: 77;/.y paper presents an approach to security policy enforcement with 
collaborative business processes defined using BPEL and deployed across 
enterprise domain boundaries for execution. The assessment of compliance with 
security policies at the location where a BPEL script is to be executed is 
facilitated by re-formulating the security policies with respect to the potential of 
violation inherent in BPEL The results of an analysis of the security-relevant 
semantics of BPEL-defined business processes conducted for this purpose 
indicate the paramount role of information flow analysis in business processes. 
Based on these results, the paper proposes an XML-based schema for specifying 
security policies for cross-organisational business processes that allows for 
automatic checking of BPEL scripts for compliance to these security policies. 
The paper also introduces a prototype implementation of an automatic 
compliance check that approves the feasibility of the method for practical 
application in security policy enforcement. 
Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., and Fumell, S.M. (2007b) 
"Analysis of Security-Relevant Semantics of BPEL in Cross-Domain Defined 
Business Processes". Information Management & Computer Security, 
I5(2):l 16-127, 2007 
Abstract: 
Purpose - Aims to identify security-relevant semantics of business processes 
being defined by WS-BPEL (Web Services Business Process Execution 
Language, BPEL for short) scripts, in particular, when such scripts defining 
collaborative business processes on top of Web services are deployed across 
security domain boundaries. 
Desigfi/melhodohgy/approach - Analysing potential of BPEL to define beha-
viour of business processes violating restrict ions implied by security policies. 
Findings - Semantic patterns being combinations of particular BPEL features 
and Web services with specific access restrictions implied by security policies 
are defined and their implications for analysis of BPEL scripts during 
compliance assessment of cross-domain defined business processes are 
identified. 
Research limitations/implications - The results of the research part of which 
are reported here have been applied in a research prototype to BPEL scripts of 
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limited size and comparatively simple business logic. Real-world examples of 
BPEL scripts with respect to size and complexity should be examined for further 
approving suitability of the algorithms used. 
Originality/value — The results can be used to specify security policies in terms 
of security-critical semantics of BPEL scripts in order to facilitate compliance 
assessment. In conjunction with other results of this research, this will help to 
overcome security issues arising from cross-domain definition of business 
processes by enabling automatic compliance assessment prior to execution. 
Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., and Fumell, S.M. (2007c) 
"Security-Relevance of Semantic Patterns in Cross-Organisational Business 
Processes Using WS-BPEL". In Proceedings of the 3'''^ Collaborative Research 
Symposium on Security, E-leaming, Internet and Networking (SEIN 2007), 
University of Plymouth, pp. 67-83, 2007. 
Abstract: This paper gives an overview of the research project considering 
security aspects in the context of business process management. In particular, 
security issues arising when scripts written in the standardized scripting 
language WS-BPEL (formerly: BPEL4WS or BPEL for short) implementing 
cross-organisational business processes on top of Web services are deployed 
across security domain boundaries, are being investigated. It analyses the 
security-relevant semantics of this scripting language in order to facilitate 
checking for compliance with security policies effective at the domain of 
execution. 
Fischer, K. P., Bleimann, U., and Fumell, S.M. (2007d) „Pre-Execution Security 
Policy Assessment of Remotely Defined BPEL-Based Grid Processes". In 
Proceedings of 4'^ International Conference on Trust, Privacy & Security in 
Digital Business (TrustBus '07), Springer, LNCS 4657, pp. 178-189, 2007. 
Abstract: In this paper, results from research on security policy enforcement 
for cross-domain defined business processes specified in BPEL are transferred 
to the field of Grid computing, where BPEL is used to define Grid processes. In 
order to facilitate the assessment of remotely defined BPEL-based Grid 
processes for compliance with security policies prior to execution, a method for 
specifying security policies with respect to security-relevant semantic patterns in 
BPEL is applied. The paper shows the extent to which transfer of the former 
results was successful and indicates limitations and areas of further research. 
Where the situation is similar to cooperative business processes, such as in 
forming dynamic virtual organizations using Grid technology, the results turned 
out to be transferable with minor modifications, whereas for a transfer to the 
Grid context in general further investigation is required (in particular with 
respect to formal specification of security-relevant semantics of Grid services). 
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A.2, X M L Schema for Security Policy Statement 
This appendix contains an X M L Schema specification for the security policy statement 
proforma introduced in Chapter 5 that has been transferred into a machine-processible 
XML-based form for the research prototype as set out in Chapter 7. The meaning of the 
elements and attributes defined in this schema have been explained in Chapter 7. 
Therefore, they are not annotated in this schema definition. 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<xsd:schema 
xinlnB:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xinlns="http://www.example.org/sps/SPSSchema.xml" 
elementPormDefaults"qualified" 
attributeFormDe£ault="unqualified" 
targetNamespace="http://www.example.org/sps/SPS_Schema.xml"> 
<xsd:element name="sps"> 
<x8d:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s " / > 
<xsd:element r e f = " i w s r s " minOccurs="0"/> 
<xsd:element ref="ewsra" minOccurs="0"/> 
<xsd:element r e f = " u n r e s t r I n t W s " minOccurs="0"/> 
<xsd:element ref="unrestrExtWB" minOccurs="0"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
</xsd;complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<!-- ++++++++++++++++++ i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element n a m e = " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s " > 
<xsd:complexType> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="remoteDomain" type="xsd:anyURI" 
use="required"/> 
<xsd: a t t r i b u t e name= "localDomain" type= "xsd: e inyURI" 
use="required"/> 
<x 8 d : a t t r i b u t e ncune="applicationContext" type="xsd:anyURI" 
use="optional"/> 
</x8d:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
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<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<!-- ++++++++++++++++++ r e s t r i c t e d WS ++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
< ! - - + + + + + + + + + + 4> + + + + -f + + + + + + + -t- + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 4> + + 4> + + + + + + + + + -l--t- - - > 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++ e x t e r n a l WS +++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element name="ewsrs"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " o p e r a t i o n " minOccurs="l" 
maxOccur s= " unboxinded " / > 
</xsd:sequence> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="internalUseAllowed" type="xsd:boolean" 
use="optional" d e f a u l t = " t r u e " / > 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++ i n t e r n a l WS +++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element naine="iwsrs"/> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " o p e r a t i o n " minOccurs="l" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
< ! - - + - f - i - - i - - f - i ' + + + - f + -f+ + + +++ opera t i o n + + + + +++ + +++ + + + + + + + + + + + + + --> 
<xsd:element name="operation"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " i n p u t " minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="l"/> 
<xsd:element ref="output" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="l"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="name" t y p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " use="required"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="portType" t y p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<!-- ++++++++++++++++++++ input ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element name="input"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " s o u r c e R e s t r i c t i o n " minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="1"/> 
<xsd:element name="part" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurss "unboTinded" > 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " s o u r c e R e s t r i e t i o n " minOccurs="0"/> 
<xsd:element r e f = " v a l u e R e s t r i e t i o n " minOccurs="0"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
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< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="name" t y p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e nazne="sourceRestricted" type="xBd:boolean" 
use="optional" d e f a u l t = " f a l s e " / > 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e names"valueRestrieted" type="xsd:boolean" 
use="optional" d e f a u l t = " f a l s e " / > 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e n a i n e = " r e s t r i c t e d O p t i o n a l " use="optional" 
default="presentOrNot"> 
<xsd: siinpleType> 
< x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n b a s e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
<xsd:enumeration value="presentOrNot"/> 
<xsd:enumeration value="forbiddenPart"/> 
<xsd:entuneration value="requiredPart"/> 
< / x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n > 
</xsd:simpleType> 
< / x s d : a t t r i b u t e > 
</Xsd:comp1exType> 
</xsd:sequence> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="message" type="xsd:string"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="sourceRestricted" type="xsd:boolean" 
use="optional" d e f a u l t = " f a l s e " / > 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<xsd:element name="sourceRestriction"> 
<x8d:complexType> 
<x8d:seguence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " s e r v i c e " 
minOccurs="l" maxOccura="\inbounded"/> 
</xsd: sec[uence> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<xsd:element name="valueRestriction"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element name="permittedValue" type="anyType 
minOccurs="l" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xsd:seguence> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<xsd:element name="service"> 
<x8d:complexType> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="portType" type="xsd:string"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="operation" type="xsd:string"/> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
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<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++ output ++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element ncune="output"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element r e f = " t a r g e t R e l a x a t i o n " minOccurs="0"/> 
<xad:element name="part" 
mlnOccurs=:"0" maxOccurs = "unbounded"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<x8d:element r e f = " t a r g e t R e l a x a t i o n " minOccurs="0"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="name" ty p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
< x 8 d :attribute n a m e = " v i s i b i l i t y R e s t r i c t e d " 
type="xsd:boolean" use="optional" d e f a u l t = " t r u e " / > 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd: sec[uence> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="message" type="xsd:string"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e n a m e = " v i s i b i l i t y R e s t r i c t e d " type="xsd:boolean" 
use="optional" d e f a u l t = " f a l s e " / > 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<xsd: element name= " t a r g e t R e l c i x a t i o n " > 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element name="domain" type="xsd:anyURI" 
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xsd:sequence> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<!-- ++++++++++++++++++ u n r e s t r i c t e d WS ++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<!-- +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ --> 
<xsd:element name="unrestrExtWs"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element name="operation" 
minoccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="name" ty p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="portType" t y p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
</x8d:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
</xsd:sequence> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
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<xsd:element name="unrestrIntWs"> 
<xsd:sequence> 
<xsd:element name="operation" minoccurs="l" 
maxOccurss"unbounded"> 
<xsd:complexType> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="name" ty p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
< x s d : a t t r i b u t e name="portType" t y p e = " x s d : s t r i n g " 
use="required"/> 
</xsd:complexType> 
</xsd:element> 
</xsd:5equence> 
</xsd:element> 
</xsd:schema> 
210 
Appendices 
A.3. Outline of Sophisticated Covert Channel Prevention for Activity v a l i d a t e 
In order to allow for type validation of a variable containing visibility-restricted 
information in cases when no risk of information leakage exists, it has to be made sure 
that throwing the standard b p e l : i n v a l i d V a r i a b l e s fault does not allow conclusions 
to be drawn as to the value of the information currently contained in this variable. 
Validation with respect to the proper type of the value contained in a variable may either 
be caused by a v a l i d a t e activity or by indication of attribute v a l i d a t e = " t r u e " in 
an a s s i g n activity. A more sophisticated check for covert channel prevention with type 
validation than that proposed in the main part of the thesis would require to assure that 
no value restricted subtype of a type is being applied in validation. 
Therefore, the more sophisticated check for covert channel detection with type 
validation would allow a variable containing visibility-restricted information to be 
validated provided its type definition does not imply any restrictions with respect to the 
value of this variable. This can be checked by inspection of the message type in a 
WSDL definition or the type definition in an XML schema containing the type 
definition for the variable under consideration. The XML type definition found for the 
particular variable must neither contain any < r e s t r i c t i o n > element nor must the 
type be defined by a < l i s t > element nor by a <union> element containing any type 
definition constrained by any of the aforementioned elements. 
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If the type can be verified in this way to not implying any value range restrictions for 
the variable under consideration, then type validation may be allowed even in the case 
where the variable currently contains a value that represents visibility-restricted 
information. 
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A.4. Java Code of Research Prototype 
The Java code of the research prototype is included on the CD-ROM in the addendum 
to this PhD thesis. The Java code may be found there in the subtree under directory 
p r o t o t y p e /java. 
A.5. Examples of B P E L Scripts Used for Validation of Research Prototype 
The BPEL examples used for the vahdation of the research prototype are included on 
the CD-ROM in the addendum to this PhD thesis. The examples may be found there in 
the subtree under directory p r o t o t y p e / v a l i d a t i o n . 
A.6. Copies of Web Pages Referred in Section References 
For convenience of the reader, copies of the Web pages referred to in this PhD thesis 
have been provided on the CD-ROM in the addendum to this PhD thesis. The copies 
may be found there in the subtree under directory webpages. 
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Abstract 
This paper addresses secwity aspects srismg in service oriented computing (SOC) when scripts mitten in a 
standardized scripting language such as U'S-BPEL (formnly: BPEUWS or BPEL for short), BPML, XPDL. 
WSCl in order to implement business processes on top of Web services ore dcpIo>'ed across security domain 
boundaries. It proposes on infrastructure and methods for checking the scripts deployed, prior to execution, for 
compliance with security policies cfTccti^ -e oi (he domain in u-hich a remotely developed script-based business 
process is to be cxccuied. 
Keywords 
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Business Process Momgement. Web Services. Web Services Business IVoccss Execuiicm Language (WS-BPEL) 
1. Introduction 
Service oriented computing (SOC) is currently considered one of the most promising new 
paradigms for distributed computing (Papazoglou and GeoT I^cnpoulos 2003). Though com-
paratively new. a significant amount of research has alrtady been dedicated to this area (e.g. 
Dcublcr cl al. 2004). Web services, and the composition or orchestration of them, play a central 
role in current approaches to service oriented computing (Berardi et ah 2003). Service orienta-
tion is also expected to have an important influence in the area of grid computing, where the 
provisioning of computing resources within a conceptual huge nctv '^ork of collaborating com-
puters and devices can also be fostci«l by services (so called grid services in this context) 
provided by different nodes (Tuccke et al. 2003). 
In service oriented approaches using Web services a layered architecture for composing new 
services from existing services or for executing processes based on existing services has 
emerged (Medjabcd ct al. 2003). The request for fast adaptation of enhanced services and 
processes to changing requirements as well as the request to avoid dependency on certain plat-
forms (vendor lock-in) lead to the specification of platform independent, standardized proess 
definition languages for the definition of enhanced Web services or business processes in the 
top layer of this architecture. However, several different standardization approaches for such a 
language have been taken, leading to a phiralily of standards; Web Services Business Process 
Execution Language (WS-BPEL), formerly known as Business Process Execution Language 
for Web Services (BPEL4WS or BPEL for short) (Afkin et al. 2004), Business Process 
Modelling Language (BPML) (Arkin 2002), XML Process Dcfmition Language (XPDL) 
(Workflow Management Coalition 2002), Web Services Choreography Interface (WSCl) 
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(Arkin el al. 2002), and cbXML Business Process Specification Schema (Malu et aL 2002). 
Though the existence of several parallel standanls aiming at the same goal detracts from the 
very puipose of standardization^ the different standards at least have some obvious commonali-
ties, as all languages are script based using XML and facilitate the composition of business 
processes by invocation of Web services and definition of the communication with other 
parties (in particular human participants) involved in a business process. It should be noted that 
a business process defined using one of these languages can itself be considered a Web service 
from the point of view of external commum'cation parties. 
The existence of several business process languages gave rise to research as to which extent 
these languages are comparable with respect to their semantic expressiveness (Aalst et al. 
2002. Shapiro 2002. Wohed et al. 2002). In particular Aalsl ct al. (2002) and Wohcd ct al. 
(2002) analysed different languages, i.e. WS-BPEL, BPML^ WSCl and some vendor-specific 
business process languages, with respect to workflow and communication paUems. The results 
of their work indicate that, to a large extent, the different languages are capable of expressing 
the same semantics with respect to workflow control and communication behaviour. As a 
result these languages could be expected to be convertible to each other as has already been 
shown in an exemplary manner for XPDL and WS-BPEL by Fischer and Wcnzcl (2004). 
Given the fundamental similarity of the different languages used for business process manage-
ment, without loss of generality we will concentrate our proposition on one particular represen-
tative, namely WS-BPEL propagated by the Organization for the Ad\'ancement of Strucmrcd 
Information Standards (OASIS). For the remainder of this paper we will use BPEL as a short-
hand for WS-BPEL. 
2. Security Issue in Cross-Domain Business Process Definition 
As security already is an important issue in distributed applications in general, this topic is also 
of paramount importance for the application of business process languages. Security of Web 
services is well studied and several approaches for access control to Web services exist (e.g. 
Nadalin ci al. 2004. Abcndroth and Jensen 2003, Dimmock ct al. 2004). Koshulanski and 
Massacci (2003) and Mendling el at (2004) are considering seciunty aspects in the context of 
employing business process languages, in particular BPEL. While access control related 
aspects arc predominant with Web services and are, of course, also an issue with business 
process languages, further security aspects arise from the employment of standardized script 
languages such as BPEL. From their namre of being standardized and platform-independent, 
these languages involve the capability of defining business processes across platforms. Use of 
this capability introduces new security issues that have not been present in Web services before 
the business process languages came in. By employing standardized business process langua-
ges it will be feasible to define a business process at one location and execute it at a different 
location. It is conceivable that the two locations belong to different security domains within the 
same or different organisations or corporations. The new seciuity issue arising from this 
approach leads to, but is not limited to. the following questions: 
• Are die semantics of a remotely defmed business process or enhanced Web service 
compatible with the security policy effective at the node where it is to be executed? 
• Which classification, with respect to access control, is required for the Web service 
offered by the remotely defmed business process or enhanced Web service in order to be 
compliant with the security policy in the domain (he executing node belongs to? 
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While the second question again anscs in the conicxl of access control, albeit from a different 
point of view to that which usual access control approaches address, the first point addresses a 
completely new security issue, thai, by its nature, had not needed to be considered m the 
conlext of Web services as it is not rele\'ant with their basic incarnation. 
In this paper we propose an mfrastnjcturc and a methodology for coping with the first one of 
these novel security aspects arising from the employment of standardized business process 
languages. We consider semantic aspects of the business processes defmed by ihcu- respective 
scripts. The methodology proposed makes use of the fact, that business process languages offer 
little or no means for defining data prcKcssing or computational tasks as part of the language 
itself, but rather have to invoke Web ser\iccs for these purposes or must import constructs 
from other XML stondards such as Xpath (Bcrglund et al. 2004). 
3. Infrastructure for Distributed Development and Execution of Business 
Processes: An Example 
In an SOC environmcni we consider the situation where the task of defining business processes 
and enhanced Web services usmg BPhL is concentrated al a particular node and distnbuted to 
other nodes for deployment and execution. 
nod« for d«v*topm«nt 
Domain A Domain B 
deployment 
main boundariM 
no<J« running 
Wab servic«s 
• tor •x»cu1ion of 
business process 
croM-<}omain cJeptoyment 
normal cx)iTimunication 
security assessment ncxle 
Mcurity kx>k-up <-"> 
• Web service W• running on node B< bemg restricted not lo be invoked from outside domain B 
• Securtty policy of domain B allows kx carrying a subset of mtomiatKXi U provided by W i ki domain A 
• There 19 a business process ir domain A that o dependen* on I * 
Figure 1 • Distributed Development and (Execution of Business Processes in SOA 
Figure I illustrates an exemplary environment for the distributed development and execution of 
a BPEL scnpt with six nodes residing in two difTerenl domains A and B. We ftuther suppose 
that each node depicted in Figure 1 is capable of running BPKL defined processes. 
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We consider the case where in domam A there is a need for a business process, e.g. in • supply 
chain application, requiring infonnation U offered by a Web service W| at node Bi. However, 
because of restriciions imposed by security policies in domain B this infonnation cannot be 
accessed directly from outside domain B. For solving this conflict with security policy 
restrictions, a conventional approach would be the provision of an enhanced Web service in 
domain B, say W j at node Bj . W2 would access the information required from Web service W| 
and offer the non-restricted part of the results, i.e. U , to nodes in domain A across domain 
boundaries. While it would be possible not to use any business process language for this 
purpose, we assume that W2 is defined by a BPEL script S2. 
Since the need for the particular business process in this example arose in domam A, there is 
some probability that also requests for changes to this business process will arise in this 
domainu In order to circumvent the requirement that requests for change arising in domain A 
must be presented to developers in domain B in order to have them change the Web service 
Wi, it would be conceivable that Wj running on behalf of any node in domain A will be 
defined at node A1 and the defining BPEL script S2 will subsequently be brought to execution 
on node Bj as indicated by the arc ( I ) from Ai to B2. 
This approach would greatly facilitate the adaptation of W2 in domain B to changing require-
ments originating in domain A. However, it would induce se\'ere security weaknesses in 
domain B, i f S2 would be executed in domain B without particular precautions. Prior to running 
S2r i i has to be determined whether the semantics of W2 as defined by S2 comply with security 
policies effective in domain B. 
The analysis of the semantics of code written in programming languages is a well-known 
difficulty (Cousot 1999). Thcreforc, the need to analyse the semantics of W2 with respect to 
security-relevant semantics will make this approach of cross-domain definition and execution 
iiuprocucal unless this analysis can be provided automatically, at least to a large extent 
Fortunately, the nature of BPEL (as well as of other business process languages) accommo-
dates this analysis, fiirther supported by the fact that no thorough analysis of each and every 
particular aspect of the seniantics will be required, but instead only a direct search for features 
violating the security policy of the target domain. To further facilitate this analysis the security 
policy of the target domain may be expressed with respect to potentially security critical 
features of the language being used, i.e. BPEL in our example. Given these pre-conditions, the 
task of analysis becomes appropriate to be performed automatically, at least in cases when it is 
sufficient to express the security policy of a domain in the way exemplarily described in the 
following section. 
4. Security Policy Definition for Business Process Analysis 
Based on concepts developed in conformance testing methodology of open systems as defined 
in a series of International Standards (CTMF. Conformance Testing Methodology and Frame-
work, ISO/IEC 9646, part 1-7; particulariy (ISO, 1994)), after analysis of the security-relevant 
features of BPEL a checklist comparable to a protocol implementation conformance statement 
proforma (PICS proforma) (ISO. 1994) can be provided, which allows for definition of security 
policies with respect to execution of remotely defined BPEL scripts. This checklist is called a 
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security policy statement (SPS) profonna and will be used to indicate allowed features of 
BPEL in compliance with the security policy. Hence, while CTMF is dedicated to black box 
test environments, we extend the concepts of CTMF to the situation whert; code inspection 
being a specific method in white box testing will be employed in order to analyse the security-
relevant semantics of BPEL scripts. In order to discuss our approach a short example presen-
ting some typical information contained in a SPS proforraa is shown in Figure 2. 
Security Policy Stotoment 
(oMitJona! iOonbdcation Intomation not of bttwost In thb oxamplo} 
Roblfng to BPEL BOipts from domain: 
rnvocailon of Wob sorvicas outside cunBm domain aOoH d^? Y/N 
If vm. MkatD oliowDd OKtormd Wob sonfces: 
URU Rof. to EWSRS 
URL: Rsf.toEWSRS 
Inrtkaitn rnstrirtad Wob tuMcos In own domain: 
URL: Ref. to IWSRS 
URL: RQf. to tWSRS 
IndkatB unresariOed Web Sentais In own domain: 
URL: 
URL: 
... {satomonts wllfi mspocf to otfxjr socunty re/ovanr tanQUoq* foarums rwy Mfow) 
Figure 2 - Example of Security Policy Statement Proforma 
After indication of identification information concerning the domain to which the SPS relates 
and the domain, which is allowed to provide remotely defined BPEL scripts, there is an indica-
tion as to whether invocation of Web services in foreign domains will be allowed or not If 
invocation of such Web services is not prohibited in general, there may be indications of 
particular foreign Web services each identified by its respective URL that arc allowed to be 
invoked in a BPEL script. For each allowed Web service a so-called External Web Service 
Restriction Statement (EWSRS) may be referenced that contains further information concer-
ning restrictions with nspcct to die particular Web service. In this example there is only room 
for up to two such Web services, but it is imder^tood that the proforma may be extended to 
acconmiodate any number of list-type elements present in this example. 
After indication of external Web services that are allowed, there are two further groups of 
indications in Figure 2 concerning Web Services of the current domain: one concerning Web 
Services for which invocation is restricted and one concerning Web Services that may be 
invoked without any restrictions. While the last type of entry docs not require any fiuther infor-
mation besides the URL of the particular Web service, for each restricted Web service there is 
a field for indicating a reference to a so-called Intenuil Web Service Restriction Staicmeni 
(IWSRS) similar to the indication for external Web services above. Both the group of EWSRS 
and group of IWSRS referenced in Figure 2 are considered part of the SPS as a whole. The 
SPS is understood to indicate all of the security-relevant semantics accepted in a BPEL script 
for cross-domain deployment. Therefore, all other security-relevant semantics not explicitly 
stated in SPS as being allowed, will be prohibited. 
In Figure 3 there is an example of an IWSRS proforma in order to clarify the typical informa-
tion contained in this part of an SPS. There may be indications concerning restrictions related 
to particular input parameters of the Web service by indicating the XML-name of the para-
meter as well as indications concerning restrictions related to allowed processing with respect 
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to particular output parameters, e.g. type of computations perfomied or flow control dependent 
on values of output parameters or assignment to outbound messages allowed. 
Intemal Web Servico Restriction Statement | iWSRS-tO 
Resartctions VMim rosped to invocation parBmoters 
Rostrlctions wtfft respect to processing of output paramoters 
Parametor 
Assionmeni of output values to outbound messaqos outside own domoin atkiMiod? Y/N 
...(smtmnnts with ruspoet to offiBT socurity r^ovant uso of output vafuos may/btftwj 
Figure 3 - Example of Internal Web Service Restriction Statement Proforma 
In our example (Figure IX i f W2 would be the only instance in domain B where remotely 
defined BPEL scripts would be allowed, the SPS for domain B with respect to domain A would 
state that only invocation of Web services within domain B is allowed, and Wj is the only 
intemal Web service allowed to be invoked. Further restrictions apply with respect to the out-
put parameters of W|, since only the information U intended for external use is allowed to be 
carried outside of domain B. This would be specified in an IWSRS for W| indicating the 
restrictions with respect to the output parameters that may not be assigned to outbound 
messages. 
While the examples are given in human-readable tabular format it is obvious that it is straight-
forward to define appropriate XML schemas in order to be capable of presenting the informa-
tion in machine-processablc format 
5. Analysis and Assessment of Security-relevant Semantics of Business 
Processes 
Specifying the restrictions derived from security policies as indicated in this example makes it 
cosier to analyse a BPEL script than it would be without specifying the security policies in 
such a SPS. The statements in SPS are focused on the security-relevant elements in BPEL. 
Therefore, during analysis these elements can be searched for in a straightforward manner. 
However, this approach involves consequences with respect to the language feaUires that may 
be employed: 
• I f only domain internal Web services are allowed then, in order to allow for checking the 
domain pan of a URL'prior to execution, only URLs explicitly predefined within the 
script (at least the domain part of a URL) are allowed in a BPEL script 
• If restrictions with respect to particular Web services apply, also the part of the URLs 
containing the Web service name has to be present explicitly 
Obviously, this may limit the expressiveness of BPEL scripts. However, as is the case in 
Figure 1 and many other applications, the URLs of nodes involved in foreign domains are 
known and fixed throughout the nmtime of the script In many cases this also holds for names 
of Web services invoked. Therefore, these restrictions, though looking very tight at first sight, 
still leave room for useful applications. Without going into details it is apparent that the more 
fine grained analysis is implied by the policy, the more likely is the need for human support 
during analysis. Therefore, in cases where it would be too complicated to differentiate between 
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allowed semantics for cross-domain defmed BPEL scripts and semantics not allowed by the 
way of indications in an SPS of domain B, it would still be possible to extract allowed seman-
tics from the Web service being remotely defined and encapsulate it into another Web service, 
say W3. defined within domain B. Thus, it would be possible to dcfme an SPS indicating even 
more restricted semantics for remotely defmed BPEL scripts, since semantics required for the 
functionality now present in Wj may also be exchided. By just adding W3 to the list of allowed 
Web services for invocation in the SPS for domain B it would again be possible to provide the 
originally intended overall semantics of a remotely defined BPEL script 
Even with the definition of SPS in the manner described obovc the task of analysing security-
relevant semantics of BPEL scripts and matching against restrictions imposed by policies still 
is not, in every case, trivial and it might not always be capable of being performed 
automatically. Therefore, it may be a promising approach to perform this task at a dedicated 
node within a domain, say node Bs in ovu- example, instead of performing this task at every 
node in domain B. Human interaction, when required during the analysis of scripts and 
comparison to security restrictions, may be more easily provided at a single node (or only few 
nodes, i f single point of failure would be an issue) in a domain compared to the situation when 
being distributed across the domain. It may also facilitate use of specific software required for 
this purpose when it only needs to be available at a single instance both with respect to 
potential license fees and effort for user trainmg. 
Again, approaches in conformance testing as described in CTMF (ISO. 1994) gave rise to this 
approach to concentrate assessment in dedicated nodes within a domain. In our example, i f 
domain A permits acceptance of remotely defined BPEL scripts from domain B. it could also 
be useful to perform examination of the scripts against the appropriate SPS at one particular 
node in domain A. say node As, independent of where the script is to be executed later on. In 
such cases of mumal exchange of BPEL scripts, the analysis and assessment could further be 
centralized to a particular node shared by both domains for this purpose. However, the issue of 
privacy of information contained in security policies as well as the issue of trust implied in this 
delegation of assessment have to be considered in order to render this approach possible. Going 
into details on these aspects is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
6. Related Work 
Sekar et al. (2003) propose an approach to the problem of executing untrusted code, in general, 
i.e. not specific to business process languages, by deriving information as to the behaviour of 
the code at the level of system calls torn execution monitoring or static analysis at the 
developing site. The information derived is mapped to a model describing security-re levant 
behaviour and carried together with the code to the executing site where this information can 
both be checked against security policies and used during execution in order to monitor 
potential deviations from the stated behaviour. Though this approach appears to be very close 
to the one presented in this paper, there are important differences which tend to make this 
approach more difficult to be applied, at least in the context of business pn>ccsscs, i f it will be 
applicable to this area at all. The requirement of extensive testing as explicitly stated in this 
paper, and the need for observation at the level of system calls as well as the monitoring during 
execution, make application of the approach very complex. By contrast, these requirements are 
not present in our approach as it is based on code inspection techruques applied at script level. 
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Mendling et al. (2004) present an approach to addn^sing the second aspect in the list in 
section 2. By extracting RBAC models from BPEL scripts, and converting BPEL code in a 
format suitable for a particular RBAC soflwarc component, they provide an automated link of 
access control requirements into bxisiness processes defined by the BPEL scripts. 
Koshutanski and Massacci (2003) also address access control issues of business processes 
defined by BPEL scripts, in particular the problem of providing the required evidence of 
possessing the required access privileges at the right lime to the right place during execution of 
a business process. This approach docs not address any issues from the list in section 2. 
Fischer and Wenzcl (2004) extend the scope of services or processes being defined by business 
process languages to the area of grid computing and grid services. Among others they provide 
a conversion of scripts wrilien in one business process language, XPLD (Workflow Manage-
ment Coalition 2002) in this case, into scripts in another business process language, namely 
BPEL. The scenarios for using scripts written in business process languages in a grid com-
puting environment add another example of the approach to execute remotely-defined business 
processes, e.g. in BPEL, to the example discussed in the present paper. 
7. Conclusions and Future Research 
In this paper, we have presented an approach to one of the security aspects arising fi'om execu-
ting business processes or enhanced Web services defined outside the domain of execution, by 
checking the semantics of the BPEL script defining the process via inspection and comparison 
with the security policies effective al the site of execution. To this extent, we have proposed a 
method for defining the security policy based on an SPS proforma focusing on the security-
relevant semantics of BPEL. This facilitates analysis of security-relc\'ant semantics of business 
processes and matching it against restrictions imposed by security policies. Since, in contrast to 
(Sekar et al. 2003), there is no need for testing or monitoring during analysis and execution, die 
application of our approach is stniightfurwunl and well-suited for automated execution in the 
context of business processes in SOC. This is an important feature considering the lightweight 
naturc of fast changing business applications, the high level of abstraction above system calls 
and platform-independence of business process languages. Further, an infrastructure has been 
introduced for separating the task of analysis and assessment out of the particular node execu-
ting the business process and delegating it to a dedicated node in a domain. In this way, capa-
bilities and resources required for this purpose may be centralised and reused from throughout 
the domain. Future work will be dedicated to more exhaustive description of the security-rele-
vant aspects of business process languages. Furthermore, the issue of increasing trust in distri-
buted multi-domain environments will be investigated, in order to make it viable to tap the full 
potential of outsourcing the analysis and assessment task, even across domain boundaries. 
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Abstract 
Purpose - Aims m idcntift' Eecuriiy-rdevMi Bennmis of busiTiesa prooessa haast defined by 
ft'S-BPEL (W'* Services Business Pnxxsa Zuankn Lanpnge, BPEL f i r sbon) sc^ pD^ in jankubr. 
ft-hai sadi Bcripta defining coliibarative business procesees on top of web aivices are depkiycd 
DesifpVmelhodoloiB-ftipproach - Amlysing potenriaj cf RPEL to define behaviour of business 
pncessa viotadng resonctims implied by security poKda 
Fiodiiuis - SmsmocDsaemsbeinjtcctQbitui^^ 
spodfic scrasi nstncmms tm;d«l by securily policies air defined and ibcir irapliraiioia for anatjnds 
of BPEL SQtpts dunns oxstpiancc sssessnvnl of QiKMbmain defined bustncsa processes arc 
Rescflrch Ihnitmtonafiinplicntioiia — Hic rcsuln of the reseorcfa part of whidi is irported 
here have been appEtd in a nseaith prototype to BPEL ssipa al limiad ske and oompanuivdy 
sinqilc Iwrinffi tccic RfotuxirM "qmpl" of B i H scripts *rith rtspect to dze and oomsitsilj stndd 
be ociT&incd for fsrtho ujipioving tmubitiTy of ibc alsorithms used. 
Originality/v-nliffi - The results c<o be used to spadfy eeairily policies in tems of secuiity-critica] 
semanlica of BPEL scripts m order to facOitaa CDcqdiance a'aessraau. to conjunction with ether 
results of this rtscaixh, this viD help to ovenxxnc security ISSICT ansing fmn croE&doouin dcfimtioQ 
of business pmtessrs b>- enabling auiomaiic corapGance ossessmem prior to execution. 
Keyu'onls Iraemet. Fkshiew envimrmttii. Rata jwuriry, InfonnaiioD 
Paper (>-pc Research paper 
Tie paper frtOT rtscbcr ai b the fircJ m a S O T S of papas that »TD iippcar dming this 
of LH£€S, tased i^nn works prEsenied ai the Eraeiald - sponsored Sixth Intmiationa) 
Nctworii Conference {INC 2006), which ran in Rymouih. UK, from U to M July 2000. The 
oonfcrence inch i^ a strong strain of security-rclatcd papcra, and those selected for the jounal 
TOT on rated hij^ily in the origiraJ cnnfiaTDce review process. The paper presents an update of 
the version tiat apparcd in the conference pnxeefings, aDowina the tnnhore to incorporarc 
feedback nsri^cd during tie conference and nrfte the btesi dn-ebpnicnts in their research. 
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Introduction 
Using business processes defined on t t ^ of web services is considered a promisinK 
approach to turn service-oriented computing (SOQ into practical application (Berardi 
et al, TJXS^ The request for fast adaplaHon of business processes to diansing 
requirements as m i l as for platform - independent definition of business processes 
leail to the specification of sundardized busness process defining languages. While 
se\eriU oompctins stnndards have been developed for this purpose, Web Services 
Business Process Execution Language (WSBPEL) (Arltin et aL, 2004). usually 
abbreviated BPEL, seems to have emerged the de facto standard for web service 
composilioD (Mayer and Lubke. 2006; Wang ft aL. 2CM). Since, this standard is 
supponed by several platfonn vendors, BPEL is particularly useful for die definition of 
collaborative business processes spanning several enterprise domains. 
Being muliiplatform enabled fadlitates crosfHloiiiain definition of business 
pTTxesses using BPEL, that is, definidon of business processes at one location ( t^ . a 
first enterprise) and execution of them at a different location ( tg . a second enterprise). 
The security issues invoh^ed, how-ever, impede this approach from being turned into 
practical application. In particular; uncertainly about the semantics of remotely 
defined BPEL scripts, notably with respect to their oompaiibility with local security 
policies, gets in the way of executing than at a foreign location. Bdng able to assess (in 
an easy and preferably automatic way) that the semantics of such scripts comply to 
local security policies, could fosto- the fiather exploitation of BPEL as a standard by 
albwing remotely defined scripts being executed without ieopardizing security 
requirements. 
In this paper, we analj"Se the security-relevant semantics inherent in BPEL as a first 
step to;\-ards facilitanng assessment of compliance v.-ith security policies. 
Security-relevant semantics in diis context considers the functional behaviour of 
business processes that may be expressed by the different language elements of BPEL 
with resjxci to poientLil smirity U:>ues imulved. Once sccurity-critica] semantic 
patterns of BPEL have been identified based on the results of this analysis, local 
security polices can be expressed in terms of aUo wed and disallowed seman tic patterns 
in remotely defined BPEL scripts as has already been set out in another paper of the 
authors (Fischer ci aL, 20Q5). Finally, if this is done in a formal well-suited for automatic 
processing, the assessment of compliance with local security policies can be performed 
for BPEL scripts in an automatic way prior to executing them (Fischer el aL, 2007). 
Security-relevant 
semantics of 
BPEL 
117 
Cross-domain dcf lni i ion of collaborative business processes 
Figure 1 shows an exemplary scenario for disoibuted dcfinitioD and execution of a 
BPEL script in two different domains, A aiul B. The two domains are considered to 
belong to two differeoi organisations (e.g. enterprises). Each of the systems shown in 
Figure 1 is capable of running BPEL-defined prooe5se& Sincf^ a business process 
defined by a BPEL script offers services to hs environment, it can itself be considered a 
web service. Therefore, in this example one of the web services used by the business 
proctss in system 1 is realized as a business process controlled by a BPEL scripL For 
this scenario it is ossuTned, tliat this BPEL script is defined in domain A and dqiloyed 
across the domain boundary for execution in system 2 of domain a Given both 
systems are based on a BPEL-enabled pbtform. this scenario would be technically 
feasiblt However, security issues involved in this oossKlomain approadi of defining 
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tiguro 1. 
Distributed defbunon and 
execution of business 
processes RPEI-
BPEL«cripidcfiiwJ 
locally snd deployed^ 
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MwUonedbyranijteJy 
defiaed BPEL uroi 
Web leixice I 
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BPEL scrip! defined 
n]d<fcpla)'edlocairy 
and running a busines process may prevent ihis scenario from being applied in a 
rcal-tt-orld crossorganisationaJ environment 
Security issues o l cross-domain defined business processes 
Since, security alreadj- is an important issue in distributed applications in general, this 
topic is also signiiiant importance for business processes, particularly for business 
processes crossing domain boundaries. Security of web sm-ioes is well studied and 
smra) approaches (rrr aocrss control to web services exist (Abendroth ond Jensen, 
2003; Dimmock et aL. 2004). Role-based access control (RBAQ (Ferraiolo et ol, 2001; 
Poig and Chen. 20(M) is the widely used concept for doling ^^th security aspects in 
this field. Howe\-er, novel security aspects not corercd in the aforementioned 
appiTHches arise from the distributed definition and ejtecution of business processes. 
The following questions Yoxt to be answered in this context: 
• Ai? the semantics of a remotely defined business process compatible with the 
security policy effective at the sj'sicm where it is to be executed? 
• Which classification, u i ih respect to access control is rpquired for the web 
service offered by the remotely defined business process in order to be compliant 
with the security policy in the domain where it will be executed? 
While the second question again arises in the context of access control, albeit from a 
different point of view ihaji die aspect addressed by usual access control approaches, 
the first question addresses a new view of access control and be>'ond, that had not 
needed to be considered in the context of web services as it is not relevant wilh iheir 
basic incarnation. Since, obeying the restrictions implied by security policies is ahra>-3 
important when developing distributed applicntiona, this aspect is not considered on 
isue panioitariy associated with business processes, when de\'eloping them locally. 
Ibwever, this aspect will gain predominant imponmice that is particular to business 
proctsses, when remotely defined script-based business processes are to be executed. 
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Security aspects in web savices concern questions like; what kind of privileges are Security-relevant 
required for in^-oking a particular web service? In the cross-organisational deployment semantics o f 
scenario of Figure 1, the view to security is taken from an opposile direction, aiming at R p p i 
questions like: what functionality is allowed to be provided by o remotely defined o r t L 
business process with respect to die security policy effective in the domain of 
execution? The answa- to iWs qtiestion may in most cases depend on the intended use 
of die web sovice pnmded by this business process. To keep it simple, without kiss of 119 
generality we assume, that — 
* the domain where the BPEL script is specified and tarn where it is sent 
CTossHJomain to the sj'stem where it will be executed, is identical with die 
domain invoking the new web service provided by the business process, for 
instance domain A in the scenario of Figure 1; 
• with respea to access oontn)l and potential other security aspects relc\-^^ 
relation between both domains, all potential external invokers of this new wt i j 
service (IJC invokes residing outside the domain running it. e^. invokers in 
domain A) are provided the same set of privileges. 
Given these preconditions, the answo- to the above question concerning the allowable 
functionality of the business process is rcbted to the set of privileges owned by the 
invokes of i t as a wd) service In terms of RBAC (Femuoto et al. 2001), due to 
precondition b) all external invokers are associated with the same role. Hoice, the 
answer is related to this role, this means in the abm'e scaiario^ it depends on the role 
associated with invokers in domain A with respect to domain B. At this point, it 
becomes obWous that both security issues identified above are closely related. They 
may be considered to be complementary to each other, since the first issue is takiqg die 
view from inside to outside, while die second one is taking the view from outside to 
inside. 
In this paper, the inside-out view of the tirst issue will be considered. For this 
purpose, the results of a detailed anal>'sis of the security-relevant semantics of BPEL 
dHt need spedal atimtion in the security assessment of busirtess processes are 
presmted 
Related work 
While access control-related aspects arc predominant with web services, they are, of 
course, also on issue with BPEL In rebted work, Koshutanski and Massacci (2003) 
address access control issues of business processes defined by BPEL scripts, in 
particular die problem of providing the required evidence of possessing the proper 
access privileges at the ri^t time to the right place during execution of a business 
Peng and Chen (2004) propose an extension to conventional RBAC models called 
W'S-RBAC, in order to incorporate wdi services and business processes on top of diem. 
In their approach, web sovices an sui^ject to access control in place of common sj^stem 
resources in convoidonal approaches. Business processes and oiterprises are elements 
in their WS-RBAC model making it suitable for application to oollaboradve business 
processes. 
In other related work. Mendling et al (2004) invesiigaie access control requirements 
of BPEL script-defined businesa processes. By extracting RBAC models from BPEL 
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IMCS scripts, and convming BFEL languor constructs in a fannat suitable for a panicuhr 
150 RBAC software compancnt, ihey provide an automated link of access control 
enforcement into business processes defined by the BPEL scripts. 
Though ihe papers mouioned in this section do nut specifically address distributed 
definiaon and execution of BPEL scripts, their approaches also are applicable to the 
second security aspect arising in this context as listed above. However, none of the 
120 rebied \raiit deals with the first security aspect in the list above, being the concern of 
the results pnsenied herein as ft-dl as of the appitiaches introduced in a p i w o u s p a ^ 
of the authors (Fischer et al, 2005). 
Analysis of security-relevant semantic pancms of DFEL 
While a detailed description of BPEL can be found in its specification (Arkin et al. 
2004), a oomprehoisive analysis of its semantics W2,3 conducted by Wohed et at ^002) 
based on a pre\Tous vcreion of the BPEL specificatioa An overview of the language 
and a comprehensive example is given by Leymann and Rotkr ^004). The nature of 
BPEL accommodates the analysis of sccurit>--reIe\-aDi semantics by offering only little 
or no means for defming data processing or aunputational tasks as part of the 
language itself. For these purposes; BPEL scripts have 10 invoke web services, or must 
import constructs from other XML standards such as XPiilh (Berglund et al. 2005). fn 
addition, security aspects such as authentication, provision of secure coimmmication 
channels, and non-repudiation are not considered in this context, since ihe language 
does not provide any means related m these security a^ects. These aspects usually are 
catered for by Uie phtfbrm running BPEL scripls. Thus, the anal>-sis can be 
conrentrated on the business or woikflow logic, that may be expressed in BPEL, in 
order to identify security'rele\-ant semantics. 
Adjust ing the scope uf uimlysia 
For the sake of general applicability, we aim at analysing security relevance 
independent from the application contexts of particular BPEL scripi-defined business 
processes. Therefore, we rdate language constructs with typical restrictions implied 
by security policies. Analysing security rele^-ance in this way entails the opportunity 
thai, once the securit>*-rielevant £taturcs of BPEL are identified, no thorough anal>'sisof 
each and every particular aspect of the semantits will be requiicd during the 
assessment of BPEL scripts for compliance with security polidcs. Instead, a direa 
search independent from application comexts looking only for the features idoitified as 
security-critical will be sufficient for this purpose. 
To allow as much functionality as possible in a business process uithin the limits 
imposed by security [nlides, it is anticipated that the restrictions derived from such 
policies shall be as weak as posibl^ but at the same time as stria as requij ed to avoid 
any violation of security p o l i c e Since, the strategy aims at avoidance of 
comprornising security policies, following Dobson (LS9i) access control and 
information flow control are the mechanisms of dioice. Access control to the iveb 
service offered by a business process under consideration is the ooncem of • 
complancntary security issue not addressed in this paper as stated above. Hence, the 
analysis addressed herein aims at examining whether information or resources 
accessed and the flow of tnfiormanon frura inside to outside the domain and vice vosa 
are consistent with the limitations of the security polio'. 
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ftjssihle viohtions of the policy arc 
* making information or use of resources available outside the domain beyond the 
restrictions imposed by the policy (e^ reading restricted information from a 
database and sending ti to an external partner); 
> bringing information from outside into an internal data storage that is not 
allowed to be wTiltcn to &wn cilemal sources and 
• using functionality or resouroes that ore not allowed to be used ( tg. altering data 
in a data base or exercising a s>'5Cem control fimcdon). 
In BPEL, two types of processes may be modelled executable and abstract processes 
Since, abstract processes are not executable by their deration, they are not m the 
scope of our anal>-5is. Executable pnxesses specify workflow logic in terms of 
activides. The aaivities expressing semantics of a business process ma? be either 
primitive or structured The prevaleni semantics expressed in BPEL is the exchange of 
messages ni th one or sev eral externa} partners, that can be thought of as invotdng web 
services provided by partners or being invoked as a u-rf) service by partners. In a 
definition part, BPEL scripts define the potential links to external partners by 
refffences to WSDL definitions of the web services involved Thus, analysing these 
definitions in a first step yields the sel of wd) services that may be in%-oked or are 
offered by a business process under consideration. 
Security-relevant 
semantics of 
BPEL 
121 
CtnssificQtion of web service access rcstricdons 
Since, the language constructs are not security-relttrant as such, they have to be 
examined in the context of access to information or resotuces. Hence, the language 
constructs u-ill be in^-estigaied in conjunction wilh different tj-pes of web services 
because m BPEL scripts access a> information or resources may only be gained via 
web ^ervia=l. Givai a particular set of ratricttons implied by a socuriry policy, ihot is 
associated co a particular set of privileges fte. a particular role), veb services may be 
distinguished with respect to access allowance or restrictions to their input end ourput 
parameters. In Table I , six diffierent casts are defined. 
Invoking web services belonging to the cases of Table I in combination with the 
activities defined in BPEL will be im-esiigated as semantic patterns to determine their 
Cases Deporipjion 
\V5 intb cnitstricied access to aS pans of rcnuias a inforoaiion otItsaS 
WS oilh con i^fciely rstriaid access, i t web sovices thai ere not Qlliwed I D be invdted 
VfS «itii restricted visibiL'ty af read vahies access: sooe infmiauon node accessible ore 
not alkwEd to be cmied outside dcrnam D. Lft [mame^ 
to he used withci doniani B. but DOI ia outbound mcsases to targets otnstde docuin 0 
WS *iih restricttd »7ite access seme of the input poramelere of the web service are ooi 
allowed to be used at all 
\VS*i;hre&triaed set of TahtfsaPQwediagTTte access: Eooe of the mputpm 
WS ray only be used with panioihi values, ntileothen nay be used w-ilhoul rcstriaiora 
WS vith valuea in wiite aectss rearided to spedfic eourcea: far some of the iiput 
psnunetss of ibc WS only vahxs Eran [n" '" '* '" sources iiny be used, for insiznce; only 
nbia returned by a paiticukir W5 
Table 1. 
restrictions to 
servicea 
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IMCS relevance with respect to security policies, in particular access control and information 
150 flow control Of course a particular web service may belong to more than one of the 
cases 3 through 6 simuItaneousI>'. For the ease of discussion, we analyse no oombined 
cases, sinoe for a web ser\-ice belonging to more than one of these cases, the results 
related to each of the cases it belongs to may be applied simultaneously in this 
situaQoiL 
122 As cm be easily seen, web services with unrestricted access penmssion (case 1) as 
well as web services with total access rKtriction (case 2) do not pose any particular 
challenge for analysis. In these cases, any funher distinction between combinations 
with different feamrcs of BPEL is not relevanL The reason for this is that their allowed 
or forbidden use in a BPEL script may already be detected by examining the definition 
part. .Vo web sen-ice nnth total access restriction (case 2) must occur in die definition 
part or at least, if such a web scr\ioe should occur in the definition part, it must not be 
used in any oommunicatian paformed in the business process. Conversdy. vdb 
services with unitstricied access permission (case 1) may be invoked freely diroughmii 
a bu^ness process, irrespective of particular combinations with BPEL activities. The 
only aspea relerant widi web services of case I is the inforaiation flow fnm and to 
parameters of such a web service prio- and succeeding its invocation, respectively. 
This has to be considCTed during information flow analj-sis from and to resnicred 
paramcieis of web services in cases 3 through 6L 
The distinction between cases 3 throuj^i 6 requires detailed knoftledgc of the 
semantics of a web service. Since, such detailed knowledge of cjrtcrnal web services may 
not be arailable in domain B, in general, external web services tend to £all into cases 1 or 
2. Conversely, the semantics of internal wrf) services can be assumed to be well-known 
within dimiain B, such that die differtimation betwOT cases 3 dirough 6 wiU be ptissi^ 
Analyais of security-relevant semantic patterns 
The results of die analysis of semantic pauerns invoh-ing web servioM of cases 3 
duDugh 6 are depicted in Tables U and I H Ulule Table R presents the results for 
semantic patterns formed by combination with primitive activities. Table HI indicates 
the results for structured aaivities, 
ftiniiiive aaivirica Cases Case 4 Cases 5% 
Invoke lav'oatian of a web eovtce IFAtv) W lFA{w/3) 
Rccriv« Wailing kr a mcsasc to arm-e IKAfv) 
Sending 2 npty co a message rpfrii.-ed W IFA(w/s) 
Assgn AssiBimient of values telwwn tvo cfif/erent lomtiai s (Relfvanl in IPA oaty) 
Wait Woitiii; far a spedfed amount of time 
[nation of eieepyins such as bihins during 
Throw cxixuiitsi 
empty -
Tcrminztmi of a pn.cm ii&Ltiifr' ExiUv) 
Scoirity referana (rf O N'otcs: CbnstnKt exii was ttrminatf in preraa versions d ffitU W5 = wtb service 
fisEanric patiena «ith IFA - infonnation flow anal>'sia (v) mth n^iea to visibility erf values read bvm WS nith respca 
primitive activities to values Ktiltai to WS wih nspcci to sources of values wriltoi to WS 
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Smictmcd Cases Case 4 OaaS/S 
Flow I^iaCd cxEOitkin of aniritia - -
Switch Branching tjctwwn several allmnte nctivities 5wxa± am^v) 
WhCe [teranve execonon, le. kxqiins Loop cond(v) 
Pick Wsiiinj; sinml&meoustr for acveaJ events to occur IFA(T) 
and prcocding wiih the fiist eveni thai BcaaDy Timftv) 
o x u T s ^ ncu) 
Notes: TypksiDy, oae of the r-tna wni'rcd fir b a ameom e%-ait. while the other events are messzgea 
to nnive; ^'S «=• Web Sovicc IFAfv) - mfbnnanoo flow tmlysis vrith respect to visiMily of values 
read from 
Security-relevant 
semantics of 
BPEL 
123 
Table m. 
Sccunty relcvnm of 
fiennmic palimis with 
miaunsl acrivitio 
Tables n and m each comprise fi\e columns. The second column oontants a short 
defOTptinn of the semantics of the respective BPEL activity in the first column. In 
columns three through five, the implications for security assessment are indicated, 
when the respective BPEL activity is combined with a wd> senice of cases 3 through 6. 
Since, the entries for the cases 5 and 6 only diffw slightly, the indications for these 
cases are combined in the fifth columrL 
Entry indicates, that the respecti\-e semantic pattern is not relevant in scope of 
access control and infonnation flow. As shown in Tables II and U\, some aaiviiies 
require special attention * i i h respect to information flow. As indicated by entry 
[FA(v), analysis of information flow is rccpiired, if a wr f j service belonging to case 3 is 
used in one of the activities invoke (with respect to the inbound parametere, i.e. the 
output paramctere of the web service invokedX receiv e or ihe cn message pan of pick. 
This is to determine whether visibility-restricted information returned by the web 
senice is kept inside the security domain and is not sent outside via one of the 
aaivities invoke (u*ithin an outbound parameta*) or reply. 
For case 4, only invoke (with respect to the outbound parameters, Le. the input 
parameters of the web service invoked) and r ^ I y need special attrition to check 
that the restricted input parameters of the particular web service will not be used 
at all fi.e. written to as indicated by the entry w). Cases 5 and 6 are similar, since 
with invuke (with respect to the outbound parameters) and reply information flow 
analysis is required to determine whether the restricted use of values is tdieycd. 
With case 3, information flow analysis related to the vahies writtm to restricted 
outbound parameters is required indicated by entry IFA(w)). whereas with case 6^  
anaj>-sis is required with respect to the souras of such values frndicated by entry 
IFA(s)). 
As indicated in Table I I . anal)-sis of infonnation flow has to embrace assign 
octiviiKS to observe the movement of information within the business process. If 
processing sudi as calculation or string maniinilation is performed within a BPEL 
script usng language constructs imponed from, for instance, X l ^ t h (Berglund et aL. 
2!X&\ it has to be analysed that no restricted infonnation is involved, or at least, 
that results from the processing is not used in a manner violating the security 
policiK. Since, allowing such Irind of processing on rcstriaed information could 
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IMCS cause obfuscation of information flow, thereby oomplicaiing the analj-sis of 
150 information flow considerably, as a matter of presautitm such processing should be 
gaicrally considered incompatible with security policy, independent of the further 
use of its results. 
As special cases, use of visibiHrj--restrictcd infonnauon gained from web services of 
case 3 in the acti^'itics wait (with respect to duraticm), throw (nnth respect to exception 
124 ihrownX exit (wirfi respea to condition for termination), switch (uith respect to 
^ definition of cases), while (with respea to loop control), and pick (with respect to 
timeout inten-al) also turns out to be security-relevam as shown in Tables 11 and HI. 
The reason for this is, that defining any of the terms indicated in parenthesis 
dependent on visibility-restricted information could be expiated to circumv-ent 
restrictions implied by security policy. For instance, i f the visibility-restiicted 
information / is used to control the amount of loop o'des in a while activity, pro some 
externaDy observable behaviour such as sending a message to an external web service 
from within the loop body could be used to drcum\-ent the visibility restriction on /. In 
this way. an external observer would be able to count the numbers of such messages 
and to dediare the value of / from this cdjser^-ation. Howe\*cr, revealing / to an external 
observer in whatever manner would violate the security policy resuicting this 
information from being disclosed outside the domain. Therefore, use of 
visibility-restricted information for flow control purposes also needs special 
attention during compliance assessment of BPEL 
Research pro to t^ iK 
Using the results of the analj*sis presented here in conjunction with a schema for 
defining security* policies in loms of allowed and disalbwed semantic patterns 
identified aboii-e as security-relevant, a research prototype has been implemented as 
proof of concepL This sdiema has been docribed in detail in another paper of the 
authors (Fischer et aL, 2007). The BPEL script to be checked and the security policies 
defined using this schtsna are input ro the prototype. Furthermore, the \VSDL 
definitions (Oiinniri ctaL, 2006) of all web services addressed in the BPEL script under 
consideration have to be made a\TiilabIe to the prototype. Without executing the BPEL 
script, the prototype irLspects it step by step to ensure, that the restrictions specified by 
the security poHdes are obeyed If any violation is detected, the program stops its 
analysis and retunu a fail verdict. It also indicates the location in the BPEL soripi 
giving rise to this verdict together with the security policy implied restriction violated 
at that location. If ihe inspection is completed without detecting any violation of the 
security policy, then the prototype assigns a pass verdia to the BPEL script. 
Before the dtecks with respect to the d i f f o ^ t kind of restrictions as indicated in 
Tables II and m can be perfonmed, the declaration part of the BPEL script being 
checked is analysed to get'information aboit web services potentially invoked during 
execution, the message types used in such in\-ocaiions (as defined in the corresponding 
WSDL scripts for the particular web service), and the variables and their respective 
types u . ^ for staring results from and passing \-ahies to w ^ service invocations. 
Furthennore, the security policy defined using the afOTemenrioned schema is parsed 
and xbc information ooniained in it is stored as an internal representation of the 
security policy for further processing. 
242 
Copies of Own Publications 
After completion of this initial step and storing the information gained during Security-relevant 
this stage, the prototype starts to anal>-se the aaivities of the BPEL script Each semantics of 
activit>' encountered is treated separate^ by the prototype, poforming the specific PPPT 
dttcks and actions associated with each type of BPEL acthity. While stepping D r t i L 
through the process pan of the BPEL script, the prototype simultaneously 
performs formrd and back^Tird information flow anafysis os required for the 
semantic pattertis encoimiered during the analj-sis. Farther details of the 125 
processing performed for the different BPEL aaivities are described in the above 
mtnliontti paper (Fischer et al, 2007). 
Since, this prototype is intended as a proof of concept, only small BPEL scripts 
indioling comparaii\-ely simple business k ^ c have been used to show that the 
architecture and algorithms used are suitable to detea possible violations of the 
security policy. Though, in principle, the viability of automatic compliance assessment 
could be approved this u.'ay, before using these algorithms for real-nxrld applications, 
more thorough rests with larEO" BPEL scripts comprisirig more complex business logic 
would have to be performed. 
Conclusions and fur ther work 
Our analysis of security-relevant semantics of business processes defined by BPEL 
scripts has identified security risks associated with particular constructs of BPEL in 
oonjunaion with various types of security policy-implied restrictions on the use of web 
sCTvices, herein called semantic patterns. The results of this analysis can be used to 
specify security policies applicable to cross-domain defined BPEL scripts in terms of 
sudi patterns. This way, assessment of compliance with local security policies of 
business processes defined and executed in a distributed manner can be fadliiated. 
Since, assessment become suitable for automatic processing as has been shown by 
implementing a research prototype desoribcd briefly above and in more detail in 
another paper of the authors (Fisdier et al, 2007), security issues arising from applying 
BI^EL for cn>S3-organisatiotial devebpment of business processes may be treated 
satisfactorily thereby fostering acceptance of exploiting multi-phtform capability of 
BPEL this n-ay in practical applications. 
Further *xirk will be dedicated to improving the research prototype and expanding 
the field of application of the results from this researdi to other areas beyond business 
process management where similar circumsiaiHDes with executing scripts written in a 
standardized process definirion language pre\*aiL One such area could be grid 
computing where BPEL can "be used for ordustration and choreography of grid 
services (Tuecke et aL, 2003) in order to define grid processes. 
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Abstract 
TJits paper prtxius on oppntocfi co ttcttniy poti^ 
erfonaaaa fniA coDabonaivr busimt proccots defmaJ 
using BPEL und drpioytd ocnxsi otttrprnt donoiit bouiy 
darta for aecvtion. The assessment of evnpttance vith 
sscarity polkta at the location nftere a BPEL xrip ts at 
be aceaaed b factlUaxd by n-formulmiag Ae seeuriiy 
policies *1lh resptxt at the patemial t^violation UAertnl 
tn BPEL The results af an analysis of the trcunty-
rttevam semarlia <f BPEL-defmed businea processes 
conducted Jbr this purpose Indicate the parmamaa rote <tf 
i/^immaionjlawataiyzis In biainesjprocesses. Basedon 
these resulu. the paper pmpasa an XML-based schema 
for spedj^ing securily polkies for croa-organhalanai 
business processes tha alltna for automatic checbng ^ 
BPEL scripts far compliance to these security poUcia. 
an automatic cvmpHance check that approx-ej the 
feasibility of the method far practlcd eHikaxim bt 
security p^icy etforcement. 
Ke>-word3 
CoOibnmivc Business Ptoccnci, Business Prrw^^ * 
Execdica Lossnage (BPEL), Security Pottcy Eolbrce-
mcm. [nfivmilion Flow Aoal)iix, Sfmmlic Analysis, 
Web ScrvicoL, Sovice (ktenled Campming (SOC) 
1. Introduction 
Defining Iwsiness processes on up of Web services 
hu evolved as a promising ipproscb to cope with rcqui-
remoits br high flaubiUty and d m time-bMnarkel in 
cumnl business process cnvironmaiu [19]. Web Sa-
vices BDStnesi Process Ejieoidaa Laoguace (WS-BPEL) 
[2J, usaDy Bbfarevtaied BPEL, b oonsidoed to be [he 
enwTjing de-ftcio srandard for Web service ctinpesirion 
[IB^O] in order ID define business processes. Tlie mture 
of being • stindanlized deCnitioo langioge for ^ ' T - ' T ' T 
processes, being able (o be ciecuted on cevcnil pladcrms, 
is psntcolaily usefhl when caUsbontivE businco pro-
ccses qnsDing seveial enterprise domains sn spedfied. 
One aspca of BPEL being muUi-pIai&nn enabled 
Kcms not to have found us way into practical appii-
cation: Emplojing die &cl thai business fxoceases 
defined (his are aUe to perform oa several fdalfkms 
tnalccs ii fta^tHft to define aou-crganisaijaaBl business 
processes al ooe tocaiion. for mstsncB one enterprise^  and 
execute than at a difTcrQii tocaiion, (br insrsncc a second 
However. Mcnrily issues invotved in this way of using 
BPEL-dcfincd buainess processes impede practical 
applicaliOQ of (his appnadL In pyniculn, (be uncertainly 
abooi tho sonactics of remotely defined BPEL scripts, 
particularly with lapea to their conpatibiUty with local 
socurily policies, gets in the my of aeculing ihcm ai a 
fcrcign location. Being aUe to assess fm an easy, and 
prc&nbly aetomalic. «ay> that the f ^ ^ ' ^ f t of such 
l - < i 4 « - 0 8 3 a - 6 / 0 7 / 5 2 0 . 0 0 •2007 IEEE. 685 
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scripts amply to local security policies, coold fosta fiir-
(hcr exploitatian of BPEL u a sumdard by oHowtog rc-
mocely definod scripts bemg cxocuted n-iltaoul jecpor-
dizfng tecurity rcquiremgna. 
[n this paper, we prapose • nie*hod of defining security 
policies to terms of secoriiy^elcvant scmmlics inbomt io 
BPEL Tbis my, the cooiparison bcTarcn security 
policies cod OPEL scripts is fitciliimrd such (hst so 
assessment of compliance witb these pc^dcs U enabled to 
be conducted automatically. It should be noted that the 
term "compliance" is atnnys used in (his soise here. The 
paper also describes a reseaicii prototype thai bas beeo 
developed Icr spjvuviog the feasibility of auttmstic 
Boessmait of BPEL scripts based on this approach. Since 
die assessncnt can be perfomod prior to execution of tbe 
BPEL scripts, (he mcdiod appears to be vkcU-nitcd to 
support elective security policy enforcement in die 
context of BPEL^lefincd collaborative business processes. 
2 . A D S C M Eutnple for a CoUaborative 
Basinesi Process 
In Figure I , an example from the area supply chain 
mnnagemcnt (SCM) is dionn that will be used to UhistrBts 
the security issues arising when remtsely defined BPEL 
soipcs are being deplojnd across cntnpiise donum boun* 
daitcs. 
The ap[dtcalion context of the distributed busincu 
process depicted in Figure 1 is the order processing of a 
cor nutnufitcturcT ordering gettrboxcs or componesls 
thereof from a gearbox msnu&cturo' wfao, in turn, odos 
ooinpo^ ^^ XB gcarboies floni dif&rcot p^^^yiippli^yi 
t»-o in this example. 
The business pnxesi ts set up in a serxice-orienled 
computing (SOC) environment whoe all funoions used 
f o r the application are provided as Web services and the 
ocanpositian of Web services is accomplisbed using BPEL 
f o r the definiiitn of Che controlling workflow. In sndi a 
contexl, BPEL s c r ^ do not need to perform my kind of 
data manipulanoo o r data ptxesslag on their own. Since 
BPEL docs not pwide any language constructs br 
jjcifbrming ( b t a nua ipu la lHins , cfsistiitcts of othc 
languages such as XPalh [4J would haw to be imported 
f o r these purpose anyway. Since ia a service orienied 
"pptirp^'fn cootoQ all dsto proccssiog can be tigpt ^ ttrijiff 
the OQntrolling BPEL scripta, tt u assumed that the BPEL 
scripts considered here only make use of elements 
imparted Irom XPEUh, i f any, to expressions specifying 
conditions for flow control purposes not implying any 
A'^tTt diBnipQ]alien. 
2.1. DcacrfptloD of Example Business Process 
In this example, a cattroOtng BPEL script b executed 
ux 0 sj^tso of (be ^corbox mpimfaL' tdcfimo^ ^ coo* 
trolling bistness process denoted by eoittrei tn Figure I . 
An process of (lie cu iH f^lTrfaf^ Trr^ T (bst ttuy itsdf 
be a Web service or B BPEL-defined business [raess in-
vokes the Wa> service of&icd by the eonfrol process at 
the gearbox manuiacturer providing a list of gearbox 
compooents to be ordered by the car manufactorv. Be-
fore placing on crdcr. (he car msnufactura expects a 
price offer accompanied by a coramitmoit with respect to 
the delivery date. 
Rgure 1: Collaboratlva buslnasi procass 
example 
The coatrot process tn^vkes o c/uek stock Web 
service for checking the availability of the ordered items 
in nock. For this purpose, the list of items to be ordered 
is passed to this Web service. After checking a\-ailafaiUty 
in siock, the cfcrc* ttoek Web service reuons two lists of 
items that are to be or^ terpd from cut>supplier I and sid> 
supptio' 2, respectively. Togetho' wilb these lists, a trans-
action ID fiv the order in progress and tfie credentials 
required to invoke the respective Web services of the two 
sub-cupplien are returned by cA«cft aoek. 
Upoi receiviog the response of ehtek stock, the 
conttot process invokes ibe price quatndon Web servica 
of the sub-supplia3 and prmidcs the rcqxctive [ist of 
itans to each of than. To get access to these Web 
services, the credaitials returned by cAee* stock are used 
by the coamt process. Of course, each Web service of 
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the sd>-8upp l tn requires its own set of credcntinls. 
"niacforc, ihe control process has to provide ihc jvopcr 
instuce of credentials to r?ch of them. 
After cbcddng s\'ailability of the ttcins o i the respec-
ti\-c Itsi. each price qaatmUm Web service returns > list 
•ugmemed b y prices and a^ulability oo stock or dates cf 
delivery. The eoronl process thai invoke a calcatetr 
offer Wd) service of the gearbox manufictiim- to jrepare 
an ofGv for the car manu&cturcr. For this purpose, the 
conXrwt ^oc^!tt p>yy^ ^ tlic ftti^^QQitcd lut^ rctivncd 
both Rib-supptiers to the eatewSau offer Web cervice 
together with the transaction [D thai was returned to it 
before b y the cArc* ttoek Web service. 
The catenate offer Web service uses the transacdcn 
ID to identify the proper orda reqiiesi o f the car manu-
facturer and to fin*t the inronnaiioa rdiiing t o this cider 
in the data base of the gearbox niami&cturer provided 
there b y the ehedt stock Web ser\ic& For instance, 
inrrrmalicin Bbcut items found to be available in stock and 
potentially rcsaved f o r this orda b y the ehtck stock Web 
service could be idcnti&cd b y d» cofrirfatt e ^ W d ) ser-
vice in the coarse of its processing. Finally, the offa is 
retumed to the control p T c e s s and w i l l be passed t o a 
check offer Web service of the cw manufecturer. This 
Web service wiD rttnm an 'OK' or Hejea* response to the 
control proces after having checked w b e t b o the offer 
would be acccptaUe to the car manu&ctnrer. 
The response bora the cheek offer Web service is 
passed to an order compledon Web service b y the control 
process. Depending on the type of response, thb Web 
service either completes the order processing within the 
gearbox manufecturer i f the rcspcmse vm "OK" or discards 
all intermediate i n thnnadoD such as ttaiu nserved for 
this transactiin ID ifthe response was llejea'. 
Afta the order completion Web service has term in at ed 
its taslc, i t mums a corresponding result to the eoatrol 
process thai, in turn, (rovidcs this ttsnll to the order Web 
service of the car manufactura as a response t o its own 
invDcadcn , thereby conqileting the uvkflow cf diis 
t^yi^ ^CT process. 
For die purpose of our discussion suppose thai die 
eeturol process coold be spedSed b y the car manu&eturcr 
03 a BPEL script and smt to the geabox manu&ctum for 
execmion. Reasons for (faing so could bo the ability to 
better adapt the irdcr processing with respect to commu-
•ication rcqoircmaits between the car nianu&cturer and 
tfic ^ c u b o A rnimirfifcT^^ '^'CT' oid t o reset fit^f^f i p cfaso^io^ 
requests concerning the workflow on the side of the car 
manufacturer. Ilcwevtr, unless the security issues related 
w i d i this approadi as discussed in the next sectim could 
be solved salis&ctDrily. the gearbox manu&ctura would 
001 accept dib remotely defined DPEL script for execu-
don. h should be noted diat die deployment o f the BPEL 
script f o r remote execution and the required f *fnifnl 
for compliance with local security policies coosttmies a 
workflow of its own not depicted in Figure 1. 
Za. Security PoUcj-lDdoced Rcstrictiou In 
Cross-Organbatlonal Btulaess Process Eiecotlon 
Wbm die ccctroning BPEL script u brou^t in from 
the car manufacturer for execmion tn die domain of die 
gearbooi manufacturer, the processing performed by the 
controlling business process will be subject to soeral 
rcstricticns derived from die security polictes of the gear-
box Tll^lllft^^^^'^^-
These securiiy policies may mandate thai die list of 
items daii are not in stock and, diocfore, ha^ -e to be 
ordered Com die sub-suppUas may not be disclosed to 
the car mamdacmrer and die respective competing sub-
supptiff for strategic reasons. The same will hold for die 
oedemials required for granting accss to the price quo-
tation Wd> services of the sid>«ipplJcrs. This mfbr-
inattoo may only be passed to the re3pecti\x sub-suf^er, 
but ncidio' to the competing sab*supplia' nor to the car 
manu&cturff fir obvious security reasons 
Other restrictions b the example of Figure I may 
rcqoire dial die list containing prices and delivery dates 
for die items to be ordered rctomed by each of the nib-
supplim has to be passed tmmodified to the catcalate 
offer Web service, die respective source of die lists may 
not be cooftised in orda- to allow for proper calculation 
of an offo to the car manufactura', and. finally, this 
information may also not be disclosed to the car 
mnnu&ctura- or die conpcting sub-supplier. Funhcr-
more, i i may be required (hat die ofTa containing prices 
and delivery dates retumed from die calceiatlon Web 
service is passed to die check order Web service of die 
car manu&cturer widioui any modiGcatioo in orda to 
prevent manipulation ofthisofler. 
3. Security Issues tvltb Remotely Defined 
BPEL Scripts 
As can be seen from the firegoing discussion, many 
restricaons relfcr to non^fisdosuxe of infbrmmion passed 
between Web services mOiin the control [nocsa to 
destinations outside die domain of the gearbox manu-
facturer, in particular to die car manu&ctorer. The laoa 
restrictim is cf spedal interest given die Oct dmi b our 
example diis very process is defined by exactiy die car 
manulanura who u restricted to gd some of the 
information bandied by diis process. Odur restrictions 
mandate that the values passed to a Web service oiginale 
ftora a particular otho Web ser^ -ice. 
Access unurol to Web services (e.g., [I,7J) and in 
particular rdc-bascd access control (RBAC) [ 1 0 ^ 1 ] may 
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only cover pan o f these restridicm. ^ l i a i addressed by 
access control means alone, cnfbi ccmfni o f non* 
disclosure of informitton outside the local <if*nmt wculd 
imply that access to the particuhr mfonnadon ntxild not 
be gnmted t o any p i t i c i p t t l outside the local doasttn. In 
oar example, the car manu&cturcr residing cutskle the 
local domain of the gearbox manu&ctoicr and, as a 
consequence; also the BPEL script defined and mvcdced by 
the car manu&ctura-. v.Duld DOI be gntntod access to 
vi&bihty icstiicted infbnnatioo thus prevoiting the 
ceatnl process of our example being remotely defined 
and dc;do>cd by die o r maoulactura-. 
Relijutioo of access resnictioos sucb as granting 
access provided the values passed to a Web service conu 
(han a particular source, for instance values relumed ficni 
a specific Web service, require infivmailoo Qow (b back-
« i m l 3 direction) to bo considered kr making dedsioni 
upcD gmnttng access of O O L Thus, infbnnation flow ana-
lysis has t o be applied in additioo to purely access control' 
oriented onnBcfaes, in onler (o cape with dus kind of 
resTioions. 
Restrioions with rcspea to visibiliiy of values returned 
from a Web ser\icc ere also not covoed by access cootrd 
measures alone. For diis purpose, informiiion flow (in 
forumd directico) has to be analysed, which means the 
fiiturc use of die values returned has to be taken into 
consideraiicii. 
WIdi the approach proposed in diis popcr, dtese restric-
tions dmvcd (nan the security pdicics at die location 
where a remrtely defined BPEL scrip! will be executed 
can be enforced using the methods proposed, inchiding die 
restriction diat die author o f the BPEL script is [rcdodcd 
from getting knowledge about i D f o m u d o D bandied by the 
business process b e hss spccifiod. At first s i ^ this may 
seem to be a restricdon contradictory t o itsdl 
The security issues arising wbei remotely deftoed 
BPEL sa-ipu arc to be executed can be condensed into the 
following quesnons: 
• Will die business process defined by the remotely 
defined BPEL script comply with die l o c a l security 
policies of the executing domain? 
• Which access privileges are required in onto to grant 
access t o die business process defined by die BPEL 
soipt (to possess the proper [mvileges (br accessing 
die resomces, in particular the Web services, encoun-
tered in the coarse o f its execution)? 
The second question is addressed by research conside-
ring access control [16,20]. even diou^ not necessarily in 
the context of BPEL script execution [MJ. The first 
question, hou-evo, is oontparatively novel since execution 
of remotely defined BPEL scripts a no t currcndy in 
widespread practical use and, ihffcfbre. security asprn^ 
inherent in dns wiy of using BPEL have not received 
significant sttmdon m prior roeordi (I1.12|. 
4. Rebtcd Work 
In the context of security cansidcmions of Web 
services, access control rcbted aspects play a central role 
and. dierefur^ arc wdl studied (eg. [3D. Research has 
also bem dedicated to access control with respect to 
business processes. In related work, Kodiutuisfci and 
MassBCci [16] address access centred issues of business 
processes defined by BPEL scripts, in particular die 
problem of pro\iding the required e\idcnoe of possessing 
die proper access privileges ai die right time to the right 
place during execution of • business process. 
Peng end Chen [21] propose an extaision to coo-
ventioul RBAC models called WS-RBAC. in onto to 
incorporate Web soviccs and business processes oo 
of dicm. In their epproech, Wd> services ore subjea to 
access conmil in pdoce of conunon system roourca in 
cooventimial approaches. Business processes and enter-
prises en dements tn dieir WS*RBAC model making il 
suitable fiv qiplicadon to collaborative business pro-
la other related ivork. Mcndltng et aL [20] investigate 
access contrd requirements of BPEL Kript-defined 
business processes. By atractmg RBAC models from 
BFEL saipts, and coovciting BPEL language constmcu 
in a formal suitable fiw a particular RBAC softuire com-
poncQi. diey provide on automated link of access control 
enrorccmcnt into business processes defined by die BPEL 
scripts. 
Algdnic end languago-faoscd approaches, not dedi-
cated spodfically to Web services, address die relition of 
programs and progranmung langiages v-ith security 
policies (8.I3.I7.22J9.311. From dieir point of view, 
these papers are comparable uith the scope of our re-
seardi, albdl from a diecretical view. Apfsoaches re-
quiring Sat analysis purposes, diat all programming logic 
is expressed by algebraic fbrmuladons such as 1^ -calcutus 
(«•«- [17]) may be of limited use in die field of business 
processes considering die program size of the platform 
running such business processes. However, some insights 
fiwi these theory-orimted papcn mi^ t be of interest 
also in diis fiehL For instmcc. Sabdfcld and Myers [22] 
poim out dial widi respea to infbnnaiton flow, static ana-
lysis being superior to dynamic anal>sis as it constders all 
possible execution paths of a program while dynamic 
analysis considers only one (usance of program exe-
cution. They also explicate die potential existence of so-
called coven diannds and emphasise die difliculiy to 
detect diem during mfwrnatioa flow analysis. Covert 
channels doiote means of information transfer that 
expldi medianisms not primarily intended to infbrma-
tioo transfer sudi as die number of iterations in a loop to 
leak mfbrmatun via externally ohservaUc program 
behaviour. 
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Other related work proposes runtime monitaring 03 a 
concept ftw security policy cnforccmml [23,28] m mobile 
or u n t r n f i c d rodr. Since these ipproacfccs require accen 
to liva byte code [28) o r (be prognm code ai cyston levd 
[24 JT], (hey mi^t also be of only limited use for being 
applied for analysing BPEL scripts and the business pro* 
cess defined by them (since neither Java byte code nor 
program code at system level is available for msiiuinoi-
lation or momtoring at the Icvd a business process b 
aecsted on a BPEL-enaUcd platicnnX 
Our ipproach. as described m | l 1,12], t rki tokeep the 
assessQcol of comptimce and die otcihods fbt analysing 
E e c u r i i ) ^ e v a n i smisntics of BPEL scripu as simple as 
possible, withom rtquirtng profmnd skills in qiecial 
fomulisms such as algebraic (bmnilaiion of prograntming 
logic: The methods proposed c i e based OD technology and 
methods wdl-known to devclt^ws of Web services and 
business processes in onlo to be comparatively easy to be 
a;q)lied aod , (berefore, could be 8ttiaai%x to be adopted by 
pTBclilioRcn in Ibis fidd. 
S. Schema for Security PoUdes Adapted to 
BPEL Script Execution 
One basic idea of our approach to cnfortina security 
policies with rcmotdy defined business processes is 
expressing ttie restrictions resulting fiom Aem in such a 
m y thai cfaocking of a BPEL script for compliaaoe to (be 
security policta is reduced to searching a BPEL scripl fa 
particular paoems that have been idmtified beforehand to 
be 5ecurity<ritical. T i i i apfrach is aiming t o allow as 
much fbictianality as possible for rcmotdy dcCncd bus i -
ness processes without jeopardizing (he security policy of 
(bo domain executiog these processes. 
Based on the results of ao analysis of BPEL as a 
specification bngia^ f o r its poential to define security-
cntini bcha^iotir, set out i n a fiirmcr pap? of (he anthers 
[12], security policies can be specified in tarns of pre-
sence or absence of such paltcms in a BPEL scripl (11 ]. Ii 
turns out (hai 'x« t^w'<»ttmt« Qf Web ECT\ice inwcations 
bsxiog special kinds of access rcstrioinis Imposed on 
dicir paramcien with certain language ooasunai of BPEL 
form the patterns that have to t K looked f o r when asses-
sing a BPEL script for compliimce with security policies. 
To allow fat bcocr undasomding of the schema ftir 
security policies presented hoc, we sumnuLrize sane in-
sights fhxn cui GmncT pipcn [11,12]. We have identified 
rix classes o f access restrioiois to Web aenr icc i as a 
w-fade or to dieir parameters induced by security pdicies 
(hat are desoibod i n Table I . lAtresorcted access ID a Web 
service (class 1) is inchided for completeness (hough it 
does Doi represent any acnal restriction, fa the example of 
Figure I , seveml parameters returned by the Web services 
tn\t4ved turned om to be subject to \isibility i 
(class 3) as discus»d above. Also, iopui parameten of 
Web scrvica resnicted to their vulues coming from 
specific sources (class 6) were found in this raample, 
e.g.. die Ibt of items passed to the price ^MOOaian Web 
scr^ics of both sut^4ifipllcrs had to be the lists <t^^'nfd 
(br the respective ntb-supplier r e n i m e d by the check 
stock Web service. Web service p a r a m e t c n of class 4 and 
S did not occur in this example, but rituaiims wben such 
restrictions may occur ate easy to imagine. For instance, 
(he Web service catcidaie offer could be augmemed w 
ctBuprise one or several fitrther input paremeEcn thai 
force price reduction in order to provide special offers. 
Such input parameters could be of class 4 wtcn a BPEL 
script sem fiom ihe car mamifactsrer would be allowed to 
I n v ^ this augrooi ted Web service. One of these new 
input poTBrneters could indicate a scale of disaaml, for 
iosunce, ringing frim I to S, with 5 leading (D (he 
highest rebate. A BPEL script from (he car manu&cturer 
could be rcs&ictcd to esc only one of these values (cLg., 
value 2% thereby obviously representing an example of a 
class 5 type of restriction. 
Ctara DmurtpOonelRamalon 
1 
Web •ovice wiib noramcied tceaa n all pRt> of raoBreci 
J Weti tavia vilh <iiiii(iady [ a t r i o e d acnn Le., Web •crrice f t e ti BOt to b« nitckcd U 
Web w u pDsneun vtib mrioal *ln!stity vf tad 
n l K K i a & n m l i o a tmAo v b titeM ftnrnnm b 
101 BHQVOJ to ovrid) fmtMc L U I C I U tkmum 
4 Web K n i c e pwmicttii wtih tesnocd me u e c s c that bom p a n o K U n an M •Ikmd TD be atoJ « all 
Web tavia p m n o n «iib l e v f c t E d K * of vabci aUovcd 
t i vntM acme t b c M tcpBt p v U M l c n s a y oaly ba ued 
viA tv^xnbcT valaa 
Web loviea vuaaam wuh valoa m wnu accxn l o n e a d 
D t p f f i f k ? y^pcr*. ftr (boe fnpoi panssoa txif TIIDCS 
ftotn p a i t i c n i v encat nnv fc4 ucd 
Table 1: Classes of Web service ecce&a 
restr1ctltHis(12] 
In Oder u> make (he ^eciflcatjan of security policies 
bctta suited fiir (he assessment of compliance, (he secu-
rity policy will be expressed in terms of Web services 
allowed to be in^ -olcEd ai all by such a DPEL script and 
die resn-iciioos induced by this security poUcy [M). Hie 
result of re-fpccifying security policies this way b called 
a security policy miemenl (SPS). For each of the Web 
services indicated in an SPS, the restrictiou with respect 
to its input and output panmem will be stated in tmns 
of the classes 3 ihrougji 6 of Table 1. 
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Lis t ing 1 : Ova r i i ) XML s tnic tura o f SP3 
As already prapcsed in ril)> the SPS diould be sped* 
tied in a madiinc-processiWe fonn. A i tlso bemg used for 
DPEL scripts and WSDL [6J qxcificadaos o f the Web 
services invoked by them, XNfL seenu to be a good 
choice fbr alsoEpedf^ing SPSs. 
For our prototype impkmeniBtioo of the assessment 
procedure the X M L schema in Listing I has been used for 
spedlying i n SPS [15]. For bct ia rodahiliiy (and 
because ^ lack o f space), the schema is depicted hoc in 
an BKF-like formal instead o f using XML-Schema 
in the listings. Therefore, an asterisk sign (*) 
behind an X M L element indicate that zoo, one or more 
occurrences o f that demeid t " ' " g allowed at this ptace. 
Similarly, a phis sign (•^) behind an X M L dement means 
thai one or more occurrences are aOimtd. Finally, a 
quotioD asA (?) behind an X M L element idmUlies en 
optional element that may occur once or may be absent. 
The element cdaa l a> r«fa> indicates the domain 
defining the BPEL soipt and the domain ^hcre it is to be 
executed in the attributes raaotaDoaala and l o c a l -
Dooaln, respectively. The application contcU (he SPS 
relates to can be spedfied in the aitribuie < i o e « l A p p l -
coo tax t> . For instance, for the car manu&ctnnr in 
Figure I a d i f l i smt set o f iccurity pdicy derived restrio 
tions could apply i f he would alio be enUilcd to remotdy 
define b^t^^^yy pi^^y<<^^ i l l the CQOtcxl of Cm iim^n 
cmstruction plans for new gcaitoxo with the gearboa 
The elements < m r i > and < l w i n > denote resnic-
tions with respect to enternal and internal Web services, 
one dement fiar each Web service indicated. Similarly, the 
dements <xmraa t r l eune*xna l i r s> and 
< iu i r a s t r i c tBxc«z i i « lWs> denote unrestricted external 
and btanal Web senices (class IX re^xxtively. 
In Listing 2, the structure o f the dement < « v i r s > is 
depicted. The clcmcm < ivc ra> bos o similar tntemal 
structure. The element <opmxmt.Loa» denotes (he name o f 
a Web service operadon and indicates the corresponding 
pert type by a URl. The <lopue> snd <oatpot> de-
ments indicate restrictions to the corre^mding type of 
Web service parameters, one for each type o f message t 
Web sv\ice CfBatioo is able to receive or send, re-
specuvdy. 
U s t l n o 2: Ex tsmal W 3 rvstr ic t lon statement 
Fran ' l«mg 3, the structure of the element <lDpnt> 
cnn be seen, [ i contains indicattons whether all input 
paraaeun or m l y paiticnlar ones are source restricted 
(class 6). I f so^  the roqutred origfnating Web scrvicc(s) 
(br a value to be allowed is indicated in one or marc 
< B « i v l c e > demeai(>) comainod in die caoorce-
B M t « i c c i o n > dcmaiL M e n Ihnn one such origbiating 
Web service may be indicated to allow for oltctnative 
I f not all, bm only ipecific input pstameters are 
restricuiL this is indicated b ihe <p«Tt> clement con-
tained in an <input>demcnL Again, itmoybe indicated 
wbelhv aD inpul paiameter cmtained in the message 
rcpramting the unicn of all inpsi paramctcn of a Web 
Ger\ice is source restricted or not (cUss 6). I f to, (he 
<pare> demcnl b tura onisins on d r m m t <aoarea -
Baate lce loo> (not indicated in Utt ing 3) with (he 
same mtcmal stnictiire as discussed abore fbr (he 
(levd. 
• tnu |CAiM*r> 
<mmrft€» ta t tTna-SaicOaElTn*' 
^ • f t t M ^ ' l — a t H i J — * / > « 
</••BsatSn tz l e t l«a> 
a i* A l l O T * * - • t r u I t kla*-> 
< | t i x t t U C r « l t u > . . . < / v « m ( t c < r a l B a > * 
< / « a l M a a A a t r l c t l « n > 
</V>xt> 
< / l j « a t > 
U s t f r i g 3: Input r u t r f c t k m a o f Wab sarvtca 
In addition, at the part levd diere u an optional 
bdicatioD (vin attribute d l « a l l o « r a d ) vibethci > tpedCc 
input pammeta tnay noi be used (class 4). This in-
rormaiioo is not provided on (he message level, that is, 
for oU input paiamctm al cnce. Such a ibanai i for in-
dicating dass 4 mtr ic t ia is for all input parameters has 
not been recognized as being required in ibe schona. It 
should be noted thai havmg class 4 restrictions for all 
mput paramctcn is not equivakni to a cbss 2 rotriction 
(br the Web cornice as a nbde. Thae may be cases, 
where it b (bttidden to pau any vahie « i ih a Wd> 
service m w a t i a n , but stUI die Web service is allo»ed to 
be m«oked (wilhoui passing any vahie to i l ) . 
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Funhmnve, via tho ittribute • a l o t S u c r l e t t t d it 
can be tndiatted 0 the psit level that a specific input 
papifpftfT iDsy ODiy be with r f r t**" values ( d a s 5)> 
The penniticd v i l u a are spedOcd in m e v more 
< p « r a l t t « d T a l a t > doncDts coatained in the dcaicm 
( p a r t x Obviously, the indkanon o f value restriction is 
only sensible at ihc pan levd. since the pennitied vatoes 
have to be specified icparatdy (br each mpul pasrtmetcr 
oSiKted by a dasa 5 rcsaiciion. 
To conclude the discusson of die X M L schema (br 
SPS, the t t i u a m of the clcanait <ootpat> is dcpctcd in 
UsUnB 4. Simibr to (he tndicatioa o f sounx restriction in 
the < lnpa t> elemat. vijitnlity resaiction may be 
indicaud on the tncssage level and CD the part ia.-d via 
anrilane v l v l b l l t t y B M t x l o c a d . As a special ease, 
visihUity restrictico may be relaxed to cope with the 
sitoaticn. in «hich one or seven] dcmains arc allowed to 
see sa othovise \-isibtlity<estrictod value. 
An example (or axh • retaxalion is the lists of items to 
be ordered from Che sub-suppUeis in Figme 1. These lists 
have their visibiliiy restriction relaxed, snce they are 
visibility restricted to all externa) domains except the 
sped fie siil>4upplia (he list is intaxkd for. 
c ra tpo t M S S A f * > * M i a s f 
« l a l b l l I t r S a a t r l a t « ^ ' t n u | f A l « a - f > 
< 1 u f a t a a l u A t 1 
< a M i l A n M - « a M l B U U - / > + 
*•--* * — * 
¥ l a l b U l l r B * B t r l c t K ^ * t r a a | r a l B a > ? > 
< / « n t « B t > 
List ing 4: Output r u t r t c U o n s o f Wab sarvlc* 
The rclaxxtiaD of visitnlity restridioD is inificated by 
the eleroem « c « r g a t s * l a x a c l a n > contnined «ilhin the 
<oatpDt> dement end contains one or m a r c t icn«lo> 
elemoiis to indicate the donuin(s) to whld i die output 
parameter may exceptionally be passed. Similar to the 
<lopae> detoait, ypfiratr parts of the nuijwit message, 
thai is, spedfic output paiametcn, amid be indicated as 
bang visibility restricted in one.or more etanents <p*r t> 
ctntaiaed b the <outputs dcmmL I f target relaxation 
applies to spedGc pans, this is indicated by < c « r g a c -
BalBxaclan> dements ocnioined within the <pare> de-
ments and Specifying the domaiii(s) to which the para-
meter may be passed The stnictu^es o f < c a r g « c B » l a -
u t i o u elemeots are the same ta message levd and ai 
pan levd. Therefore, the optional « u r y « t S a l A x « t i o n > 
demoii included at pan levd is not ihown i n Listing 4. Ii 
should be noted thai visibility restriction docs not apply to 
the Iocs! security domain «-facre the BPEL script is to be 
c x m i t t d Therefore; this doouin wi l l never be indtcaicd 
in a <dTiMin> elnnrnt within the elanem < t a r 9 f l t -
B « l « x a e l a n > . 
Once the security policy has been specified b such a 
tnonncr, the process of asseging compliance to the 
strictions imposed by the security policy for a panicuhtr 
p&flnff df idAd csn be performed flntornyt?f^lly by pBT' 
sing the BPEL script and the SPS in paralld. This b 
described in more detail in the next sccuon. 
6. Security Polity Eororremeot Bssed on SPS 
As atrody mentimcd, the pticcdure o f assessing the 
coniplisncc of a rcmotdy defined BPEL script with (he 
security polidci wi l l be performed pricr to the execution 
o f such 8 BPEL BOipL This fvxxedure can be considered 
a check point in (he sense of security patterns [32], An 
analysis pcrfonnod for (his putpose has shon-n that none 
o f the activities (ie., the language constructs of BPEL for 
specifying the I t ^ o f a business process) b on its ova 
o f any relevance with respect to potcntisl %iolntiais of se-
curity pdidcs [12). Only the combination of BPEL 
activities wi(h Web services and the values passed to and 
recci\-cd from them can exhibit any behaviour that might 
be in conflict with security policies. 
Therefore, the onalyns considcn the restriction classes 
of Web senices invoked by a BPEL script En conjunction 
with particular langisge constructs o f BPEL occumng in 
a BPEL script 
Aspects o f security polides resulting in completely 
restricted access (dass 2) for one cr several Web sovices 
can cu i ly be cn forced by looking (or invocau'ons o f these 
Web sovices in a BPEL script. I f no such fnvocaiion is 
present in a BPEL soripl, thai (he script is compliam with 
the security polidcs fioro which tficsc restrictians 
resulted. 
I f a restriction «i th respect to the use o f particular 
input parsmeiers (class 4) are to be enforced, this c m be 
achieved by checking that in invocations of Web services 
cQmpnsmg such [Uiaraeto^ the specific parameters o f 
class 4 are not used. 
The remaining classes 3, S, and 6 require m v e de-
tailed analysts of a BPEL script in orda to enforce se-
curity policies resulting in such res&iclians. I f restricted 
visibiliiy o f seme Web service parameters (ctos 3) b to 
be enfijrced, then infiirmaiiai flow analysis as to the 
fimher use of these panuneters after the invocation o f 
Web services u rcquhxd. In orda to avcnd tnfonnatian 
leakage, (he infbnnaiion returned by class 3 paramctcn 
most not be used in rfwtrttf^j IQ tiUgfH mmnrti* 
its "W«l visilriliiy domain. As a minimum, the visibi-
lity domain comprises the security domain uiiere the 
BPEL script wi l l be executed. 
Our analysb o f security-relevant semantics of BPEL 
[12] fnnho- has shown (hat m orda to avoid coven 
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channds [23] as oqrisined abof-x i l has lo be ensured, thai 
visibility restricted inlbmniiaD Is DOI used in certain 
langmge ccnstructs of DPEU f iv instance to define the 
dumion in a « a t t actinty or for loop coDtrol i n a w b l l a 
ecti\it)-. 
Restiictkos as to a sei of penniued values for input 
paiamettn are cilhcr compamivdy easy to be auessed or 
am DDI be anessed at all during an analysis prior to 
cxecutioo. I f r™**"** \'aluc3 are used (or those par^ 
meters, contpltmce assessmml is passible and may be 
roidily performed since the \^ocs o f the consunti used 
are known in the BPEL scripL Otherwise, i f « I u c s re-
turned from Web service invocations arc used kr input 
panuneters of this class, it is, m general, not possible to 
decide in a pre-cxcculioo analysis v,±.iA vshies vUl be 
returned. Thoefore, assesuncnl o f compliance uith ctais 
5 restrictions in ccmbtnsiioQ ni th dynamic vahies 
returned from Web service invocations can CDty be ao-
ccmidided i f these parametos ere treated as class 4 
parameters In this situation. 
In crdo' to enforce security policies resulting m rcstrio-
tiacis of the allowed u u i c a o f vahics used as input 
parameters (class 6), tnfonnuion flow annlyria con-
ddcring the history o f a variable used for this popose is 
required. This means, the soiree o f a vttat toed as inpni 
parameter of class 6 has to be determined by analysing (he 
infannaijcn flow from the point of in\t)catioa backwanls. 
b this analysis, all sources thai the currmt vahe ai the 
time of invocation could come frora have to be talxo into 
coniidcratiao. Therefore, aU actual paraQcl flows as speci-
Ged by the flow activity as u r l l as all potential paniDd 
flows u in the w i e c i i and p i c k activities have to be 
ccosidercd in backward infbnnBlion flow analysis in ordo' 
to determine utere a « l a c could come from. 
The prototype per{brming sudi a process o f ssscssiiis 
compliaoce of a DPEL script widi security policies has 
been implemented using Java {151. The BPEL script to be 
checked and the SPS defining the seairiiy policies are 
input to the piMotypc Fonhamare, the WSDL definiticsu 
(61 of aD Web services addressed in the BPEL script undo 
consideTBiiao ha\'e to be made ovailablfl to the prototype. 
Without execming the BFHL scripl, the prototype inspects 
it step by aep to msure, that the restrioions specified in 
the SPS are obeyed. I f any violation is detected, the pro-
gram stops its analysis and returns a Ui\ verdict It also 
indicates the location in the BPEL soipt ^v ing rise to this 
verdict togetha with the res&ictioa in the SPS violated at 
thai location. I f lhe inspecticn is completed without detec-
ting any violadcn o f the SPS, then the prototype assigns a 
paas verdict to the BPEL scripL 
Before the checks ui th respect to the diflcrent kind of 
restnctioDS described above can be performed, the 
dedini ion part of the BPEL script being checked is 
analysed to get infimnatieo about Web services poten-
tially invi ted during cjiecution. the message types used 
in such invocations (as defimd in the concqKoding 
WSDL scripts (br die paiticuhr Web service}, and the 
variables and thor respective types used for storing 
resdls ban and pasing values to Web service 
invDcaiions. Ftmhennore, the SPS is pmed and the 
informaiion ccciauied in it «.ill be sttved in instances o f 
Java classes thus farming an internal representatian of the 
SPS fbr (iinher processing. 
After conplctioo of this initial sop and staring the 
tnfbrnmioo gained during thb stage in insanca of Java 
classes defined fbr this purpose, the pnnoiype starts to 
analyse the activiticj of the BPEL script Each activity 
cncoontoed b treated separably, perCvmiDg the specific 
checks and actions associated with each type o f BPEL 
activity. 
As an eumple, the treatment of a Web service invo-
cation wiD be described in forther detail. As tfab 
treatment b the mo9 complex one in the assessRsni 
since all types of resniaiais may apply, describing the 
steps perfbnncd here gives an o v ^ e w of the actions 
pcrtamed by the prototype with any BPEL activity. 
l ^ n n encountering an lovok* activity, the prtnoiype 
determines the Web service bvdied and looks up (he 
internal representation of the SPS fiir the inftmnaiion 
presem ihereio fiv the ^ » d f l c Web service 
I f the Web service b not (bond in (he SPS, the pro-
cessing fiops becaasB tnvwaiioa o f a Web service not 
defined in SPS as being aOowed represents a violation of 
(he security policy. It should be noted (hal fix every Web 
service that b allowed to be invoked an eitry in the SPS 
has to o is t . 
[ f the Web service b fbund in SPS, the restrictions 
defined there are copied for fimhcr use. Since ihe output 
parameters of a Wd> service invocation are stored in a 
variable defined in the BPEL script, Ibe restrictions con-
tained in the <ontpat> element corresponding to the 
partiddar Web service are stared m the instance o f the 
Java class repicseniinB this variable, Alcog with (he re-
snictioQ^ the URl of the Web service invoked is stored 
in (hb variable for potoitia] later use m validadng poten-
tial source restrictions (dass 6). 
Usually, ihb process of storing the resnictions fbr the 
output pari of a Web service in the variable receiving dib 
output wil l override the infonnalioo stored (here with 
forma uses of (hb variaUe tn Web service invocations. 
Howe\er, i f die Web ser\-ice invocation wis found in o 
(actual or potential) parallel Qow (Le, uilhin a n o w. 
• w l t c b . or p i c k actiinty), that (he infonnaxion docs not 
ovmide the mfivmation already stored there. Instead, the 
informaiian to be stored in (be variable is labelled with a 
hierardiical flow identifier cmUing simultaneous cdlec-
don of informaiioD ndzted to at! potential paiallel infbr-
maiion flows. Thb way, the backward tntbrmiiion flow 
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analj'sis o n use (he restiicticns from all former psnOd 
infoniuiiaD Qcrn. When infonnaiian from p a n l k l Oowa 
is present and the smne MtriaUe u re-used as canoincr for 
the ompm o f • Web service the hjernnliiesl flow idemi-
fien stored wiib Ihe infbnnation has to te ccnsidercd u> 
decide uhicfa psn of (he infiinmticn to ovcnide and 
uliicb to keep. 
The variable as input "w^m^* to (be Web service 
bvoked is analyKd with rcspca to the aocuroulsicd ro-
mictions airBuly stared in i t This u i y it ts checked vAo-
ther visibility restricted (class 3) oifcnnuioD is contained 
in the vaiisbk to detanuae ^AxAia ccnflicts n i lh those 
restrictiau would occur by passing this mfbrmatioa to the 
cmmi l Web service. 
bi the case, d u s 6 restrictions are pfcscm for Ac input 
parBmeters of a Web service; the oripo o f the information 
contained in (he \-iriable «iU be used to assess conpliance 
or detect pocemia) DaoKXsnpltzDce n i ih these class 6 
resiriniaQS. 
Similar proccsshig as wiib the input and outptd para-
meters in on iDVQks activity applies to the r e p l y and 
r a e a i v * activities (and (he receiving paru in a p i c k 
activity), respectively. 
In order to prevcat covert chamds [22], the prototype 
takes a rigorous wppronfJi in disalloaing my visibility 
restricted infiirmatiOD to be used for flow control purposes 
(in the activities u l c , chrov, w a i t , w h l l a , • v i t c b and 
the timeoat pan o f p i c k ) . 
7. CoDcIudoo and Further Resrarcb 
We have proposed a method for specifying security 
policies in such a msmier that asscssmait o f cooiptiitnce 
of DPEL-defiocd business processes wi l l be gdlitated. 
The method is based oa an analysis of sccurit>Kclcvinl 
patterns that can occur b BPEL scripts [12J. Assessment 
o f compliancy partjcnlaily (he retjuired infbrmaiioD flow 
analj'sis can be performed *ftffwnaiieit\ty ^ tus \fr'7) 
shown by the realiation of a research prototype This 
method of security policy aifbrccment muaRy is applied 
prior to execution of remotely deflnsd BPEL scripts since 
ncilhcr testing nor manitoring of the business proocsses 
defined by (hoe scripts is involved. 
Thcrd ivy sbortcociings of-approaches rejuinng c x ^ 
cution of a script in order to observe its befaaviDur, namely 
the risk thai upcat detecting a violation of Rcnrity policy, 
the activity causing violaiiai could abody have passed a 
potm of no return sodi that Iniocepdon w n l d have bea 
exerdsed too laie to stop the activity and to p m c n i 
security vioiatioas from tioinmiTKd,, ire securely 
avoided in our approach. 
Howevo. (hough the proposed methods may fosur 
security ptAicy enforcemcDt bi BPEL-deCned business 
processes, (hey ere not mtaidcd as a replaconail of other 
secunt)* relsed nxchsnistns adihessmg compte 
purposes such ts saftguaxdmg external cuuuuunioition 
flows or prouctiOD against accidental or malidous tam-
pering tfthe execution envircnmau or BPEL scripts and 
Web services tnvoh-ed. 
Further utirk wi l l elaborate more sophisticated algo-
rithms for dftfOrng covert cfasmds (hao the current one 
in the prototype This aims to weakening the restrictions 
i m ^ e d to the use o f visibility restricted infbnnation fbr 
flow control purposes thereby permitting even more pro-
cessing diversity for remotely defined business procssrs. 
Another dimxicn of flnthcr wcrk uiU be dedicated to 
expanding the field of applicatioD of the mdhods pro-
posed to i*hT* areas beyoDd l ? f ' " c s i pi Tfff^T manage 
mem where simiUr circumstances with respect (o (he 
execution o f controlling scripts «TiUm ia a stxndanlized 
definition Uaguage prevail. One o f such an area could be 
grid corapmiDg where grid soviccs [26] arc being em-
ployed and BPEL be used for orchestratioo and choreo-
graphy o f gnd services in ordo to define gnd processes. 
AeknonrledgrmenlB. The amhcn are grateful to Boris 
Kir ic for his cuppon to daboraiing details o f the X M L 
sdiciia Ow (he definilioQ o f (he SPS and io implementing 
parts of the prWotjpe for en •ulomalic check o f BPEL 
Kiipts u i th respect to compliance with security pdides. 
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Abstract. In this papa results from research on security policy enforcement for 
cross-domain denned business processes specincd in BPEL are transferred to 
the Held of Grid computing, where BPEL is used to dcfme Grid processes. In 
order to facilitate the assessment of remotely deHned BPEL-based Grid proc-
esses for compliance with security policies prior (o execution, a method for 
specifying security policies with respect to security-relevant semantic panems 
in BPEL is applied. The paper shovfS the extent to which transfer of the former 
results was successful and indicates limitaiioos and areas of further research. 
Where the situation is similar to coopemtivc business processes, such as in 
forming dynamic virtual organizations using Grid technology, the results turned 
out to be transferable nnih minor modifications, whereas for a transfer to the 
Grid context in general fiirthcr investigatiDn is required (in panicular with re-
spect lo formal specification of securiiy-relevani semantics of Grid services). 
Keywords: Business Process Execution Language (BPEL). Grid Processes. Se-
curity Policy Enforcement, Information Row Analysis, Virtual Organizations, 
Grid Services. 
1 Introduction 
For the purpose of defining business processes on lop of Web services, Business 
Process Execution'Language (WS-BPEL) [IJ. usually abbreviated BPEL, has 
emerged as ihc de-facto standard for Web service composition [26]. In the field of 
Grid computing, Grid services (24) play a role similar to Web services in the field of 
business processes. Due to this similarity, BPEL has been found its way to application 
in Grid context for the specification of long-ninning pnxxsses modeled with BPEL 
invoking Grid services {e.g., [2,14]). Because of its analogy to using BPEL in col-
laborative business process (CBP) context, this paper proposes to transfer results of 
research on security policy enforcement for remotely defined business processes 
19.10.11] to a Grid process context 
In a CBP context, availability of BPEL-enablcd ptacfonns at every site involved in 
such a business process could be assumed, since this already is or soon will be 
C. Umbriooudakia. G. Pcraul. A.M. Tjoa (Eds.): TrtsiBus 2007, LNCS 4657. pp. I7ft-IS9, 2007. 
O Springer-Verlag Berlin Hddelbcrg 2007 
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common practice in enterprises engaging in CBPs. Therefore, gaining access to a 
BPEL-enabled node was not considered a motivatiGn for remotely defining BPEL 
scripts. Instead, location-dependent access rcstricUons gave rise to defining business 
processes displaced from the intended location of execution [9,11]. In a Grid context, 
however, the lack of access to a BPEL-enabled platform could very well motivate 
definition of BPEL scripts for remote execution since not every location having the 
need for defining Grid processes may be assumed to have local access to a BPHL-
enabled platform. In particular, having (local) access to such a platform may not be 
considered a standard situation in small or medium-sized organizations. Therefore, 
defining BPEL scripts for remote execution might be an interesting amendment of 
current stale of the art of using BPEL in a Grid context 
As indicated in our earlier works [10,11], security issues involved in this way of 
using BPEL-defined business processes (the same holds for BPEL-defined Grid proc-
esses) may impede practical application of this approach. When execution of remotely 
defined BPEL scripts is requested, there is first of all the uncertainty about the se-
mantics of the process defmcd with respect to their compatibility with local security 
policies that gets in the way of executing them without reservation. 
Making otherwise inaccessible Web services available to a controlling business 
process while still observing the security policy with respect to non-disclosure of in-
formation gained or access to resources granted by invoking such Web services was 
discussed in [11]. Since the conditions to be observed with respect to access control 
could be much more diverse in a Grid context [51, the investigation of generally grant-
ing access to otherwise restricted Grid services as the reason for executing remotely 
defined BPEL scripu is left to further study. 
However, the transfer of our results from the CBP context to the Grid context 
seems to be most obvious for situations where Grid technology is used for forming 
virtual organizations (VOs) [13]. In this context, the number of partners are limited 
and controlled by regulations for Joining a VO, particularly with respect to authentica-
tion and authorization. When remotely defined BPEL scripts are used for controlling 
Grid processes in VOs, there are many analogies to business processes defined by re-
motely defined BPEL scripts in the CBP contexL As with CBPs, local security poli-
cies of an organization offering resources for being used in a VO usually determine 
access to these resources. These policies will result in resuictions to allowed seman-
tics of remotely defined BPEL scripts that may be accepted for execution from a 
member of the VO. Such restrictions on allowed semantics may further restrict access 
to Grid services than access would be restricted by security policies of the sites offer-
ing these services alone. Reasons for this could be that allowing invocation of a Grid 
service in a particular context of a Grid process would violate a security policy such 
as prevention of generating or relaying mass c-mail from within the domain executing 
the BPEL script. 
In this paper, the method of defining security policies in terms of security-re levant 
semantics inherent in BPEL in order to facilitate the assessment of compliance with 
such policies will be transferred from the field of business processes to the Grid con-
text It will be shown to what extent this attempt is successful and where liim'tations 
and issues for further study exist 
A further aspect discussed in this paper is die possibility to delegate the task of as-
sessing compliance of BPEL-defmed Grid processes with local security policies. An 
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infrasmicture supporting ihc delegation of this task to one or seveml dedicaied nodes 
in a network or to specific assessment centers has also been introduced for the CBP 
coniexi (9]. This possibility may be of even more interest in the Grid context where 
typically many small to medium size computers, spread over diffeient locations, arc 
involved, not necessarily belonging to a larger organization (as typically encountered 
in a CBP context) that can afford or provide the effort required for the task of per-
forming the security policy assessment as proposed in this paper. 
2 Related Work 
Since security in the Grid context plays a panunoum role, much research has been 
dedicated to this field on Grid computing. In particular, research concerned with ex-
pressing security policies in the context of VOs are related to our approach presented 
herein. In [7], for example, a security arehiiecture for peer-to-peer-based Grid com-
puting is proposed where a security layer offering security-related functionality re-
sides between the Grid application layer and the communication infrastructure. This 
way, applications do not need to implement such functionality on iheir own. Security 
requirements may be stated by each member of a VO on a pecr-by-pccr basis or for 
groups of peers. 
In [27], it is investigated how security functionality can be made available to Grid 
services, in particular in the context of VOs. A security model for Open Grid Services 
Architecture (OGSA) [12] specifying security services to provide different security 
functionality is proposed for this purpose. The authors show how security-related 
specifications from the field of Web services can be used in the context of this secu-
rity architecture. In their paper, expressing security policies for using a Web service in 
terms of WS-Policy [3] specifications and publishing these policies together with the 
WSDL [61 specification of the service is also nftrire.«ed. 
It should be noted thai security policy expressed in terms of WS-Policy deals with 
the requirements for security mechanisms to be applied or provided for using a Grid 
service (such as certificates to be required for accessing a service, or encryption 
methods to be applied when communicating input and output parameters of a service). 
In a layered architecture for composing new services from existing ones, or for exe-
cuting processes based on existing services as proposed in [16], these mechanisms are 
to be provided in layers below the business process layer, since in the business proc-
ess layer (and particularly in BPEL) there are no means for providing communication 
security and for exchanging or checking security certificates. The security policies 
expressed in the two approaches above, therefore, address aspects of policies com-
plementary to (hose that have to be obeyed in the business process layer when re-
motely defined BPEL scripts are to be executed (as addressed in our former research 
[lO.I I ] and in ifais paper). 
Process algebra and language-based research, not dedicated specifically to Web 
services or Grid services, addressing the relation of prograins and programming lan-
guages with security policies [8,21] are comparable with (he scope of our approach, 
albeit from a theoretical perspective. Approaches requiring for analysis purposes, that 
all programming logic is expressed by algebraic formulations such as X-calculus {e.g.. 
[17]) may be of Umited use in the field of Grid processes considering the program size 
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of the execution environment running such processes. However, some insights from 
these theory-oriented papers might be of interest also in the context of Grid processes. 
With respect to information flow, for instance, Sabelfeld and Myers [21) emphasize 
the advantage of static analysis considering oil possible execution paths of a program 
compared to dynamic analysis considering only one instance of program execution. 
They also explicate the poieruial existence of soollcd covert channels (i.e., means of 
information transfer exploiting mechanisms not primarily intended for informaiion 
transfer such as the number of iterations in a loop to leak information via externally 
observable program behavior) and emphasize the difTiculty to detect them during tn-
formalion flow analysis. 
Our approach, as described in [9,10.11 J. tries to keep the assessment of compliance 
and the methods for analyzing security-tclevont semantics of BPEL scripts as simple 
as possible without requiring profound skills in special formalisms such as algebraic 
formulation of programming logic. The methods proposed are based on technologies 
and methods u-ell-known to developers of Web services and business processes as 
well as of Grid services and Grid processes in onler to be comparatively easy to be 
applied and, therefore, could be attractive to be adopted by practitioners in this fields. 
The insights from theory-oriented research with respect to information flow analysis 
and consequences of the considerations with respect to covert channels mentioned 
above, however, have been taken into account in our approach. 
Other related work proposing runtime monitoring as a concept for security policy 
enforcement in mobile or untnistcd code requires access to Java byte code as in [25] 
or to program code at system level as in [221. These approaches might also be of only 
limited use to be applied for analyzing BPEL scripts and the Grid process defined by 
them for compliance with security policies (since neither Java byte code nor program 
code at system level is available for instrumentation or monitoring at the level a Grid 
process is executed on a BPEL-cnablcd platform). 
Since the approach taken in our research allows for assessing compliance of BPEL 
scripts with security policies prior to execution, the shortcomings of approaches re-
quiring execution of a Grid (or any other) process in order to observe its behavior and 
to check it for possible violations during execution are neatly avoided. One of these 
shortcomings is the risk that upon detecting a violation of security policy, the activity 
causing violation could already ha\'e passed a point of no return such that interception 
would have been exercised too late to prevent security violations from being commit-
ted, which can be securely avoided by pre<xecution assessment. 
3 Security-Relevant SemanUc Patterns in BPEL-Based Grid 
Processes 
Based on the results of an analysis of BPEL as a specification language for its poten-
tial to define security-critical behavior, security-relevant semantic patterns in BPEL 
have been identified as combinations of BPEL activities and Web services subject to 
access or information flow restrictions to and from their parameters as derived from 
security policies [10]. In order to transfer this concept to the Grid context, the classes 
of security policy-induced access restrictions found in [10] are converted with respect 
to Grid services (GS) as shown in Table I . 
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Table L Classification of access restrictions to Grid services (adapted from [10]) 
Qass Description of RestritUon 
1 GS with unrestricted access to all ports of resources or information oETered 
2 CS with completely restricted access {Le., GS that are not allowed to be invoked) 
3 
GS parameters with restricted visibility of output values with respect to specific 
targets: information returned by these parameters is not allowed to be carried to 
specific targets ( L C , to specific other GS or to particular parameters of specific GS) 
4 GS with restricted write access: some of the input parameters of the GS ore not allowed to be used ot all 
5 GS parameters with restricted set of values allowed in write access: such input parameters of a GS may onlv be used with particular values 
6 
GS parameters with values in u-rite access restricted to specific sources: for such 
input parameters of a GS only values from particular origins may be used, that is. 
only values returned by a particular GS or a specific parameter of a particular GS 
7 
GS particularly prone to overload if invoked excessively. For these GS. maximum 
invocation rales or maximum amount of data passed to it that prevent overloading 
will have to be observed 
Whereas the term 'Web service* had to be replaced by 'Grid service* throughout 
Table 1, most descriptions could be transferred otherwise unchanged (classes 1, 2. 4, 
and 5) or nearly unchanged (class 6). Only the description of class 3 was modified to 
bcner fit in the Grid context and a new class 7 was introduced. 
While in the CBP context the restriction in class 3 was specified in terms of restricted 
visibility to targets outside the domain executing a BPEL script this distinction docs not 
always play an important role in the Grid context. Therefore, the definition of class 3 
was abstracted from the location where a target resides to generally express restricted 
infonnaiion flow to dedicated targets irrespective of ihcir locatioa Hence, restrictions 
will be specified in terms of specific Grid services or particular input parameters thereof 
that are forbidden to receive the values returned from these parameters. In order, for in-
stance, to prevent a list of e-mail addresses returned by a particular Grid service to be 
used for generating mass e-mail, this output parameter could be n:stricted not to be used 
as input parameter of particular other Grid services known to generate an e-mail to each 
address passed to i t Obviously, the location of die second Grid service (inside or oui-
.side the executing site) docs not mailer in this case. 
Unlike in the CBP context, where effective runtime mechanisms for prevention of 
overloading a Web services could be deemed to be in place (in layers below the busi-
ness layer) at a platform running these services, this might not in general, be expected 
from sites running Grid services. Therefore, a security policy of a site accepting re-
motely defined BPEL scripts in a Grid context could require that a process running on 
resources of this site shall not cause ovcrioad (running the risk to result in an inten-
tional or uninieniional denial of service attack) to specific Grid services known to be 
prone to overload when invoked in a particular manner. Since, In a Grid context ef-
fective nmtime prevention of overloading a Grid service shall not be expected to take 
place at all sites running these services, semantic patterns of BPEL potentially causing 
such overioad have to be identified and looked for in pre-execution compliance as-
sessment to prevent BPEL scripts including such patterns from being executed. 
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Table 2. Security relevance of semantic pattcma with primitive aciiviiics (adapted from [101) 
PrimltlTc Acuntics aas9 3 Oass4 CXaissc3 5/6 Class? 
invoka invocadoD of a Grid sen'ice IFA(v) w IFAfw/s) IFA a^? 
r*aelTe waiiinK for a messasc to arrive IFA(v) - - -n p l y sending a reply to a mcssafcc rvcdved - w IFA(w/s) -
u f l i g a assignment of values betueen two differau locations 
(relevani In I FA only) 
wait waiting for a spedRed amouni of time Uine(v) - - -throw indicailon of cxceptiaos sucb as failuics dunni; execution cxceiM(v) - - -
«8(pty no operation - - - -•Kit tenninatioa of a pnjass instance exiifv) - - -
w = obscnance of resuictcd use of inptrt ponimeiers in wtitc access to GS. 
IFA = infarmaiian Qow analysis, (v) with respect to visibility of values read from GS. (w) with respect to 
values wriuoitoGS, 
(s) wih respect to souroes of values tttiuen to CS, (a) with respect to arooum of data written. 
There are two types of overload thai may be caused to a Grid service: One lype is 
sending more data in on invocation of a Grid service than con be handled. The other 
type is invoking a Grid service at a higher rale than this service can cope with. There-
fore, performance-related restrictions related to these types of overload may be indi-
cated for a Grid service falling in this new class 7 in the Grid context. 
Table 3. Security rtlevancc of semantic patterns nith structured adiviiies (adapted from [10]) 
Structured Activities Class ^ Qas54 aasscs&6 Class? 
definition of a fixed execution order - - -flow parallel execution of activities - - -•witch branching between xevenl alteraaie activities dependinit on conditions stt-itch cond(v) - -
whil* iterative execution, loopinn loop cond{v) - - FO 
pick 
waiting siinulianeously for sev-
eral events to occur and pmcec-
ding with the event that occurs 
first (sec note) 
IFA(v) - -
tiin£<v) - - -
Note: Typically, one of lis events is & timeout cvail, while the other evenu are messages to arrive. 
[FA(v) = information Dow analysis with respect to visibility of values read from GS. 
FQ B invocation freqoency lo be checked against nmimuro. 
The security-relevant semantic patterns were adapted from [10] in Tables 2 and 3. 
For reasons discussed in [10], no such patterns exist for classes I and 2. While all se-
mantic patterns identifred in [10] arc also relevant in the Grid context and, therefore, 
could be transferred by simply substituting (he term "Grid service" for "Web service", 
some new semantic patterns were added as combinations of BPEL activities and the 
new Fcsiriction class 7 in the last column of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Hence, at-
tention has to be paid during compliance assessment to semantic patterns identified as 
being capable of generating high invocation frequencies of Grid services (in v b i l e , 
oequezxce, or f l o w activities, marked TQ* in Table 3) or passing large amount of 
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data to Grid services not designed for coping with such data volumes (in invoke ac-
tivities, marked 'TFA(a)' in Tabic 2). 
From Tables 2 and 3, it can be seen that information flow analysis is required for 
most of the semantic patterns identified as security-relevant in [10]. It should be noted 
that the security relevance of the patterns in Table 2 related to restriction class 3 de-
noted by 'timc(v)' (LC. duration of wait dependent on visibility-restricted value), 'ex-
cept(v)* {te.^ type of exception thrown dependent on visibility-restricted value), and 
'exii(v)* (i,e„ termination dependent on visibility-restricted value) as well as in Ihc 
same column of Table 3 denoted by "switch cond(v)' (i.e., branching dependent on 
visibility-restricted value), 'loop cond(v)' (ie., number of iterations dependent on 
visibility-restricted value), and again *lime(v)' is a consequence of the requirement to 
prevent covert channels as mentioned above. 
Making, for instance, the condition for choosing alternative flows in a s w i t c h ac-
tivity dependent on visibility-restricted information, consiituics a covert channel since 
this could enable an external observer of the executing process to draw conclusions on 
the values of such visibility-restricted information from the observation which alter-
native flow actually is being taken thereby violating the security policy of non-disclo-
sure of this information. 
4 Rewriting Security Policies to Support Pre-execution Security 
Policy Assessment 
In [9,10], rewriting security policies in terms of security-relevant semantics has been 
proposed to support compliance assessment of remotely defmed BPEL-based business 
processes with these policies. An informal checklist for stating allowed and disal-
lowed semantic pancms WBS introduced in [9] leading to a so-called security policy 
statement (SPS) when filled in to rellect the security policies of a specific domain. In 
the CBP context, such an SPS was defined domain-specific with respect to two do-
mains, namely the domain where die security policy is in effect (i.e., domain execut-
ing BPEL scripts) and the domain defining and sending BPEL scripts for execuiioa 
An XML-based schema for specifying an SPS in machine-readable form which has 
been the basis for implementing an automatic asscsstitent of OPEL scripts for compli-
ance with security policies expressed by such on SPS has been introduced in [11 ]. 
In the Grid context, rewriting security policies in such a way may also prove useful 
for assessing BPEL scripts with respect to compliance with these policies. Since se-
mantic panems hav-c been modified (definition of restriction class 3) and supple-
mented (paitems involving new restriction class 7) compared with those found in 
[10], the check list as basis of an SPS as well as the XML-based SPS schema for ma-
chine-readable versions thereof have to be modified accordingly in order to accom-
modate this new set of security-relevant semantic paitems. 
Unlike in the CBP context, an SPS may not be sensibly defined for a specific for-
eign domain, since Grid computing is concerned with a potentially large amount of 
foreign domains thai are essentially indistinguishable from the point of view of the 
domain executing the BPEL-defined Grid processes. Only in a VO environment, 
when the identities of members and their privileges to execute Grid services arc 
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known in advance, defining an SPS for each other member in the VO that is allowed 
to send BPEL scripts for execution could make sense. 
Therefore, with the exception of the latter situation, only one or a few SPSs without 
any relation to a specific external domain will make sense in the Grid context If more 
than one SPS will be specified for a domain, they are expected to be differentiated with 
respect to different application contexts for which they apply (e.g.. computational simu-
lation in a particular field, collection of field-specific data such as in meteorology). Al-
though details of application context-dependent SPSs are left to further study, it is 
anticipated that such SPSs will be (ighily bound to access privileges or roles classifying 
the sender of a B PEL script 
Specifying security policies in terms of security-relevant semantic patterns identi-
fied in section 3 requires an exhaustive list of all Grid services allowed to be invoked 
by a remotely defined BPEL script Furthermore, for every Grid service mentioned in 
this list the security-relevant semantics of the service and its parameters has to be 
known in order to determine the access restriction classes appropriate for each of 
them (cf.. Table 1). This requirement may cause additional effort since specification 
of security-relevant semantics may not be available for Grid services in the first place. 
It should be noted that unavailability of semantic specification (at least as far as se-
curity-relevant semantics is concerned) may prevent the approach proposed herein 
from being applied. However, unavailability of such specification may also prevent 
the applicatitm of any other pre-execution approach to assessing compliance of Grid 
processes with security polides. This holds independently of both the location where 
a Grid process is being defined and executed, and also the manner in which the proc-
ess is being specified (i.e., independent of using BPEL or any other means for speci-
fying Grid processes). In case of unavailable semantic specifications, the only way of 
enforcing security polides is monitoring the execution of a Grid process and interfer-
ing in cases when violations of security policy have been detected involving the 
known shortcomings of such approaches mcuiioocd above. 
However, much current reseaith is concerned with describing the semantics of 
Grid services in order to support identification of matching Grid services for auto-
madc Grid process orchestration ie,g.^ [18.201). Bringing the results of this research 
together with the approach proposed in this paper in order to define a framework for 
formally specifying security-relevant semantics of Grid services in terms of well-
defined (maybe even standardized) categories is expected to be an interesting field of 
fiirther study. 
A further motivation for research in this direction could be the endeavor to facili-
tate specification of-information flow restrictions of output parameters and value or 
source restrictions for input parameters wiUi respect to particular characteristics of a 
Grid service by denoting particular semantics bound to this Grid service instead of 
particular Grid services themselves. Such semantic characteristics could be "returning 
lists of e-mail addresses" or "causes sending e-mails to addresses passed". Means to 
specify restrictions this way would eliminate the need to analyze every potentially al-
lowed Grid service for falling into a spedfic restriction class if, in parallel. Grid ser-
vices and their parameters would have been spedficd in terms of such characteristics 
with respect to their (security-relevant) semantics. 
If such classification of Grid services would be available, then, for instance, in or-
der to enforce a security policy of avoiding the generation of Spam emails at a Grid 
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node, one could require that any output parameter with the semantic characteristic 
*'retuming a (poicniiolly large) list of email addresses'' must not be input to any pa-
rameter with the characteristic "causes sending e-mails to addresses passed". Specify-
ing allowed and disallowed semantic patterns with respect to such categories instead 
of individual Grid services and their parameters obviously would help to sboiten the 
content of an SPS considerably. How for this idea of categorizing Grid parameter se-
mantics for this purpose can be successfully based on or linked with research such as 
work on semantic Grid services [151, semantic matchmaking of Grid service com-
position [ 18], or workflow ontology of Grid services (4] requires further investigation. 
Such amendments of addressing semantic characteristics of Grid service parame-
ters in an SPS are expected to involve increased complexity of the assessment task 
because of required matching of SPS and semantic characteristics of the Grid services 
acmally used in a BPEL scripL Even before such amendments are available, it is not 
obvious and actually will require further investigation whether the assessment of 
compliance with security policies specified in an SPS is similarly straightforward as it 
has been shown for the CBP context by implemeniing a research prototype [ I I J . In 
particular, it is expected that covering semantic patterns involving class 7 restrictions 
in automatic compliance assessment prior to execution will turn out to be complex or 
even impossible to a certain extent since this class of restrictions addresses dynamic 
aspects of a BPEL script that obviously arc not easy to be analyzed in a static prc-
cxecuiion assessment. 
5 Delegation of Security Policy Assessment 
Since, as indicated above, the assessment of compliance with security policies may be 
more complex in a Grid context requiring specific skills or use of dedicated tools, the 
motivation to delegate this (ask to a specific node nr an assessment center may be 
higher in the Grid context than it already was in (he CBP context Delegation of com-
pliance assessment can occur in a variety of ways, as described in the specification of 
a security infrastructure enabling such delegation [91. This infrastructure can be trans-
ferred to the Grid context in a straightforward manner and some amendments specific 
for the Grid context are made. 
Assessment can be performed against locally or remotely defined SPSs. Such re-
motely defined SPS may be sent together with the BPEL script as a kind of assertion 
what the Grid process defined by the BPEL script is going to do or not to do with re-
spect to security-relevant semanucs inherent in BPEL and the Grid services involved. 
When this approach is taken, means for checking the proper relation and integrity 
of the SPS and the BPEL script may be provided based on appropriate certificates 
added to both the BPEL script and the SPS. 
A remouily defined SPS provided with a BPEL script may be checked against local 
security policy requirements. After positive assessment of compliance with these re-
quirements, the local site: 
• may decide to trust in the assertion provided by (he remote site and. after checking 
integrity of BPEL script and SPS. execute the BPEL script without any further 
compliance assessment, or 
• may initiate an assessment of compliance in any ways mentioned below. 
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Besides local or rentote definition of SPSs, there is the third alremati^ -e that an SPS 
may be defined centrally (e.g., defined by a central organization within a Grid envi-
ronment or agreed upon as a standard relevant to a Grid context). In any of these 
cases, assessment of compliance w\\h security policies expressed in an SPS may be 
performed in different ways: 
• I^ocally at the executing site itself. The potenUal problem with this approach as al-
ready indicated above could be that performing security policy assessment locally 
might be too elaborate a task to be conducted by small footprint computers (e.g„ 
stand-alone personal computers) or small organizations that cannot afford specific 
checking toots or acquire specific skill required for diis task. 
• Remotely (in an assessment center) on behalf of the site executing the BPEL script. 
The SPS will be sent together with the BPEL scripl to the trusted assessment center 
for checking compliance of BPEL script and SPS-defined security policies. In case 
of a centrally defined SPS, a reference to this SPS may be sent instead of the SPS 
itself. The results will be returned to the executing site as ceitified verdicts (i.e., 
passed or failed, the latter possibly accompanied by the reason(5) for this verdict). 
• (Not applicable for locally defined SPS) Remotely (in an assessment center) on be-
half of the site defining the BPEL script with respect to an SPS defined by the 
remote site or centrally defmed. BPEL script and SPS arc sent to the assessment 
center as in the previous case. The results of the assessment may be certified by the 
assessment center and sent back to the defining site together with the certified 
(with respect to integrity artd identity) BPEL scripl and SPS. The defining site may 
ihen pass the certified BPEL script and SPS to the executing site possibly accom-
panied by the certified results firom the assessment center. If an assessment center 
adheres to a published policy to only certify BPEL scripts and SPSs that received a 
passed verdict when checked for compliance, then sending the result from the defi-
ning site to the executing 5dte can be abandoned since, in this case, having a certifi-
cate from such an assessment center implies the passed verdict for the BPEL scripl. 
From the current point of view, these alternatives seem to be versatile enough to cover 
the requirements in the Grid context and. therefore, there seems to be no particular 
need for further research in this area. 
6 Conclusions and Furtlier Research 
In this paper, the results arising from research into collaborative business processes, 
defined using BPEL scripts at one site and brought to another side for executioo, with 
respect to assessing their compliance with the security policies effective at the execut-
ing site have been tnmsfcrred to Grid processes. The discussion has identified the ex-
tent to which such a transfer can succeed, with or without requiring ntodifications of 
the former results and the limitations and areas needing further study. 
The insights with respect to compliance with security policies could also be benefi-
cial for security policy enforcement of Grid processes in strictly local environments 
({.«.. when definition and execution of BPEL scripts occur at t l ^ same location in a 
Grid environment), since reformulating security policies such that the process of 
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compliance assessment is facilitated thereby possibly enabling automatic perform^ce 
of assessment could also be useful there. 
In the attempt to transfer the results from the C B P to Grid context, several issues 
for further research have been encountered. Amongst them the classification of secu-
rity-relevant semantics of Grid services and their parameters is deemed to be the most 
challenging as well as the most promising field for further study. 
Investigating how the approaches proposed in this paper could be applied based on 
Grid environments or Grid middleware such as Globus Toolkit [23] or OuiGrid [19], 
and what adaptation would be required in order to be successful in doing this, is an-
other interesting direcdon of further research. 
References 
1. Alvcs, A.. Arkin, A., Ask2ry, S.. Bloch. B.. Curbcra, F., Coland. Y., Kanha, N.. Liu. C.K, 
Kdaig. D., Mchta, V., Thaue. S., van dcr Rijn. D.. Ycndluri. P., Yiu. A. (cds).: Web Ser-
vices Business Process Execution Language Version 2.0. In: OASIS. 2006 
hnp://www.oasis-opcn.OTg/committees/downIoad.php/18714/wsbpel-specirication-drafi-
MQyI7.hun (last accessed 20(n-02-22) 
2. Amnuaykonjanasin. P.. Ntipairoj, N. : The BPEL Orchestniting Framework for Sccuicd 
Grid Services. In: Proc. lotemaiional Conference on Informatjoi) Technology: Oxling and 
Computing (rrCC'OS). vol. 1. pp. 348-353 (2005) 
3. Bajaj. S., Box, D.. Chappell, D., C:urbcrB, F., Daniels. C., Hallam-Beker. P., Hondo, M., 
KaJer, C, Langut^thy, D., Nadalin. A.. Nagamtnam, N., Prafullchandra. H., von Ricgen. 
C Roth, D.. Schlimmcr. J., Sharp, C , Shcwrhuk, J., Vedamuihu. A., Yalpnalp. 0., Or-
chard, D.: Web Services Policy 1.2 - Fniracw.-ark (WS-PoUcy). In: Worid Wide Web Con-
sortium (2006). http://www.w3.org/Submission/2006/SUBM-WS-Policy.20060425 Oast 
accessed 2007-02-25) 
4. Bcoo, S.. Cnnlatupo. B., Uiamnmrino, U , Mai&kanis. N. , Smridge, M.: OWl^WS: A 
Workflow Ontology for Dynamic Grid Service Composition. In: Proc. 1st Internationa] 
Conference on e-Scicnce and Grid Computing (B^CIENCE *05), pp. 148-155 (2005) 
5. Chadwick. D.W., Su, L.. Laborde. R.: Providing Secure C^rdinatcd Access to Grid Ser-
vices. In: Proc. 4ih Inicmaiional Workshop on Middleware for Grid Cony)uiing (MCG 
'06). pp. 1-6 (2006) 
6. Chinnici. R.. Moreau, J.-J„ Ryman, A., Weerawanma, S.(eds.): Web Services Description 
Language (WSDL) Version 2.0 Pan I : Core Language. In: Worid Wide Web Consortium 
(2006), hup://www.w3.orgmV2006/CR-wsdI20-20060327 (last accessed 2007-02-22) 
7. Deisch, A.. Gaspary. L.P., Borcellos. MP.. C^avalheiro, G.G.H.: Touards • Rexiblc Secu-
rity Framework for Peer-to-Pccr-bascd CJrid Corapuiing, In: Proc. 2nd Workshop on Mid-
dleware for (3rid Computing (MGC*04). pp. 52-36 (2004) 
8. Echahcd, R., Prosl. P.: Security Policy in a Declarative Style. In: Proc. 7th ACM 
SIGPLAN intcmaiional conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming, 
PPDP'05. pp. 153-163(2005) 
9. Fischer, K.P.. Bleunann, U., Fuhimann, W., Riracll, S.M.: A Security Infrastructure for 
Ooss-Domain Deployment of Script-Bosed Business Processes in SOC Enviranmcnis. In: 
PTDC 5lh hilemationaJ Netwtnk Conference, INC'2005. pp. 207-216 (2005) 
10. Fischer. KJ>.. Bleimann, U.. Fuhnnann. W., Furncll. S.M.: Securit)hRelevant Semaniic 
Paiiems of BPEL in Cross-Organisaiional Business Processes. In: Proc. 6th Intcmaiional 
Netu-oric Conference, INC'2006, pp. 203-212 (2006) 
266 
Copies of Own Publications 
Pre-«ecution Security Policy Assessment 189 
11. Fischer, K-P., BIcimann, U., Fuhrmann, W., Fumcll. S^.: Security Policy Enforccmcnl in 
BPEL-Defined Collaboralive Business Processes. In: Proc. Ist International Workshop on 
Security Technologies for Ncxi Generation CoIIabomive Business Applicaiions 
(SECOBAP'07), pp. 685-694. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2007) 
12. Foster. I . . Kcsselman. C , Nick, J.. 'Hicckc. S.: The Physiology of the Grid: An Open Grid 
Services Architecture for Distributed Systems Ifuegmiion. Globus Project (2002). 
http://www.globus.org/aUiaxice/publicationVpapers/og5a.pdf (last accessed: 2(X)7<02-23) 
13. Foster, L, Kcssclman, C, Tucckc, S.: The Anatomy of the Grid: Enabling Scalable Virtual 
Organizations. loL J. High Perform. Compui. Appl. 15(3). 200-222 (2001) 
14. Gannon, D., Kiishnon, S., Fang, L., Kondaswamy. G., Simmhan, Y., Slominsk. A.: On 
Building Parallel & Grid Applications: Component Technology and Di5tribmed Services. 
Ouster Computing 8(4), 271-2T7 (2005) 
15. Goblc. C , De Rourc, D.: The Grid: An Application of the Semantic Web. SIGMOD 
Rcc. 31(4). 65-70 (2002) 
16. Medjahcd, B.. Benaiallah, B., Bougueitayact, A., Ngu. A.H.H., Elmagarmid, A.IC.: Busi-
ness-co-business interactions: issues and enabling technologies. VLDB Journal 12, 59-85 
(2003) 
17. U , P., Zdancewic, S.: Downgrading Policies and Relaxed Noninterference. In: Proc 32nd 
ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL'05), pp. 158-170 
(2005) 
18. Ludwig, S.A.. Reyhani, S.M.S.: Introduction of Semantic Matchmaking to Grid Comput-
ing. J. Parallel Distrib. CompuL 65(12). 1533-1541 (2005) 
19. OuiGrid, http://www.ourgrid.org. (last accessed: 2007-02-23) 
20. Ren, K., Xiao. N.. Song. J.. Chen, T.. Zhang. W.: A Model for Semantic Annotation and 
Publication of Meteorology Grid Services in SMGA. In: Proc. 5th International Confer-
ence on Grid and Cooperative Computing Workshops (GCCW06). pp. 496-503 (2006) 
21. Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C: Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE Journal on 
Selected Areas in Communicalions 21(1). 5-19 (2003) 
22. Scknr. R., Vcnkatakrishnan. V.N.. Bosu, S., Bhaikar, S., DuVamey, D.C.: Model-Carrying 
Code: A Practical Approach for Safe Execution of (intrusted Applications. In: Proc. 19ih 
ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP'03). pp. 15-28 (2003) 
23. The Globus Toolkit, hup://www-unix.gIobus.org/toolkil (last accessed: 2007-02-24) 
24. "Hiecke, S.. Czajkpwski. K., Foster, 1., Frcy J., Graham. S., Kcsselman. C . Maquirc. T., 
Sandholm. T., Snelling, D., Vandeifcili, P. (cds.): Open Grid Services Infrastructure 
(OGSI) Version 1.0", Global Grid Forum (2003) htlp7/www.ggf.org/documcnts/GWD-R/ 
GFD-R.0I5.pdf Oast accessed: 2006-11-16) 
25. Vcokaiakrishnan, V.N.. Pent, R.. Sekar, R j Empowering Mobile Code Using Expressive 
Security Policies, hi: Proc. New Security Paradigms Workahop'02, pp. 61-68 (2002) 
26. Wang, H.. Huang,* S2.., Qa, Y.. Xie, J.: Web Services: Problems and Future Directions. 
Jounml of Web Semonucs 1 (3). 309-320 (2004) 
27. Welch, v., Sicbcnlist F., Foster. I . . Bresnahan. J„ Czajkowski. K.. Gawor. J., Ke&sclman. 
C . Meder. S.. Pearlman, L.. TUecke. S.: Security for Grid Services. In: Proc. I2th IEEE 
International Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC*03). pp. 
48-57 (2003) 
267 
